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Brief summary:
This thesis takes up the intimate link between migration realities and the necessity to 
ensure security on the territory of nation states. Unluckily, migration has the same 
effect as international terrorism, i.e. blurring the borders between an external and 
international security dimension. Therefore migration management is often 
understood as migration control. But the security dimension of migration gets 
sometimes too predominant, neglecting human rights of individual migrants. National 
policies are influenced by a wide range of actors within the society, who contribute to 
focusing the debate more on the integration rather than the control dimension, even if 
the majority of public opinion has anti-immigrant positions. Germany will provide the 
case study for analysing the national level. An economics, laws and politics triangle 
provides the basic analytical framework. The emergence of a securitised migration 
approach on the EU-level is linked to the willingness of member states to cooperate 
on this sensitive issue. Other cooperation processes occur outside the EU 
framework, but it is generally not less focused on security and control. Illegal 
migration is particularly outlined here, even if it is extremely difficult to get statistical 
data for scientific foundation. Criminal networks are also often trans-national, which 
makes cross-border cooperation indeed effective. But the vulnerability of individual 
migrants within societies, particularly those living in illegal situations, ought not to be 
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Glossary
Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration 
end of work recruitment ordered by the 
German government on 23.11.1973 
term used by Genscher: abuse of the asylum 
system
extradition treaty
expelled or returned expatriates of German 
ethnic origin
federal border control agency 
regional entity of the federation (16 in all) 
federal parliament (region representation) 
federal parliament
Federal Constitutional Court of Justice 
Central and East European Countries 
Christian-democratic party (in Bavaria only) 
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) Christian-democratic party of
Germany 
Czech Republic
Extreme right-wing party (German popular 
union)
German-ness: debate over the German identity 
term used by the SPD disagreeing with this 
debate launched mainly by the CDU/CSU 
German trade union 
European Refugee Fund 
“police state”— minimalist definition of the tasks 
of a state: guaranteeing a nation’s security 
fingerprint database for asylum seekers (EU) 
repressive measures of the government 
against extremist movements 
Freiheitlich-Demokratische Grundordnung (FDGO) free democratic fundamental order 

























EU Agency for the Management of External 
RorHers
(temporary) guest-workers, recruited in the 
1950s-70s on the basis of work contracts: often 
stayed after the end of the contract 
Fundamental Law in FRG since 1949 
regional parliament (federal system of FRG) 
“leading culture”: debate over the integration of 
foreigners
Linkspartei Left-wing party since 2005








Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)
Schicksalsgemeinschaft
SIS
principle, according to which a refugee cannot 
be expelled if facing a life-threatening situation 
Qualified Majority Voting 
Legal Assistance Treaty 
freedom  to  travel












cf. Aussiedler, yet arriving to FRG after 1994 
statistical federal agency 
third country nationals
minister meetings against terrorism, radicalism, 
extremism and international violence 
excessive proportion of foreigners among the 
German population 




1) Framing and outlining the relevance of the topic
In October 2004, European Union (EU) justice and interior ministers met in 
Luxembourg in order to drive the process of a common asylum and immigration policy 
forward. The deadline for such a common EU policy was set for 2010, which shows that 
it is a topic that ministers do not easily agree upon.1 In the actual context it is unlikely that 
a common Europeanized immigration policy will be agreed upon, because states do not 
want to lose control in controlling migration or preventing crime. A cause for this is the 
fact that migration challenges one of the oldest tasks of a sovereign state, i.e. 
guaranteeing security to nationals, be it within or outside the territorial boundaries. It 
blurs the lines between traditional definitions of external or internal security, a 
characteristic shared with global terrorism, which contributes to equating migration with 
the issue of security. Surreptitiously, managing migration has thus been increasingly 
understood as making sure that potential criminals/terrorists are kept out of the borders 
of the national (or EU) territory.
Besides national migration policies and laws (i.e. against illegal migration), the EU 
approach to migration and security with the establishment of the EU Agency Frontex in 
Warsaw is important to underline. In what way does migration affect the legitimacy and 
the traditional role of nation-states? One of the main effects on or through the lens of 
state sovereignty in handling the reality of migration is that states are simply not ready to 
push the issue on the EU level, despite the creation of the mentioned agency. It also 
means viewing migration more and more as a threat, as created through mainstream 
security discourses by governments, security agencies and the media, which in turn stirs 
up popular believes and fears, populism and radicalisation on the domestic scene.
The EU is not a specific case, as current protest movements in the USA against 
tightened migration laws prove it. Migration is an inherently international issue, in which 
dialogue between governments has become necessary, but also ever more difficult with 
the fight against terrorism remaining top priority. The efforts of the IOM and UNITAR in 
2006 to favour intergovernmental dialogue are significant indicators of the importance of 
migration in global politics. Furthermore, immigrants in their various categories (asylum 
seekers, labour migrants, family reunifications...) are protected by international law
1 K. Bennhold, “EU ministers set deadline on immigration policy” (26.10.2004), International Herald 
Tribune, Available [online]: 08.06.2005, on: http://www.iht/com/articles/2004/10/25/news/immig.html
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regimes, making democratic states, which are dedicated to the cause of human rights 
(HR), responsible for them.
Nonetheless, one of the most attractive features of this research topic applied to 
the EU is its actuality and relevance at a time, part of the EU deals with the future 
integration of the new member states (MS) into the Schengen zone and when national 
governments such as Germany, France or the Netherlands discuss deep-going reforms 
in their migration policies. National immigration policies and laws influence continuously 
the EU process on its way of establishing a common asylum and immigration policy. This 
however cannot be interpreted as strengthening the entities of the state, but rather as its 
weakening point— the intimate link between migration and security lies at the bottom of 
the entity of the nation-state itself. Not emerging from, but getting new relevance and 
visages through globalization, getting the balance right between migration and security 
needs is therefore at the heart of the 21st century challenges on all the levels involved.
2) Assumptions, hypotheses and methodological construction
International migration can be regarded as being either an independent variable, 
which explains various social and political changes in the EU. Here however, the 
assumption is reversed, i.e. international migration is a dependent variable, the 
understanding of which is shaped by institutions within receiving states and by relations 
between the states.2 Out of this perspective emerges another core assumption 
throughout this work: governments and the EU have handled migration predominantly 
under its security aspects. Critics have called this an evolution towards a “fortress 
Europe”, free inside but difficult to penetrate from the outside; international observers 
have also issued worries that selective migration will harm the overall cause of 
refugees.3 The major aim of the thesis will be, on the one hand, to discuss evolution and 
implications of migration policies based on border control, also in terms of illegal 
migration (only randomly evoking issues like family reunification or labour migration when 
necessary); on the other hand, broader implications of migration management will be 
outlined, which make it necessary to go beyond the territorial aspect of security.
It is expected that the gradually evolving communitarian EU approach in migration 
and asylum issues goes into the same direction as its MS in terms of prioritizing the
2 Cf. A. Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London/Thousand Oaks/New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005, p. 2f.
3 M. Sunjic/N. Prokopchuk, “Fortress Europe: The wall is getting higher” (26.04.2006), UNHCR, 
Available [online]: 03.05.2006, on:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/UNHCR/b81f202eecb8f80d4a4d8f9c97dfb6cc.htm
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security-based definition. It is not the endeavour of this work to determine how the EU is 
capable to influence MS, but rather as is argued here that both entities are tightly 
intertwined and that they go into the same direction. A second hypothesis is that more 
restrictive immigration policies do not find their roots in an objective threat emanating 
from immigrants, but are often captured by political parties in order not to lose votes to 
the far-right. Finally, a third hypothesis is that stricter border controls might have a 
reverse effect, favouring the formation of cross-border smuggler networks through the 
restriction of accessible legal options and thereby do not contribute to limiting the crime 
element of illegal migration, but rather harms immigrants altogether.
The reasons for an ongoing securitization of migration are various and can be 
found within the multi-disciplinary nature of migration itself, at the crossroads of 
demography, economics, history, law, political science, sociology and anthropology.4 
Each discipline tackles migration from a different perspective, which in turn shapes the 
choice of the levels or units of analysis to be emphasised. Micro-level research analyzes 
more concretely how larger forces shape the decisions and actions of migrating 
individuals or families and, by extension, how communities are affected by them. 
Structural political, legal and economic conditions shaping migration flows are tackled by 
the macro level of analysis. The units of analysis can vary as well, focusing on 
individuals (economics, anthropology or law in case studies), the population 
(demography, history), the state or/and the international system (political science) and so 
on. Since the 1990s quite a few researchers have called for more interdisciplinary, cross­
national research projects (Castles, Massey, Brettell and Hollifiled among others). Still, 
the broad perspective has to be narrowed down to fit the research aim in this work.
Mainly political, economic and legal factors (cf. pp. 18ff.) will be therefore taken 
into account; where necessary, statistical demographic data will be used. The macro­
level of analysis will be given preference, because the aim is to discuss policies 
determining rules of entry and exit and thereby regulating migration flows. The primary 
units of analysis will be the international system itself, encompassing international law 
and organisations active in this sphere, the EU- and the national level. Due to material 
reasons (mainly lacking language proficiency to analyse the national legal frameworks 
and political debates), it was not possible to make a cross-national comparison of the EU 
MS. The national level will therefore be represented by Germany due to its geo-strategic 
position, historical evolution and contemporary political debates.
4 C. Brettell/J. F. Hollifield, Migration Theory— Talking across disciplines. New York/London: 
Routledge, 2000, pp. 1-26
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The main methodological approach applied here is qualitative analysis;5 some 
statistical demographic data will be used when trying to get a better picture of the 
German national situation (e.g. in terms of the evolution of foreigners’ criminality). The 
focus however will lie in the analysis of government policies and actions, especially 
because statistics were not as pertinent to use as expected (quantification methods and 
definitions used by official federal bodies in Germany changed in 2004). Primary sources 
will mainly be legal texts, but also speeches and statistics; the secondary sources will 
heavily rely on research articles, books and news articles providing information on policy 
impacts on the societal level. The dependent variables are government or EU policies 
(admissionist vs. restriction ist and their shifts) and their outcomes (integration and 
control), determined by impacts from new global security threats. Independent variables 
can be institutions and legal rights, as well as interests guiding decision-makers. To get 
insight-knowledge and perspectives on these issues, interviews with responsible 
authorities would have been excellent, but it was an unrealistic method to realize within 
the limited network and time frame available for this research. Analysing media 
approaches can at least indirectly circumvent these limits.
3) Structure of the thesis
The structure of the work will be as follows: An introductory chapter will define and 
analyse the concepts of security and migration, as well as the consequences of their 
interconnectedness in a global world. The main argument will be the fact that migration is 
blurring the traditional external vs. internal security concept, thereby leading to a 
securitized approach to migration itself. The chapter will outline the ways, in which 
migration challenges nations’ conceptual, organisational and territorial boundaries, 
leading to more restrictive migration policies. Main security threats emanating from the 
post-cold war context and radicalisation of terrorism support this evolution.
The following chapters will be dedicated to the levels analysed more in depth. The 
second chapter will therefore give a more specific account of the evolution towards 
initiatives in migration policies on the EC/EU level, starting with the principle of free 
movement of persons since the Treaty of Rome. It shows that the 1990s have been 
particularly important for the establishment of migration approaches, particularly since 
the issue was moved from the third pillar to the first pillar in 1999. Current texts adopted
5 Ch. C. Ragin et al., “Political Methodology: Qualitative Methods”, A new handbook of political 
science, Chapter 33, ed, by Robert E. Goodin/Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford/New York, 1996: pp. 750-768
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by the Commission or the European Council, proposed by the European Parliament (EP) 
will show the direction EU has taken in recent years, despite some reticence from the 
side of MS. A sub-chapter will narrow down the broad perspective to the area of central 
Europe, currently preparing to enter the Schengen zone and responsible for border 
management to the eastern EU border. This makes sense as national immigration 
policies are partly influenced by fears of Western EU people that the 2004 enlargement 
to the East would also let in a flow of migrants from geographically closer crisis regions.
The third chapter will give an in-depth analysis of the national level, based on the 
case study of Germany: the country is particularly interesting for its specific migration 
patterns and recent evolutions in immigration policies. Its geographic position at the 
border of Central Europe has led Germany to be active in the EU enlargement process. 
The country has also been particularly approached from asylum seekers and refugees in 
the 1990s; therefore, Germany became a promoter of the Europeanization of migration 
policies. The perspective will draw heavily on the above-mentioned three-fold analysis in 
political, economic and legal terms. Some discussion will be dedicated to the situation of 
crime when linked to migration in order to analyse whether policies have become more 
restrictive. The goal is to test the hypothesis as far as possible of whether strict border 
control is efficient against crime when there is a link to migration. This was indeed the 
most problematic point of the thesis, since it was not possible to rely too much on 
statistical data; this problem has been outlined by most researchers specialised on 
German (illegal) immigration as well. Understandably, the nature of illegal migration as 
such makes it difficult to find reliable numbers on them. Because of the federal system of 
the country, the chapter will dive into the Länder level and will analyse the societal 
debate between political parties, interest groups and private actors.
The fourth chapter summarizes the interconnectedness of German and EU policy 
evolutions, although the linkage will be mentioned throughout the thesis where 
necessary. It was not possible to include an analysis of the international level within the 
scope of this work, even if it is not less crucial, particularly for such a global phenomenon 
as migration and security. Therefore, the international legal framework and some 
international and intergovernmental cooperation initiatives imposing duties on Germany 
outside the EU framework will be at least briefly outlined in the end. Cross-border 
problems and policy responses ought to be dealt with by constructive dialogue among 
governments on all levels, also relying on international organisations as mediators. 
Regional cooperation, e.g. between Bavaria and the Czech Republic has just as positive 
effects on migration management. But the HR dimension for individual migrants has to 
be given more attention in these cooperation processes.
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Chapter I: The challenge of migration to national security
policies
A—Contemporary context: security and human rights as main tasks of the state
a) Globalization and new threats: new perception of the notion of security
i. Traditional role o f the state: ensuring a nation’s external and 
internal security
From the end of World War II (WWII) to the start of the 21st century the notion of
security has acquired diversified meanings moving from a mainly military definition to
incorporating a human, ecological, economic, financial, health dimension etc. The
Universalis Encylopaedia defines security as:
“1. absence of danger; 2. confident and tranquil state of mind in a context of 
absence of danger (real or imaginary absence! there can be a false impression 
of security); 3. button tha t blocs the functioning of an instrument, an 
armament, a machine” .
In a broad sense, the third definition can be seen as anything perturbing a system 
from working. In a strictly traditional concept of state theory, it is one of the principal 
duties of a state to ensure the internal and external security of the nation (minimalist 
state definition, so-called Etat-gendarme). Max Weber well defined a state as being a 
form of political organisation characterised by the monopoly of power of constraint on a 
given territory and a given population, and by a set of stable judicial rules (constitution, 
laws). Over time, states have extended their role until the emergence of Beveridge’s 
British Welfare State (WS) system in 1942. Since then, various liberal ideologies have 
emerged to reduce the state’s role back to a minimal one: what remains in the core of its 
tasks is the issue of assuring the security of a population on a clearly defined territory.7
To tackle a possible danger from its roots, sources and targets have to be clearly 
defined, meaning that the community to be protected and the enemy posing a threat 
have to be apparent. In 1932, Weber’s colleague and Nazi state-counsellor Carl 
Schmitt— supporter of a strong state entity— saw the criteria of “the notion of politics” in a 
friend-enemy distinction, which helps state authorities to form a clear notion of belonging 
by shutting away outsiders. It is this distinction, according to him, that transcends any
6 “Définition: sécurité”, Encvlopediae Universalis. DVD-Version 8, 2002
7 J.-Y. Capul/O. Garnier, Dictionnaire d’Economie et de Sciences Sociales. Paris: Hatier, 1999, pp. 
168-179 ; C. Roux-Lanier et. al., La Culture Générale. Paris: Hatier, 1998, pp. 133f.
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community into a political unity.8 His theory had provided the basis for strengthening the 
Nazi regime; but if taking this ideological dimension out, the theoretical framework is 
valuable to explain international relations during the Cold War period, in which the world 
was clearly defined in dogmatically centralized boundaries and firm ideologies, in central 
organisations and rigid, near-impenetrable borders.9
The 1989/90 events, and later 9/11, were decisive turning points in recent world 
history. The inherent change can be seen in the fact that threats have to be increasingly 
faced collectively. Gradually moving from a clear system of nation-states to one of a 
“planetary village” (McLuhan)10 where many phenomena are inter-linked, most security 
threats do not stop at state borders and can have dramatic, far-reaching effects both in 
geographic and time dimensions. Particularly the attacks on the US World Trade centre 
made it clear that threats had themselves changed in nature, moving away from clear 
identities, traditional warfare and standing armies towards guerrilla fights and non-state 
actors. Other societal security issues, such as interstate or internal migration, 
environmental protection, food and water security and job security have long been 
regarded as mere domestic political issues.
Yet despite the fact that threats have changed, that enemies are not visible as 
states used to be and that their motivations are neither quest for territorial gain nor power 
expansion (except in a religious way in the case of extremist fundamentalists), responses 
to them remained guided by a traditional (realist) view of security. Thus, the reactions to 
9/11 were perpetrations of military attacks on clearly defined territories (i.e. Afghanistan 
and later Iraq) despite the fact that enemies had not yet been clearly identified. Ironically, 
the attitude to attempt defining an enemy against whom to ally remained unchanged; the 
international community had trouble overcoming ideologies it had been embedded with 
over the past 50 years and thus addressed (and aggressed) once again the state level.
ii. Contemporary world politics blurring the line between internal and 
external security dimension
The changes that did take place in world settings were quite abrupt. As Jowitt 
outlines, the world moved to a world, in which the borders of territory, ideology and
8 C. Schmitt, La notion de politique. Théorie du partisan. Paris: Flammarion (Champs collection), 1992
9 Cf. N. Poku/D. T. Graham, “Redefining Security for a New Millenium,” in: Poku, Nana/Graham, David 
T., Redefining security— Population Movements and National Security, eds. Pokus/Graham, Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1998, pp. 1-3
10 M. McLuhan, Guerre et paix dans le village planétaire. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1970
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issues were gradually attenuated, becoming unclear and diffuse.11 Warren Christopher 
enumerates these new threats as follows: ethnic and religious conflicts; weapons of 
mass destructions in the hands of unstable powers; outbursts of old rivalries in the 
Middle East, in Europe and Asia; various global challenges ranging from AIDS and 
overpopulation to the destruction of the planet’s support system. It has now been 
accepted among security specialists that the traditional definition of threat in military 
terms and with clearly defined ideologies linked to a political regime is passé.
Ex-US president Clinton pointed out already in 1993 that the division between 
what is domestic and foreign does not longer hold; the greatest threats to the global 
system tomorrow stem from what we name “internal” today. It entails that such dangers 
cannot be handled by distinct entities alone. In security terms, this has frequently meant 
relying on resolutions and interventions of the UN Security Council. Another development 
blurring state borders is the enlargement and integration process of the EU. Part of its 
driving force can nonetheless be seen in the same endeavour to find solutions without 
being limited by state entities. The 21st century also set out a warning to the EU with the 
Madrid bombings in 2004. Although Spain for example was used to dealing with terrorist 
acts because of ETA, the Madrid bombing stemmed from global actors (the network Al 
Quaeda has become a near-synonym for this new phenomenon). In December 2003, the 
European Security Strategy “A secure Europe in a better world” named terrorism, 
weapons of mass destructions, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as 
the new key threats. As Guéhenno argues, a tight and effective international cooperation 
becomes necessary in a world, where “[...] the solitary individual is face-to-face with a 
globality, which cannot be mastered, but which cannot be ignored e ithe r,12
The global state entities themselves have ever more become main sources of 
threats for their citizens. Rather than facing military attacks from one state against 
another, individual human beings found themselves in situations of catastrophic 
insecurity, induced by the inability of (the international system of) states to provide 
protection (even when states were not themselves the perpetrators). Not external threats 
by enemies outside state borders (according to the traditional military security concept), 
but oppressive policies from their own governments were the sources of fear for the 
citizens. Human rights (HR) abuses have led to sadly known genocides in Rwanda, 
Indonesia or ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
A redefinition of the security concept (moving towards a concept of human 
security, rather than national-state security) has therefore become urgent. Baldwin bases
11 Quoted in: N. Poku/D. T. Graham, Redefining security... (pre-cited), p. 2 and 6
12 Pierre Garrigue, “Action humanitaire”, in: Encvlopaediae Universalis (pre-cited)
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his arguments on the fact that a total “absence of danger” as defined above cannot be 
achieved. Therefore, he proposes to take a more inclusive view of security as “a low 
probability of damage to acquired values.” He outlines two factors as his framework, 
which can be helpful in this analysis as well: one factor aims at specifying the actor(s) 
whose security is under discussion; another factor specifies the values to be protected, 
such as political autonomy, territorial integrity and continuity of state identity. States still 
face challenges to sovereignty and territorial integrity, but other agendas emerged and 
incorporated migration, AIDS, environmental and social security. Further variables 
remain important when elaborating a security policy: sources of specific threats; means 
and policies to be used for pursuing security; time period for a given security policy and 
the opportunity cost of security for specific values. Finally, a distinction has to be made 
between objective (real) and subjective (perceived) threat. Waever names immigration of 
‘others’ and an ensuing competition of incompatible identities as an example for the 
impact of subjective threat.13
Indeed, if migration is only one of the new dimensions of the new global 
landscape, it has important impacts on the redefining process of security.
b) The effects of migration on borders and the link with illegality
i. Migration’s impacts: challenging various kinds o f boundaries
Migration is part of those agendas getting more and more attention in the post­
cold war context. There is no universally accepted definition of migration, but the 
movement of entities across boundaries constitutes its core feature (therefore ‘migration’ 
is a notion also broadly used in botanic, cellular biology and informatics). There are 
varying definitions of migration across the states; the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) defines international migration as the ‘movement of people across 
borders’ and as “(...) a trans-national phenomenon that presents major policy and 
management challenges and opportunities for governments and other actors in all 
regions of the world.”14 The UN Population Division estimated the number of international 
migrants at about 175 million people, double the amount in comparison with 1965, which
13 N. Poku/D. T. Graham, Redefining security... (pre-cited), pp. 9-11
14 IOM, “The International Agenda for Migration Management,” (16./17.12.2004), Available [online]:
28.04.2006, on:
http://www.bfm.admin.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Themen_deutsch/lnternationalesrrhe_Berne_lnitiative 
/IAMM_E.pdf, p. 15 f.
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comes down to an average of 2.9 per cent of the world’s population.15 Migration is linked 
to wide-ranging topics, e.g. development, trade, health, environment and national 
security. Therefore it is appealing to notice that— regardless of the international 
dimension of migration— states handle mainly immigration, the inflow into a country. 
Immigration is then typically understood and managed “(...) as a domestic concern 
marked by the responsibility o f the interior ministries and associated agencies for the 
regulation o f immigration,”16
The interplay of the phenomena of migration and security, both standing at the 
crossroads of international and domestic politics, poses many fascinating challenges to 
the involved actors in the 21st century. Defining migration and its impacts on security 
requires defining the ‘borders’ that are crossed beforehand. When investigating into 
Baldwin’s security framework (the actors to whom security has to be granted and what 
values ought to be protected), it appears that migration has contributed to call into 
question different kinds of previously clearly set boundaries, a fact to which states have 
to adapt in their policy responses.
One such boundary— the ‘conceptual border’— is related to the above-outlined 
Schmittian friend-enemy distinction and continuity of state identity, not only challenged 
by non-state terrorism, but interestingly enough also by migrants (a feature sometimes 
sealing their fate when covered with a bad public image). Geddes defines conceptual 
borders as notions of belonging and identity, inherent to trans-national, national and/or 
sub-national communities. The issue of ethnicity is also predominant in multicultural 
European societies, yet policy responses have tended to emphasise socio-economic and 
linguistic adaptation, labelled with the vaguely defined concept of “integration”.
The second, more obvious value that a state tries to protect is its territorial 
integrity. Migration is face to face with the sovereign authority of states to exclude at 
territorial borders, i.e. land, air and sea ports of entry. Territorial boundaries have 
themselves moved as a result of the 2004 EU enlargement (the EU has since tried to 
consolidate these new borders) on the one hand. On the other, they have moved through 
the fact that migration management now tries to tackle the issue already directly in the 
countries of origin of the migrants (so-called ‘remote control’ migration). More and more 
actors become involved in tackling migration, because the state level cannot deal with it 
by itself. In an inaugural lecture in 2001, Guild stated that “[the] exercise o f migration 
controls at territorial borders has (...) moved up, down and out to include, for instance,
15 Ibid., p. 5
16 A. Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations,” in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, 2005: pp. 788 ff. (and the following)
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supranational actors, third countries, and private actors such as truck drivers, ferry 
operators and airlines”.17
A third important boundary defied by migration is the more concrete organizational 
or functional one, i.e. the borders of institutions such as the access to the labour market, 
WS and citizenship, which represent the sites of a political community’s membership 
conditions. It includes learning the language and social habits, as well as the legal rights 
applicable to newcomers. Here the different types of migrants are of importance, since 
the rights vary according to the categories, be it asylum-seekers, highly- or lower-skilled 
migrants, seasonal workers, students or family migrants to name only the most common 
ones. The largest problematic category of migrants are however those who are illegal or 
undocumented, trying to avoid policy measures altogether.
ii. Associating migration and illegality— the root o f an emerging bias 
against migrants
Because of the wide-ranging effects of migration on such basic values as the WS 
system, the balance of the labour market and the definition of national identities itself, the 
reaction of state authorities is specific according to the society the migrant tries to 
integrate into. Natural tendencies have been to try to keep out the necessity of handling 
the issue altogether by providing individuals with the right to exit but not to enter states. 
As the UN puts it, “(...) no State allows the unlimited and unpatrolled crossing o f its 
borders".18 Ronald Skeldon analysed the element of control as being the root of much 
migration policy; he furthermore sees in it a bias toward limitation and restriction rather 
than toward promotion and facilitation.19 Part of this has derived from equating migration 
more and more with one of its sub-categories, namely irregular or illegal migration.
Democratic states have to face two obligations in their policy responses. For one 
thing, human dignity and the dedication of liberal democratic states to international 
values and HR makes migrants part of the (national) community to be protected (i.e. 
actors), despite their not being citizens. In the case of refugees fleeing from humanitarian 
disasters, it has— by international law custom— become unacceptable to oblige these 
non-citizens to go back to a country, where they are endangered. For another, 
immigrants switch to the other, threat-posing group (i.e. source of threat) if carrying
17 Quoted in: Ibid., p. 789
18 United Nations, World Population Monitoring. 1997. Issues of International Migration and 
Development: Selected Aspects. Population Division of the Department for Economic and Social 
Information and Policy Analysis of the United Nations Secretariat, ESA/PA/VP, New York, p. 117
19 R. Skeldon, “Migration Policies and National Security,” in: N. Poku/D. T. Graham, Redefining 
security... (pre-cited), p. 30
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extreme political or religious opinions: in the worst case, life-threatening risks to a state’s 
own citizens through terrorist activities are conceivable. What results from this is a 
dichotomy for the state: migration challenges state identity (values), obliging it to re-think 
the notion of community beyond citizenship, which leads to a broadened concept of 
community. Another factor however remains unchanged— the need to ensure security— , 
which together poses the starting point for the link between external (ethnic implosions, 
humanitarian disasters...) and internal security (societal instability).
In diverse public discourses, the merging of external and internal society is being 
analysed as a result of organised crime, terrorism and illegal migration, which has 
awkward consequences on migrants’ public image. The recent meeting of the British, 
French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish Ministers of the Interior in Heiligendamm 
(22/23 March 2006) confirms this. The aim was to elaborate a common strategy for 
integrating immigrants, next to which the ministers decided to cooperate more closely in 
combating illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. The fact that both issues are 
discussed side by side discloses the even unconscious closer look given to immigrants in 
terms of security suspicions.20
Didier Bigo criticises this underlying framework, which he regards as being 
commonly accepted by security analysts.21 He views the blurred external and internal 
security concept as deriving from a transformation of the social world and from ways, in 
which different (security) agencies construct these ‘changes’ as threats. In addition, he 
outlines the role of personal interest in the competition for budgets, legitimacy and 
missions and the impacts of how political, bureaucratic and media games do (not) 
construct social change as a political or security problem. This comes down to security 
agencies having increasingly replaced the old, military definition of threat by crime. This 
shows, Bigo continues, in the fact that “[governments] have tried to apply to illegal 
migrants the techniques that police use against criminals, and this is perhaps one o f the 
strongest reasons for the link between crime and migration" This assumption has also 
spread to the EU-level with the creation of fingerprint databases in the sphere of 
immigration (Eurodac), a technique taken over from national anti-crime measures. 
Finding a balance between integrating migration policies and sufficient control 
mechanisms is a difficult task for nation-states locked in control dilemmas.
20 Bundesregierung, “Gemeinsam fur Integration” (23.03.2006), Available [online]: 24.03.2006, on: 
http://www. bundesregierung.de/-,413.978899/artikel/Gemeinsam-fuer-lntegration.htm
21 D. Bigo, “Migration and security,” in: Controlling a new migration world, eds. V. Guiraudon/ Ch. 
Joppke, New York/London: Routledge/EUI Studies in the Political Economy of Welfare (Florence), 
2001, p. 121 f„ p. 134
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B—Migration as a threat: migration management based on control dilemmas
a) Restrictive policies as a result of control dilemmas
i. Migration in a triangular relationship o f politics, economics and law
As briefly outlined above, migrants fall into the categories of those whose security 
is under discussion, while challenging the values of a community to protect. Thus they 
are increasingly identified as objective sources of threat because of terrorism or as 
subjective sources, e.g. among xenophobic extreme-right wing political opinions. 
Vaughan Robinson, analysing the evolution of the linkage between migration and 
security from WW II to the 1990s, concludes that an increasing number of countries now 
feel beleaguered by migration threats: existing migrant communities who challenge 
models of social and cultural homogeneity, mass illegal migration impacting on labour 
markets, asylum seekers overwhelming the WS or having too great demands on the 
natural environment, and threats from victims of environmental catastrophes. In short, 
immigrants are seen as a threat to the international order, to national economies, 
governments and homogeneity, welfare provisions, local ecosystems and personal 
security. The author states that within 50 years the specific sub-group of refugees has 
thus been metamorphosed from victims into a burden and ‘international pariah group’.22
One can agree with the argument that contemporary migration exacerbates 
tensions between democracy and capitalism and between democracy and liberal norms. 
Particularly the interplay between economics and politics is under pressure, for WS 
systems have limits and there are both costs and benefits for accepting migrants. Yet 
over the last 30 years, the legal dimension has been more enforced by activist high 
courts pushing immigration policy towards taking a more normative turn than Robinson 
suggests it (e.g. in terms of family reunification). Guiraudon and Joppke conceptualize 
current control dilemmas in a triangular relationship between (democratic, populist, anti- 
immigrant) politics, law (liberal norms, activist judiciaries) and economics (free trade, 
mobile capital, interest in foreign labour, global mass tourism).23
Concerning the political implications, it has to be acknowledged that the media 
and public debates (e.g. on TV, involving the public) contribute to pressing migration as a 
potential source of danger on the forefront of political agenda. Consequences of popular
22 V. Robinson, “Security, Migration and Refugees,” in: N. Poku/D. T. Graham, Redefining security... 
(pre-cited), pp. 67-90
V. Guiraudon/Ch. Joppke, “Controlling a new migration world,” in: Controlling a new migration world 
(pre-cited), pp. 8-11
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fears are populism, radicalism and new forms of racism on the domestic scene; main 
arguments are the viability of the tax system, social and pension systems, as well as a 
tighter competition for jobs. Quassoli inserts the contribution of the judiciary to the 
process of blurring lines between external and internal security. According to him 
increasing migration waves are often coupled with crime rates in stereotypes: “(...) 
migrants’ criminality is constructed in multiple and often related social contexts as an 
‘objective social fact’ and a source o f social insecurity." He investigates more precisely 
the ways, in which courts use a social categorisation of viewing the immigrant as an 
irregular, marginal, and finally criminal person. The author does not suggest that what he 
labels “racial, ethnic, social biases in the administration of justice” happens on a 
subjective basis, rather that they can be imputed on procedures used to recognize, 
describe, explain the reality of migrants’ criminality.24
Economics are the last element of the triangle. While the economic argument 
predominant in the 1960s and 1970s viewed migration as a factor contributing to 
economic growth in the receiving states and to development in the sending states, it had 
shifted to considering immigration as intolerably high, taking part in the competition over 
scarce resources. The importance of labour migration has regained importance recently: 
governments recognize more frequently the need to overcome pressing demographic 
situations by recruiting e.g. high-skilled IT specialists or cheap unskilled labour.25
Some researchers criticise the growing gap between goals and outcomes of 
national immigration policy, which creates greater hostility toward immigrants and 
pressuring authorities to adopt more restrictive policies. Guiraudon and Joppke do not 
agree with this analysis, for policies are faced with contradictory pressures and 
conflicting goals at the same time; furthermore, it is difficult to clearly identify policy 
outcomes. “One has to evaluate policy outcomes also along the illegal and criminally 
framed (human smuggling) flows [...], which are naturally much more difficult to 
measure, and which by definition escape the official statistics on entry and residence.’’26
ii. Specificity and implications o f illegal migration and political options
An IOM analysis stated that more restrictive legislation has been a result of 
confusing the status of refugees and illegal migrants, while relating security concerns
24 F. Quassoli, “Migrant as criminal— the judicial treatment of migrant criminality,” in: Controlling a new
migration world (pre-cited). p. 151 
IOM, “The significance of migration,” in: “The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy 
Options”, IOM Migration Research Series, no. 8, 2004, pp. 7 ff.
26 V. Guiraudon/Ch. Joppke, “Controlling a new migration world” (pre-cited), p. 11
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with the problem of asylum seekers.27 To the degree that immigration is unwanted 
immigration policy is likely to become in effect a control policy addressed in negative 
terms. In 2004, Norbert Cyrus published a detailed account for the Agency for 
Immigration and Integration in Germany about the problems related to the illegal status 
of migrants. He therein warns against a lacking systematic link between research 
projects focusing on the social situation of illegal migrants on the one hand, or on the 
importance of smugglers and human traffickers on the other hand. This argument can be 
understood with reference to the assumption that illegal migration has indeed specific 
implications based on the above-outlined triangular relationship. Cyrus summarizes 
effects of illegality on the labour market and on the social situation in Germany; he also 
interprets main causes of illegality within the legal framework and pulling demands for 
cheap labour by (national) employers. Routes towards illegality and thereby negative 
impacts in terms of societal insecurity can be barred by providing more secure and legal 
options for migrants within the country.28 This argument will be picked up in this thesis.
There are diverse ways, through which a migrant can fall into the category of 
illegality. These thus represent the starting points for politicians to tackle the issue. 
According to the first periodic security report by the German Ministry of the Interior and 
the Ministry of Justice in 200129, illegal entry can occur as follows: abuse of the freedom 
to travel (Reisefreiheit), i.e. entering as tourists or visitors and then work in the country; 
entry with falsified documents (often used by asylum seekers and refugees, but also by 
labour migrants from visa-requiring countries); visas received on the basis of wrong 
statements; and finally entry without any documents— this option has received a lot of 
attention because of the impressive conditions linked with it, often smuggled in by night 
and fog, even leading to death.
However, as Cyrus outlines, most cases of illegality occur after official entry at 
border checkpoints (e.g. visa overstayers). Conversely, tighter border controls make 
entry without documents more difficult, demand for and reliance on smugglers higher 
(including price conditions and thus incentive for these criminal networks). Also, an 
analysis of the crimes committed by illegal foreigners in 2003 in Germany shows that 
most offences linked with illegal entry or residence was the falsification of documents or
27 Cf. IOM, “The significance of migration” (pre-cited), p. 7
28 N. Cyrus, “Bericht fur den Sachverständigenrat fur Zuwanderung und Integration, Nurnberg—  
Aufenthaltsrechtliche lllegalität in Deutschland” (2004), IBKM Universität Oldenburg, Available [online]:
05.03.2006, on:
http://www.forum-illegalitaet.de/Materialien/04_Expertise_Sachverst_ndigenrat_Cyrus.pdf
29 Bundesministerium des Innern; Bundesministerium der Justiz, Erster Periodischer 
Sicherheitsbericht. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2001, pp. 
333 f.
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the consequences of the asylum or foreigners law (thus offences that, by definition, can 
only be committed by foreigners).30
Four main political options for migration management can be sketched (these can 
also be tested in other states). Too restrictive immigration measures— the preferred 
option of the radical right— can in practice not be nowadays implemented; next to the 
impossibility to physically shield all the borders, HR are too deeply-rooted in democratic 
societies (at least in theory). The second option would be to have restrictive legislation, 
but be lenient with the putting into practice of the regulations, yet this would deepen 
citizens’ mistrust in politics. A third way would be to find pragmatic political solutions to 
the realities of the time, following rather a method of small steps rather than one big 
resolution, e.g. to avoid humanly degrading situations or to fight the bases of informal 
economy. “In its core, this policy aims at strengthening social institutions for an increased 
self-regulation o f economy and society.”31 The last option available is not to have any 
regulation at all and to allow everybody to stay; this is neither possible, for it would lead 
to a totally uncontrolled labour market and thus to neglecting societal security.
Interestingly enough, Cyrus does not call for stricter border control measures to 
hinder entrance into Germany, but focuses on measures to alleviate harsh social 
situations within the country, i.e. by guaranteeing access to basic medical care, scholarly 
education of immigrant children, providing legal access to the labour market and 
guaranteeing access to the legal framework of the state. Guiraudon and Joppke support 
the hypothesis that risks associated with migration increase as a result of tighter control. 
“States’ control policies thus indirectly play into the hands o f international crime 
organizations.”32 But it should not be forgotten that migration is an inherently trans­
national phenomenon and that it therefore has implications across borders that can be 
responded to by international cooperation.
b) Impacts of EC/EU enlargements on migration management
i. Putting border control on the forefront o f the agenda
The case of Germany is particularly interesting for diverse geopolitical, historical 
and economic reasons, and will therefore be analysed more in depth in this work (a 
European-wide comparative analysis of the MS was not possible to undertake). The case
30 N. Cyrus, “Bericht fur den Sachverständigenrat...“ (pre-cited), p. 16
31 Ibid., p. 5 [translation: mine]
32 V. Guiraudon/Ch. Joppke, “Controlling a new migration world” (pre-cited), p. 20
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analysis can provide the background for showing problems faced by the state in handling 
illegal migration and border management as well as showing one example of how 
different, involved actors and levels (from the supranational to the Länder level) are 
interconnected. The link between EU and German politics is very close and this feature 
probably even constitutes a main driving force for including migration on the agenda of 
the EU in the long run.
The debates over the EC/EU enlargements from the 1970s essentially had to do 
with fears of massive migration flows. Germany even opposed the widening of the EC to 
countries in the south, i.e. Greece, Spain and Portugal, for this very reason. When the 
European Community did deal with migration, it did so in the domain of co-ordinating 
control policies, aimed particularly against trans-national crime networks. Hence it is 
sometimes argued that the overall trend toward securitization of migration in Europe 
finds its roots within the Europeanization of the policy itself. Migration was finally taken 
over on the agenda together with asylum, when a growing number of asylum seekers 
came to Europe: proponents of Europeanised migration policies came particularly from 
the main destination country Germany and from refugee support groups, who wanted to 
prevent refugees from being caught further between the states.33
Nonetheless, concrete actions touching migration more generally started in the 
1980s and unfolded towards the end of the 1990s. While mainly correlated to security 
and focusing on preventing illegal migration, there has been a clear tendency to focus on 
the issue of border control within migration management. This trend, far from being 
attenuated, has led to the creation of the European Agency for the Management of the 
External Borders (Agence Européenne des Frontiěres Extérieures, Frontex) in 2005. It is 
not by accident that the seat of the Agency is in Warsaw. It has been put in place in the 
aftermath of the eastward enlargement of the EU: the migration of the EU borders and 
the disappearance of passport controls within its territory— which will be also apply to ID 
card controls in new MS once they will have integrated the Schengen area in a few 
months/years— have reinforced the necessity of the EU to make her borders more 
secure. In fact, it is not within the logics of EU integration to put up borders, rather to 
make them disappear. Nonetheless, the parallel construction of a ‘fortress Europe’ as 
many analysts called and criticised the evolution in the 1990s, was based once again on 
the minimal traditional role of nation-states to ensure security to their citizens: with the 
permeability of the borders, this task could not effectively be guaranteed anymore, lest 
states profited from the EU by co-operating where previous intergovernmental
33
B. Marshall, “The European dimension”, in: The new Germany and migration in Europe. 
Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 118
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agreements had proven insufficient. With regard to the terrorist attacks in Madrid and
applied to Geddes’ analysis of migration as a challenge to territorial, conceptual and
organizational borders, the following can be agreed to:
“The EU has become particularly concerned with the projection of territorial 
borders focused on the regularization of migration flows defined as unwanted 
or less useful in order to m aintain organizational borders of work, welfare and 
citizenship that remain primarily national.”
ii. Questions for analysis ensuing from the Europeanization and 
securitization of migration
Several problematic points emerge when analysing the ongoing securitization of 
migration in the EU with far-reaching impacts on the national level; but migration itself 
remains strongly embedded on the national and international scene (cf. Chapter IV B).
As already mentioned, Germany will provide the case example as representing 
the national level in this work, although it has to be stated that the situation of 
immigration varies greatly across the national states. This is also the reason, why 
researchers tend to specialise on one country (e.g. Marshall on Germany or Geddes on 
Great Britain). Angenendt has published a comparative analysis of asylum and migration 
in the EU MS by making a compilation of articles on the diverse national situations by 
diverse researchers.34 It had been my endeavour to focus on the situation in Central 
Europe and therefore to compare the Czech Republic (ČR), Poland and Germany to see 
whether the new Eastern EU border would have effects on the situation of illegal 
migrants in the EU. This question can somewhat be answered to when looking into 
German statistics of migration inflow in 2004, but I did not have the linguistic 
requirements to analyse the legal evolution in Poland or the ČR. Keeping the specificities 
of the German case in mind, it nonetheless makes sense to focus on the country situated 
in the geographical middle of the EU, a destination country for long years, and 
particularly with such radical changes in policy development since reunification.
Numerous assumptions have been outlined in the previous sub-chapters, which 
have now to be tested. At first, have immigration and border control policies indeed 
become more restrictive? To find an objective measure to approach this question, the 
evolution of laws and political debates in the German Länder, on the federal level and 
within the EU will be outlined; the involvement of different actors will also be discussed. 
The triangular relationship outlined by Guiraudon and Joppke and Baldwin’s variables
34 Angenendt, Steffen, Asylum and Migration Policies in the European Union (DGAP), ed. by 
Angenendt, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1999 (new version available following the 2004 enlargement)
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will provide the basis for the analytical structure. The time frame will start with the 
Treaties of Rome, but will cover mainly the 1990s and will focus on recent years (2000- 
2005) insofar as official statistical data allows it.
Then the evolution of illegality itself will be of interest, in order to find out whether 
restrictive policies or tighter border controls have direct effects on illegality or whether 
alternative policy options would indeed be more efficient. This question is particularly 
difficult to reply to, because of the inherent nature of illegality as such. This problem can 
be somewhat overcome by giving estimations founded on statistics on crime rates 
committed by foreigners. Yet it has to be acknowledged from the start that they often 
remain assumptions and that effects therefore cannot be established with scientific 
certainty. In the case of Germany, illegal immigration and its consequences can also be 
tackled through specific welfare states responses, such as regularization programmes of 
illegal migrants, which provide social security care (regularization programmes is a 
measure currently proposed in the US).
Finally, it seems that the national level focuses on ‘integration’ of immigrants in 
public debates, while the EU puts accents on the issue of security. What would then be 
the logics of an EU-wide migration policy? Would there be a further securitization of 
national discourse on migration or is the EU a reflection of such an already existing 
discourse equating illegal immigration with criminalization? External evolutions, such as 
global terrorism and technology (used in border controls) also interfere with this 
phenomenon. In a first step, the incorporation and reach of migration policies will be 
analysed on the EU-level. In a second step, Germany will be analysed as a case 
example and a third chapter will deal with the country’s intergovernmental and 
supranational cooperation implications.
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Chapter II: Emergence and implications of EU migration policies
Giving an overview of the EU level has to be done with great care, for it is deeply 
linked and even reliant on national governments’ political will and development. It has to 
be clarified what entails the previously outlined hypothesis that the securitization of 
migration comes as a consequence of its Europeanization. It seems that national 
governments could only agree on further cooperation, when it served the security cause. 
This is particularly true for the period of the 1990s, which was responsible for a start of 
migration policies altogether, the more so after the European Council in Tampere (1999). 
The 2004 enlargement has played an important role in furthering this evolution, too; 
some attention will therefore be given to the geographic area of central-east Europe.
Focusing on the EU makes sense in several respects: first of all, political entities 
with differing welfare systems are faced with a similar problem of migration, which is 
nonetheless difficult to be dealt with commonly. As the IOM Chief McKinley pointed out in 
March 2006 in Sicily, a better organized labour market would make access to labour 
market easier. This would be an effective antidote to underground arrivals, but a 
precondition would be international cooperation.35 As of now, the EU continues focusing 
mainly on securing the territorial rather than the conceptual or organizational boundary.
A—Steps towards Europeanized and securitized migration approach (1957-2002)
In order to give a better understanding of the European dimension of migration 
and its focus on migration control, this chapter will be dedicated to the steps taken 
towards European migration policies into the 21st century. In a chronological-thematic 
way, the last 15 years will outline the relative rapid evolution from the 1990s onwards 
and the main themes standing at the forefront of discussions. As analysed by Jôrg 
Monar, migration and asylum gained more influence in the EU after the issue was moved 
from the rather week third pillar (Maastricht, 1993) to the influential community pillar in 
the Amsterdam Treaty 1999.36 The chapter outlines the trend towards emphasising the 
dimension of controlling immigration within an emerging common migration approach.
35 S. Castelfranco, “IOM Chief Calls for Cooperation Against Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants,” 
(13.03.2006), Available [online]: 15.03.2006, on: http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-03-13- 
voa18.cfm
36
J. Monar, “Die EU als Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts und die Herausforderung 
des internationalen Terrorismus,” in: Integration, Institut fur europäische Politik, 25th y., 3/2002: p. 171
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a) Evolution from the Treatv of Rome to the 1990s
The fact that the EU justice and interior ministers agreed on a necessary time 
period of six years to establish a common asylum and immigration policy (cf. the 
previously mentioned Luxemburg conference, p.8) fits UN consultant Peter Stalker’s 
statement that “[ultimately] immigration in Europe is controlled by national 
governments’\ 37 Furthermore, European integration has had effects on producing ‘good’ 
(to be encouraged) and ‘bad’ (to be restricted) types of international migration, which 
have to do with the ways in which international migration is viewed by the state and 
supranational decision-makers.38 What have been the milestones of MS’ contribution to 
include a European dimension in migration and asylum issues over the last 50 years? 
And, more importantly, can the hypothesis of a trend towards an ever more securitized 
approach to migration be verified in this development?
i. From the principle o f free movement for EC nationals to the 
Schengen Convention (1957-1995)
Migration in Europe has been shaped by diverse factors over the last 50 years. 
Different migration theories focus on diverse causes, such as the establishment and 
existence of networks forging paths for future migrants, economic needs for states 
attracting labour migrants (as was the case for the German state’s recruitment of guest- 
workers, cf. Chapter III), colonial ties also played an important role in determining 
specific migration patterns between European states. The EC has focused on the 
economic aspect before broadening the approach later on; two steps were taken to lever 
migration in favour of EC-intern (mainly labour) migrants as opposed to non-EC citizens.
In a first step, evolutions concerned citizens of the EC territory only. Ever since 
1957, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community has integrated 
provisions to ensure the right to seek work outside national state boundaries (but within 
the EC) to MS nationals, including the Commonwealth and the French DOM. Regulation 
no. 1612/68 was based on the principle of equal treatment of all EC nationals, starting to 
abolish entry or exit requirements, which de facto represented obstacles on the way of
37 P. Stalker, “Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe,” in: International Migration, IOM, Vol. 
40(5), 2/2002, p. 165
38 Cf. A. Geddes, Politics of Migration... (pre-cited), p. 3
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seeking a job abroad.39 Several judicial cases have contributed to gradually form a 
unified market (completed by the Single European Act/SEA in 1987), e.g. the application 
of the direct effect clause for self-employed (Van Duyn case, 4 December 1974), the 
right of establishment (Reyners, 21 June 1974) or in the service-sector (Van Binsbergen, 
3 December 1974). The economic component then led to including the free movement of 
family members, the right of residence beyond the termination date of the professional 
activity and specific provisions for students (three directives implemented in 1990 and 
1993). The main remaining characteristic was to be EC-citizen (ex-Article 18); the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) finally conferred the right to move and reside freely within the 
EC/EU (ex-Article 14).40 MS are also restricted by Directives in their right of expulsion, 
since workers from other MS have the right of recourse to the courts if a deportation 
order is issued against them. Limitations of the right of free movement are provided 
exceptionally if relative to the protection of public order, public security or public health. 
Since there is no uniform definition of what is “public order” , the Bouchereau case (27 
October 1977) determined that it meant a “threat affecting a fundamental societal 
interest” being “real and sufficiently serious” and related to the personal behaviour of the 
individual to be expelled (e.g. if the person has already committed an infraction)41
In a second step, MS took moves towards developing policies on non EC- 
nationals. Member governments held regular consultations on this topic since 1975 and, 
interestingly, one year before the Bouchereau case the so-called TREVI Group 
(Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme, Violence Internationale) came together, i.e. a 
meeting of ministers that aimed at cooperating on issues of law and order (incorporating 
also policing of drug pushing). The initiative was a sign of the governments not to forget 
the security dimension when tackling the issue under a mainly economic perspective. 
The pertinence and longevity of this standpoint was made obvious, when the group of 
ministers turned into the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration (AHWGI) responsible for 
illegal immigration and asylum in 1986.42
At about the same time, French-German economic and political cooperation was 
consolidated, but border controls still represented restrictions in the movement of flows 
on the EC labour market (e.g. long delays at the Franco-German borders). A strike by 
the truck drivers on both sides induced the signature of the Sarrebruck Accord (13 July 
1984), enlarged to the Benelux countries on 14 June 1985, which had already abolished
39
EU Commission, “Free movement of persons,” Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on:
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14001.htm; EU Commission, “Free movement of 
workers,” Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l23013a.htm
40 J.-C. Gautron, Droit européen. 10th edition, Paris: Dalloz, 2002, pp. 279-289
41 Ibid., p. 288
42 P. Stalker, “Migration Trends..." (pre-cited), p. 167
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their mutual borders in 1960. The formal Schengen Convention was signed in 1990, 
which removed border controls between the five adherent countries, while strengthening 
the now common external frontier. Seven points represented the core contents of the 
Schengen Accord: visa policy (a common list of countries requiring visas for entry into 
the EC); combating illegal immigration (obligations for the transporting companies, i.e. air 
companies); computerised databank on immigration, asylum and policing (Schengen 
Information System/SIS); coordination of treating asylum applications (within one state); 
customs cooperation; police cooperation (possibility of cross-border pursuits); judicial 
cooperation (including extradition).43
Several EU MS and two non-EU countries— Iceland and Norway— have adhered 
to the Schengen area since, with the two notable exceptions of the UK and Ireland; some 
exemptions of the convention were also provided for Denmark. The new EU MS (2004) 
have no choice and will have to adhere as soon as the preparations are met (probably in 
2007), since the acceptance of the EU and Schengen acquis was a pre-condition for 
accession (cf. the incorporation of the Schengen Accord in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1999). The Schengen Agreement came into force officially on 26 March 1995.
ii. Gradual communitarisation o f migration management in the 1990s: 
linking economic and political priorities
The mainly commercially driven cooperation among EC MS allowed incorporating 
migration and asylum on the European agenda in the 1980s, when increasing waves of 
asylum-seekers came to Europe. This tendency increased with the crumbling of the 
Communist block and somewhat postponed the signature of the Schengen Convention 
from 1989 to 1990. First debates had started with the signature of the SEA in 
Luxembourg (February 1986), because the ex-Article 8 A had defined the single market 
zone as an “area without internal borders in which free circulation of goods, people, 
services and capital is assured according to the dispositions of the treaty”. The sensitivity 
of migration issues can be seen in the fact that the realisation of the market was to be 
fulfilled by the method of qualitative majority voting (QMV), except for the free movement 
of the people and fiscal harmonisation (requiring unanimity vote) 44 Too precious was the 
sovereign right of MS to control immigration from third countries (not of EC-nationals).
43 J.-C. Gautron, Droit européen (pre-cited), pp. 135f.
44 Ibid., p. 98 [translation and emphasis: mine]
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During the implementation period of the Schengen provisions after 1995, “[the] focus was 
entirely on the fight against illegal immigration in the future (...)” 45
By 1990 however, the common feature of rising numbers of migrants to be 
handled by the EC governments led to the necessity and wish to harmonise national 
legislations. To this effect the Dublin Convention (15 June 1990) created a system to 
determine the state responsible for examining asylum applications lodged in one MS 46 
The underlying aim was to end the practice of ‘asylum shopping’ in several EC MS; the 
Eurodac database also allowed MS to keep track of rejected asylum claims. The London 
Resolution (1992) added the principle of ‘manifestly unfounded applications’ for asylum, 
as well as the principle of ‘host countries’ to the Dublin Convention. This resolution had 
however no legal weight. The background arguments were the protection of the rights of 
refugees and the protection of the MS against any abuse of the system itself. The 
AHWGI elaborated the principles of ‘safe third country’ and ‘safe country of origin’: if the 
country of origin itself was defined as ‘safe’, procedures for not granting asylum became 
thus quicker. Also, less rights of appeal were granted: if asylum is refused, an application 
can be made only after a period of two years (currently also a discussion point in French 
immigration reforms). A common problem that this regulation entails is the destruction of 
identification documents by asylum seekers, so that their country of origin cannot be 
determined, in order to prevent deportation.
The debate became closely linked with deliberations about future institutional 
structures of the EC and had repercussions until the reform of the Treaty in 1999. In April 
1991, the Luxembourg presidency submitted a plan to the MS, in which immigration and 
asylum remained dealt with on an intergovernmental basis within the third pillar. The 
Maastricht Treaty (1992/93) extended cooperation in foreign policy areas and ended 
temporary restrictions on migration from Spain and Portugal to other EC countries. 
Massive migration from southern Europe to Germany had been a wide-spread fear 
among the German population, a phenomenon that repeated itself with the 2004 
enlargement. Cooperation remained intergovernmental and dominated by the QMV 
method, except for the visa policy, which was incorporated into the first pillar (Art. 100c). 
Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) implicitly associated 
migrants and refugees with criminals, for it encompassed asylum policy next to external 
border control, policies on third country nationals (TCN), drug trafficking and fraud. It also
45 B. Marshall, “The European Dimension,” in: The new Germany... (pre-cited), p. 123; also pp. 124ff.
46 EU Commission, “Convention determining the State responsible for examining asylum lodged in one 




left migration within the intergovernmental scope of decision-making. HR activists and 
pro-integration advocates were therefore unhappy with title VI.47 A counterargument is 
that experiences of forced prostitution and modern servitude infringe on HR so outwardly 
that it can justify its being handled within the policing pillar of JHA, if not abused of.
After Maastricht the AHWGI was turned into the Council of Ministers for JHA. 
Collective policy initiatives on immigration were still intimately linked to public domestic 
concerns about negative implications of immigration, even if areas such as family 
reunification and judicial rights for immigrants were maintained out of moral and legal 
constraints. If agreements were achieved, it happened mainly in the stricter, controlling 
element of policy making. Thus, in December 1995 the JHA Minister issued a 
‘Recommendation for the harmonisation of means to combat illegal immigration and 
illegal employment, as well as for the improvements of respective control mechanisms’.
Even if political compromises emerged on the basis of commercially driven 
interests and then focused on asylum and (mainly illegal) immigration control, analysts 
deplore that the single market and opening of the borders has not yet applied to labour 
migration. The Lisbon Council in 2000 outlined economic reform objectives to promote a 
more flexible European labour market. In addition, the Community EQUAL initiative 
aimed at facilitating the social and occupational integration of asylum seekers on the 
basis of trans-national cooperation.48 According to Geddes, the externalization aspects of 
EU migration and asylum policy was driven by concerns to maintain key organizational 
and conceptual borders of work, welfare and citizenship. The endeavour was to view the 
migrant as a useful contributor to the system, rather than building up a European fortress 
against immigration.49 Nonetheless, criticism against a growing distinction of the EU’s 
migration management between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants, leading to a ‘demonisation 
of settled migrant workers’ and thus racism remains present up to today.50
47 Cf. R. Koslowski, “Security and sovereignty in uniting Europe,” in: Controlling a new migration world 
(pre-cited), p. 101
EU Commission, C(2000)853 (05.05.2000), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on:
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10237.htm
49 Cf. A. Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and Inti Migration Relations“ (pre-cited), p. 801
50 Liz Fekete, “Fortress Europe -  effects and consequences of labour migration,” Available [online]:
02.03.2006, on: http://www.irr.org.uk/2006/march/ha000008.html; C. Kern, “Fortress Europe? A critical 
analysis of the evolution of common European Immigration and Asylum Policies,” in: L ’Europe en 
formation, no. 1, published by Centre international de formation européenne, Paris, 2003, pp. 75-123
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b) Concrete steps towards a communitarised migration policy
i. Legal and political steps: the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and 
the European Council in Tampere (1997-2000)
The Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 came into effect in 1999, with a 
transition period of five years for the application of Community procedures. It represents 
a main step towards the communitarisation (not supra-nationalisation) of asylum and 
migration. Not only does it aim at establishing an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ 
(AFSJ), but it extends this principle to all the persons at the internal EU borders whatever 
their nationality. Both the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the Implementing Accord of 
1990 were integrated into the Treaty (Britain, Ireland and Denmark retained their specific 
provisions). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) could now be asked for rulings by 
national courts in the area of migration and asylum policy— this was an important step, 
because the legal integration power of the ECJ was already quite extensive. An 
exception remained however jurisdiction over internal border controls for the sake of 
safeguarding internal security.51 The Commission has the right since the end of the 
transition period (1 May 2004) to develop initiatives in the area of immigration and 
asylum. On 3 December 1998, the Council and Commission laid down a timetable of 
measures to be adopted to achieve objectives of common standards on controls at the 
external borders of the EU (visas, asylum policy and immigration mainly) by 2004.
The probably real start of communitarian EU migration measures is to be found in 
the European Council in Tampere (October 1999). The heads of government underlined 
that the freedom to move in conditions of security and justice— alias the AFSJ— was not 
‘the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens’. Common policies should rather ‘offer 
guarantees for those who seek protection in, but also for those seeking access to the 
EU’.52 In addition, the Commission was conferred the task to elaborate tools to achieve 
this goal: partnership with countries of origin aiming at keeping migrants closer to their 
country of origin (this shows again the blurred line between internal security concerns 
and foreign policy); more specific asylum measures with common minimum standards 
(determine the state responsible for examining asylum application, conditions for 
receiving asylum applications, minimum standards on the procedures, qualify and 
determine contents of refugee status); equal treatment in economic, social and cultural
51 S. Peers, “The future of the EU judicial system,” in: European Journal o f Migration and Law, ed. by 
P. Boeles (special ed.), vol.7/no. 3, 2005, p. 265
52 Quoted in: E. Brouwer, “Effective Remedies for Third Country Nationals in EU Law: Justice 
Accessible to All?,” in: European Journal o f Migration and Law (pre-cited), p. 219
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life for TCN; management of migration flows (e.g. common policies on visas and false 
documents or tackle illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and economic 
exploitation of migrants).53
In 1999, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWGAI) 
established action plans for Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco and Somalia, 
countries thought to be the root causes of migration. Yet as Geddes points out, “[the] 
reports were criticised for reflecting EU priorities of migration control, readmission and return 
rather than the pursuit o f partnerships based on real dialogue."5* The Dublin II regulation 
defined the state responsible for asylum claims, established minimum protection standards 
for refugees and gave a common definition of refugees.55 In addition, The Eurodac files were 
to incorporate fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and a European Refugee 
Fund (ERF) was created to give financial support for reception centres and voluntary 
repatriation schemes in the case of sudden emergencies.56 Although humanitarian and 
security dimensions were tried to be dealt with side by side, the application of methods used 
traditionally against criminals was striking. Therefore, the European Parliament’s Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs Committee rejected the proposal of the JHA Council at first.57
Among the most important features of the Treaty of Nice (2000) was the shift to the 
codecision procedure in visa, asylum and immigration policy, as well as to QMV (with prior 
unanimous adoption of common framework legislation on asylum, and only applicable to 
asylum and temporary protection). Since 1 May 2004 the shift to QMV occurs for conditions 
of free circulation of TCN if they are legal residents (Art. 62 EC Treaty). The conclusions of 
the treaty asked to take more concrete measures on combating trafficking in human beings 
and combating illegal immigration.58 The Nice Treaty was important from the point of view 
of HR, for the integrated Charter of Fundamental Rights considered non-EU nationals 
with residence and work permit the same as EU citizens.
ii. Focus on combating illegal migration (1998-2004)
The years 1997/98 laid milestones towards dealing more specifically with illegal 
migration. An important contribution was the Conference of Ministers on the “Prevention 
of Illegal Migration” in October 1997 in Budapest, which aimed at harmonizing
53 A. Geddes, “The Politics of migration“... (pre-cited), pp. 136ff.
54 A. Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and Inti Migration Relations" (pre-cited), p. 792
55 Cf. Joint Position 96/196/JHA (04.03.1996), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on:
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33060.htm
56 Council Decision 2000/596/EC (28.09.2000), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on:
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33078.htm
57 B. Marshall, “The European Dimension” (pre-cited), p. 132
58 EU Commission, “Free movement of persons” (pre-cited)
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legalisation to combat trafficking in aliens and linkages with other forms of organized 
crime. A few months later, in January 1998, an Action Plan was adopted by the EU 
Foreign Ministers reducing the numbers of Kurds arriving illegally in the EU, on grounds 
that these ‘illegal refugees' and ‘illegal immigrants’ “(...) almost always make use o f 
traffickers, o f whom the majority appear to be part o f organized crime networks, with 
contacts in the EU". Out of the 46 points proposed, most were focused on restrictive 
measures against illegal immigration, such as enhanced border control or effective 
removal; six points were dedicated to humanitarian aid.59 The same year, the UK held 
the presidency of the European Council and UK Home Secretary Jack Straw made 
specific reference to combating organized crime and illegal immigration. In May, the JHA 
Council signed a Pre-Accession Pact on Organized Crime based on judicial and police 
cooperation. Background arguments were that the reality of public concern on EU drug 
trafficking and organized crime had to be responded to; but Monar regrets the lacking 
financial funding programmes and the limited scope of the otherwise crucial Pact.60
A positive aspect of this tendency was to ensure personal security more in 
general— including a focus on combating human trafficking— and this principle was now 
also being applied to TCN. Through this, a shift was taking place also in terms of 
widening the conceptual boundary of the EU integrating non-nationals in the EU legal 
framework. The Cardiff European Council in June encouraged MS to ratify conventions 
on fraud and extradition, as well as to recognize the decisions of each other’s courts.61 
The Council called in an Action Plan on how to best implement the ASFJ of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (3 December 1998).62 Yet the European Council in Laeken in 2001 was a 
set-back in the supra-nationalisation process of migration and asylum: no greater 
cooperation on immigration issues than the level already agreed on could be achieved.63 
Instead, a comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and Trafficking in Human 
Beings was to be adopted urgently. The issue of irregular immigration could somewhat 
re-launch the process in June 2002 at the European Council in Seville. Joint 
management, it was now thought, could provide a more targeted approach of the root 
causes of irregular immigration, putting all EU foreign policy instruments at the 
disposition of the MS. It aimed at reducing underlying causes of migration flows by closer
59 Council, quoted in: Migration News Sheet, “Influx of Kurds Prompts Adoption of a 46-Point Action 
Plan,” Migration News Sheet, no. 177/98-02 (February), pp. 4-6
60 J. Monar, “EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of Diversity 
and EU Instruments and Strategies” (Discussion Paper), Bonn: Zentrum fur Europäische 
Integrationsforschung (ZEI), 2001, p.26f.
61 R. Koslowski, “Security and sovereignty in uniting Europe” (pre-cited), pp. 103f.
62 Council and Commission Action Plan (03.12.1998), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33080.htm
63 P. Stalker, “Migration Trends...” (pre-cited), p. 167
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economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention.
The European Council argued:64
“(...) any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the 
European Union or the European Community concludes with any country 
should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on 
compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration.” (III.33)
“The European Council highlights the importance of ensuring the cooperation 
of countries of origin and transit in joint management and in border control as 
well as on readmission.” (III.34)
“Inadequate cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of 
closer relations between the country and the Union.” (111.35)
This extract shows the rather firm standpoint of the European Council on illegal 
immigration and in particular the far-reaching impacts of cooperation refusals on 
readmission. It conceptualized illegal immigration as a foreign policy issue, making 
security definitions melt once again. Statewatch editor Tony Bunyan comments this 
outcome harshly: “We should be ashamed (...). The swathe o f measures being put in 
place means the EU is heading for a situation where people fleeing poverty and 
persecution are to be expelled, repatriated, deported, back to where they have come 
from regardless o f the circumstances."65 This criticism is tough, especially because HR 
abuses can sometimes only be responded to by firm actions. Indeed, the Council may 
adopt measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the case of 
unjustified lack of cooperation.66 But this statement also means that Seville did not 
underline the urge of taking humanitarian needs into consideration. Illegal immigration 
could be approached from a different perspective, such as by controlling demands for 
illegal workers on the domestic labour market. The political component of migration, it 
therefore seems, has by now clearly taken predominance over its economic aspect.
B—Contemporary evolutions—depending on the will of the states
Several theoretical approaches find causes for restriction ist politics on migration 
and asylum by comparing the domestic politics of individual European states. National 
governments and situations have real impacts on the policy formation on the EU-level, 
due to the subsidiarity clause in some cases, to QMV or unanimity decision-making in 
others. The role of the European Council accounts for this approach. Koslowski gives a
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different, interesting argument: there is a “(...) possibility o f restrictionist politics operating 
at the European level in tandem with the political objective furthering European 
integration in general."67 This applies when highly mediatised issues such as forced 
prostitution or children trafficking are used to push cooperation forward, because the 
public remains sensitive to them.
In recent years the Commission received the right to take initiatives in the area of 
migration and asylum, next to the Council of the EU. But besides the political EU-level, 
the role of the judiciary and NGOs were significant in order to put the dimension of 
required individual HR protection back on the EU agenda next to the gradual and ever 
more concrete evolution of making EU borders secure. The rules and goals set out in the 
treaties and by the European Council provide the basis on which more precise legal and 
technical texts could and can be elaborated, which will be outlined first. Then the 
argument will be developed that the process is rather slow, because of the parallel 
enlargement preparations to include central and eastern European states in 2004 and 
the specificities of migration realities in this area.
a) Legal and technical applications of migration policies
i. Evaluation, implementation and budget dedicated to migration 
priorities
The document JAI 141/MIGR 56 established by the Council of the EU (14 June 
2002) summarises advances made in combating illegal immigration (it does thus not 
include the Seville goals). The main points outlined are: visa policy (introduction of a 
common Visa Identification System/VIS); information exchange on illegal immigration; 
cooperation with countries of origin prior to border-crossing; improved quality and 
effectiveness of border controls (e.g. at maritime borders); readmission and repatriation 
policies; strengthened operative role of Europol (combating trading of human beings); 
repressive measures against crimes. The last point is interesting, because it mentions 
protection and assistance to victims and “combating employers who illegally employ non­
member country nationals who are illegal residents"68 The perspective used here is 
broader, incorporating impacts of domestic demand for illegal migrants. Furthermore, 
specific cooperation between the EU and some regions, e.g. EU candidate sates, Asia
67 R. Koslowski, “Security and sovereignty in uniting Europe” (pre-cited), p. 101
68 Council of the EU, JAI 141 MIGR 56 (14.06.2002), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on: 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st10/10009en2.pdf, p. 5
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(ASEM Ministerial Meeting), Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean (MEDA funds support 
the regional Valencia Action Plan) is mentioned. Still, the measures seen as particularly 
important in the future are restrictive ones: establishment of a common VIS, speeding up 
negotiations of readmission agreements, elaborate deep-going expulsion and 
repatriation policies and strengthening cooperation between national police services.
What these measures have in common is a reinforcement of the territorial 
dimension of the EU, either expelling illegal immigrants or pushing asylum claims outside 
the EU borders. The problem is thereby offloaded on sending states, as the Thessaloniki 
EU summit in June 2003 proves: the conclusions, based on a UK proposal to create 
regional or transit processing centres, was to keep asylum seekers in camps in 
neighbouring, non-EU countries (Romania or Albania). An obvious criticism was that 
asylum seekers were at greater risk when put beyond the domain of justice. The 
Commission therefore proposed to introduce resettlement schemes where responsibility 
is shared between the MS and protected entry procedures from outside the EU. 
Morrisson talks about the creation of a previously unknown category of ‘illegal asylum 
seekers’. Based on the EU documents on migration management, it can be said that 
“[action] was most evident in the more coercive aspects o f migration policy (...), 
measures on asylum, irregular migration, trafficking, smuggling and border controls.’’69
A concrete action put in place was the establishment of a common list of visa- 
requiring and visa-exempted states, implemented by a Council regulation in 2001. The 
technical application of fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal migrants was executed 
by a 2003 Council framework. MS proved reluctant and rather slow in implementing the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters adopted in May 2000; the Council 
therefore pushed MS to create joint investigation teams in order to make cross-border 
police cooperation and law enforcement more efficient. The effectiveness of these 
actions can be inferred upon the coming into force of the mentioned Convention in 
August 2005.70 First positive results have been since noticed on the collaboration of joint 
investigation teams, even if lack of enthusiasm remains understandably present in the 
sphere of exchanging intelligence information. More effective police cooperation allows 
overcoming popular fears that the abolishing of internal borders leads to the erosion of
69 A. Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations” (pre-cited), p. 796
70 Council Regulation (EC), No. 539/2001 (15.03.2001), Available [online]:
http://www.europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc 
=Regulation&an_doc=2001&nu_doc=539; Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 (11.12.2000); Official 
Journal C5 (10.01.2003), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on:
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33081.htm; Council Framework Decision, Available 
[online]: 19.03.2005, on: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33172.htm
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(criminal) law enforcement. The same steps are now being taken to drive cooperation in 
fighting terrorism forward, yet it remains a sensitive area.
Financial measures were also used as incentives for putting legal rules into 
practice. The budget AENEAS, dedicated to the period 2004-2008, provides €250 million 
to the countries having negotiated readmission agreements with the EU (cf. regulation 
EC 2004/401), i.e. for setting up measures for migration legislation, legal immigration, 
refugee protection, preventive measures, legislation against irregular immigration and 
readmission.71 In addition, the ERF was prolonged for the period 2005-2010 by the 
Council Decision 2004/904/EC (2 December 2004). In its recent communication COM 
(2006) 67 final (17 February 2006) to the Council and the European Parliament, the 
Commission asked for an amendment to the ERF in order to make more funds available 
for practical cooperation through Community actions. Reasons for this are the lacking 
flexibility of existing financial opportunities to complete the ‘ambitious mandate set in the 
Hague Programme’ (cf. following paragraph). Specific amendments aim at enabling MS 
to access funds more quickly and with few bureaucratic processes to allow for a rapid 
reaction to potential sudden arrivals of people in need for international protection. The 
same ought to apply for the funding contained in the ARGO programme (13 December 
2004) for administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and 
immigration. This is an important step, because EU actions have to become operable 
faster in emergency situations (unlike it happened in the Kosovo crisis) and the 
endeavour to improve the quality of the common EAS is a good step into this direction.72
ii. Contents and implications o f the Hague Programme 2004
One of the most important texts in contemporary European migration policy is the 
Hague Programme (13 December 2004) from the Council of the EU— in line with the 
above-outlined implementation steps and posing the basis for future actions on the EU- 
level. It outlines concrete implementation steps to take for strengthening freedom, 
security, and justice in the EU— the goal of creating an AFSJ. The Commission has to 
establish yearly scoreboards on the results of the Hague Programme (as was done with 
the Tampere results). The overall aim is to give pragmatic steps based on Tampere, to 
maintain fundamental rights (cf. the European Convention for the protection of Human 
Rights/ECHR), to develop practical methods for Eurojust and Europol and to prepare
71 A. Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations” (pre-cited), p. 796
72 European Commission COM (2006) 67 final (17.02.2006), Available [online]: 19.03.2006, on: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/fr/com/2006/com2006_0067fr01.pdf, pp. 1-10
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legal reviews in the case of the implementation of the Constitutional Treaty.73 The 
similarities with former documents on migration prove the consistency of EU policies in 
this area. Also, the importance of return and readmission policies and migration 
management is re-instated.74
The chapter on strengthening freedom in the programme includes following 
topics: EU citizenship; asylum, migration and border policy (an interesting link); the 
establishment of a common European asylum system (EAS); the fight against illegal 
employment; the integration of TCN and partnerships with the Mediterranean. The SIS II 
(Schengen Information System), VIS and Eurodac are to be effectively interoperable by 
2007. Alphanumeric and biometric identifiers are to be introduced in travel documents 
and minimum standards for national ID cards to be established. Internal border controls 
are to be abolished and replaced by an integrated management system for external 
borders: “The control and surveillance o f external borders fall within the sphere of 
national border authorities", but for ‘long or difficult stretches of external borders’ or 
‘exceptional migratory pressures on these borders’ the European Council is in charge.75 
Frontex was planned to be in place by 1 May 2005 (cf. p. 44f.), a European system of 
border guards is planned. A positive aspect is the explicit recognition of the need for a 
balanced approach between law enforcement and safeguarding individual rights. 
Nonetheless, freedom, it seems, can only be guaranteed by knowing where its limits are.
The security measures concern mainly mutual intelligence information exchange 
(to be effective by 2008) and its use to protect also the internal security of other MS: this 
is an interesting step, which requires a high level of solidarity among the MS. To this 
effect, the interoperability of Europol, Eurojust and the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator 
is to be assured, as well as common measures in fighting terrorism (e.g. against 
financing terrorism or assisting victims of terrorism). Joint investigation teams and 
systematic exchange programmes are to reinforce police cooperation; crises within the 
EU have to be managed with cross-border effects, i.e. the European Security Strategy 
(cf. p. 15) is to be linked with the internal EU public order. Two committees were to be 
created: the Committee on Internal Security and the Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA). The SCIFA shows the importance of border control in 
immigration matters. The security aspect of migration also names steps to undertake 
against crime prevention, organised crime and corruption and offences related to drugs.
73 This last point has lost its relevance since the non-ratifications of the Treaty by France and the 
Netherlands in 2005 have refrained debates on introducing such a constitution in the near future.
74 Council of the EU, The Hague Programme, JAI 559 (13.12.2004), Brussels
75 Ibid., pp. 14f.
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Within the strengthening justice chapter, fewer points are directly related to 
migration as such. The judicial cooperation in criminal matters evokes the need to 
recognize mutually the framework decision on the European Evidence Warrant, minimum 
rules for procedural law, as well as the need to define criminal offences and to determine 
penalties. It also includes mutual recognition of family law, on the grounds of which 
family reunification measures can be applied.
Evelien Brouwer questions the real application of the freedom to move freely in 
the EU in conditions of security and ‘justice accessible to all’ as outlined in Tampere. She 
argues that there are significant differences between the Tampere goals and the Hague 
Programme: the steps taken rather lead to an ‘area of justice for EU citizens’. She 
underlines the need for legal remedies against the database regulations of Eurodac, VIS, 
SIS and SIS II, for instance, although she recognises the improvement of the legal 
provision in SIS II, since it included the right to be informed about the reasons for issuing 
the alert into SIS II. Yet, she also writes that almost 90% of the information stored into 
SIS on individuals concerns ‘TCN to be refused entry to the Schengen territory’.76 These 
doubts about the protection of individual rights and effective application of justice and 
freedom to non-EU nationals— related to far-reaching data storage of personal 
information for a period up to five years— have to be kept in mind and legal guarantees 
ought to make sure that individual rights are not eroded. One positive evolution has been 
the extensive Commission communication establishing a framework programme on 
Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007-2013.77
b) Impacts of the 2004 EU enlargement: institutional changes, human rights abuses 
and protection of territorial boundaries
The evolutions of EU migration policies have affected the MS of EU-15 and 
certainly— to a great extend— of EU-25 as well. Not only was the EU experience as such 
new to Central and East European Countries (CEEC), but also the phenomenon of 
immigration, since countries such as the ČR gradually turned from a transit into a 
destination country. Newer EU MS had distinguishing factors, namely higher levels of 
economic informality and differently configured state-society relations, to which older MS 
had to get used to.78 After outlining institutional implications of EU-intern changes on the
76 E. Brouwer, “Effective Remedies for Third Country Nationals...” (pre-cited), pp.213-236/quote:p.230
77 Commission, COM (2005) 123 final, Available [online]: 30.04.2006, on: http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
lex/lex/LexllriServ/site/fr/com/2005/com2005_0123fr01.pdf
78 A. Geddes, Politics of Migration... (pre-cited), p. 192
41
new MS, the security dimension of the EU enlargement and protection of HR will be 
analysed.
i. Institutional adaptations and the parallel evolution o f the EU and 
NATO eastward enlargements— EU response to terrorism
The specialist on EU JHA Monar analysed the evolution of the EU into an AFSJ
1999 as a ‘major and rapidly developing integration process.’ No other example in the 
history of EC/EU integration process, he continues, has permitted an area of loose 
intergovernmental cooperation making its way so quickly to the top of the Union’s 
political and legislative agenda, the more so since the communitarisation of asylum and 
immigration through the incorporation of the Schengen acquis took place. He also states 
that this development has represented a major challenge for the eastward enlargement 
in many ways. A first factor is the ‘security rationale of the AFSJ’, shared by the 
Schengen system and based on the concept of a common single internal security zone. 
This analysis fits Geddes’ arguments of the EU focusing on the strength of its territorial 
boundaries and, to some extend, also on conceptual boundaries when determining who 
has to remain outside this zone (cf. VIS and the proposals during the Thessaloniki 
summit in 2003). The sensitivity of JHA in the national context— integrating issues of 
asylum, immigration, border controls and fight against crime and drugs— is a second 
factor. Monar points to the risk of xenophobic tendencies profiting from an altogether not 
too popular eastward enlargement. The two last mentioned factors are linked to EU- 
intern developments, i.e. late preparations for accession in the area of JHA (late 
definition of the EU JHA and Schengen acquis in 1998/99); and the rapid growth of the 
EU acquis itself after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.79
Next to these institutional challenges, a distinctive political change took place, 
namely the parallel NATO enlargement of the very same region. Although migration 
issues and the NATO enlargement are normally not discussed jointly in research papers, 
there is a link between the two, because it implied that security issues were particularly 
present in the minds of decision-makers. The new NATO and EU MS had too recent an 
experience of national sovereignty to give it back again for the sake of European Security 
and Defence Policy or migration policies. If coupled with the terrorist attacks in Madrid 
and agenda dedicated to ways how to make the EU more secure, the step towards a
79 J. Monar, “EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement: The Challenge of Diversity 
and EU Instruments and Strategies” (Discussion Paper), Bonn: Zentrum fur Europäische 
Integrationsforschung (ZEI), 2001, pp. 3-8
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more restrictive view of migration does not lie far away, as some intergovernmental
conferences show (cf. Heiligendamm conference, p. 19). Illegal migration is viewed as a
potential threat source, thus being a subjective threat. In addition to territorial integrity,
the particular sensitivity of some CEEC representatives towards political autonomy and
national sovereignty turns them into values to be protected according to Baldwin’s
framework (main protagonists of the issue are e.g. Kwansniewki and Klaus).80
From an institutional perspective, Monar is in favour of an increased “cross-
pillarisation”, which would be beneficial in the case of combating terrorism. He backs his
argument in the Union experience of resettlement agreements in asylum and immigration
policy, where systematic cooperation with third countries is already taking place. Cross-
pillarisation would contain economic and financial concessions from the first pillar, a
necessary component in the fight against terrorism. The impression occurs that just as
the contours of security definitions blurred, so should internal and external measures be
more systematically linked.81 One of the most obvious reasons for linking migration and
the EU fight against terrorism are found in the antiterrorist measures adopted by the EU
Head of States and Governments in Brussels (25 March 2004): the proposed measures
are strikingly similar with those taken against illegal migration (e.g. stronger cooperation
between intelligence, police and justice), reinforcing the illegal migrant— terrorist link:82
“(...) The setting up of a database containing criminal records, lost and stolen 
passports and visa applications,
The introduction of visas by making them computer-readable, including 
biometric features, by the end of 2005 for all EU countries,' (...)
The EU leaders instructed ministers to accelerate the development of the EU 
shared data-base of visa seekers tha t would determine whether a foreigner is 
allowed to enter the EU. (...) They also instructed the European Commission 
to speed up the development of a system that would allow the police to access 
a Pan-European Database of DNA, fingerprints and visa data. (...)”
In a concluding manner, the IOM— while supporting policy and actions against 
terrorism— calls for a balanced approach, which prevents overreaction towards migrants 
and TCN who can be affected by xenophobia and discrimination.83
80 Cf. J. Delors, Mémoires. Paris: Pocket, 2004, p. 572f. ; J. Graff, “Rotten at the Core?” (25.01.2004),
World Economic Forum/ Davos, Available [online]: 20.01.2005, on:
http://www.time.com/time/europe/davos2004speed_2.html
81 J. Monar, “Die EU als Raum der Freiheit...“ (pre-cited), p. 184
82 IOM Belgium, “EU Leaders Adopt Terrorism Action Plan” (26.03.2004), Available [online]:
06.03.2006, on: http://www.belgium.iom.int/PDFDocuments/2006030614393123400062.PDF; For the 
whole text: cf. Appendix 1, p. 102 [emphasis: mine]
83 Ibid., p. 2
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ii. Border control and human rights dimension of the EU enlargement
The EU enlargement to the East has contributed to put the security dimension on 
the forefront of the discussion, a way of responding to re-emerging fears of mass influx 
from the new MS. Most importantly, CEECs like Poland, the ČR or Slovakia, which had 
been turned into a buffer zone in the 1990s by Germany in particular, were now to be 
incorporated into the EU territory. The border itself was now migrating to the east, 
eliminating the buffer zone and putting the EU face to face with Croatia, Serbia, Romania 
and Russia— ‘large and potentially very large migrant and asylum-seeker sending states’, 
as Koslowski puts it.84 Because of persisting problems of corruption, organized crime, 
smugglers and bondage cases in CEE countries (the example of a Kosovo Albanian 
smuggling gang has been widely publicized), a special multilateral meeting was launched 
by Germany prior to the enlargement and in collaboration with these states to reduce 
illegal migration through south-east Europe.
The geo-political widening of the EU had therefore important human security 
implications. New migration flows were added to existing patterns of European migration. 
The traditional nature of European migration, namely guest-worker and post-colonial 
migration patterns (e.g. Turkish and Polish community in Germany, Morocco migration to 
France etc.), were gradually supplanted by irregular migration networks, such as 
smuggling or human trafficking (cf. the concrete example of Bulgarian irregular migration 
to Germany in recent years, p.68f.). Inflow from crisis regions— regions of political 
instability, economic weakness and even recent ethnic cleansing experiences— became 
more likely due to geographical closeness or even neighbourhood to the EU external 
border to the East. The proximity of these new EU migration states have contributed to 
the increased attention that has been paid to the external dimension of EU migration and 
asylum policy, concludes Geddes.85 Out of this situation probably emerged the wish to 
externalise control of irregular migration rather than to take internal measures against the 
informal sector of the economy.
As mentioned, on 1 May 2005, the European Agency Frontex (frontiěres 
extérieures) took up its responsibilities. Interestingly, a military was nominated as its 
chief: the Finnish Colonel llkka Laitinen was appointed Executive Director to run the 
European Agency on 25 May 2005. The seat chosen for Frontex was Warsaw, which 
makes sense with respect to its proximity to Ukraine and being the territory on which the 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is present. The agency is a co-ordinating body, which
84 R. Koslowski, “Security and sovereignty in uniting Europe” (pre-cited), pp. 11 Iff.
85 A. Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and Inti Migration Relations“ (pre-cited), p. 791
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monitors land, air and sea borders between the MS, supporting national authorities with 
training, risk assessment and organisation of joint return operations. Underlying aims are 
again linked to the Hague Programme of maintaining an AFSJ: “The spectre of international 
terrorism, the human tragedies of victims of trafficking and the equally sad and grave 
consequences of illegal migration into the EU, are constant reminders of that we need to do 
even more to combat the many and diverse threats facing this area," concludes the Vice 
President of the Commission Frattini. Too recent is the creation of this Agency to evaluate 
its reach (the website http://www.frontex.eu.int/ is still under construction)86, yet the 
creation of the agency is already interesting in itself.
Due to the clandestine nature of human smuggling, it is nearly impossible to 
tackle its real extend. In 1999, Jonas Widgren (member of the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development) estimated that some 400,000 people are smuggled into 
the EU (EU-15) annually.87 Russian and Eastern European women are trafficked for 
(often forced) prostitution into the EU, 58 Chinese suffocated to death in the back of a 
truck as an attempt to be smuggled into the UK during the Feira European Council 
(Dover-case, 2000), in February 2004 23 (again Chinese) cockle-pickers were 
discovered dead in Morecambe Bay in England. The snakehead was judged a few 
weeks ago in England which is a positive evolution of law, also applied to illegal human 
beings, thus providing legal security to them. Yet this is not always the case. The scale of 
the global irregular migration and human trafficking business is estimated to range 
between $12 billion (IOM numbers) and $30 billion (US evaluation).88
NGOs have a more local access to individual cases of human abuses and make 
public statements to defend their causes. On 25 November 2004, the conference 
“Fighting Human Trafficking across Europe” by La Strada in Prague debated more 
concretely the example of women trafficking from Macedonia to the ČR. It outlined the 
importance of NGOs in preventing women trafficking, supporting victims’ rights and
86 IOM Belgium, “Inauguration of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the MS” (04.07.2005), Available [online]: 06.03.2006, on:
http://www.belgium.iom.int/PDFDocuments/2006030614565612500065.PDF; Migration Policy Institute 
(mpi), “Conference summary— The Presidency Conference on Future European Cooperation in the 
Field of Asylum, Migration and Frontiers” (2004), Available [online]: 08.06.2005, on:
http://www.belgium.iom.int/document/Summary.doc; Communitarian Agencies, “Frontex,” Available 
[online]: 10.05.06, on: http://europa.eu.int/agencies/community_agencies/frontex/index_fr.htm; cf.
Appendix 2, p. 104
87 The Economist, “A Single Market in Crime,” The Economist (16.10.1999)
88 A. Geddes, “Chronicle of a Crisis Foretold: The Politics of Irregular Migration, Human Trafficking 
and People Smuggling in the UK,” in: British Journal o f Politics and International Relations, vol. 7, no.
3, 2005-08: pp. 324-339 (numbers, p. 325)
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influencing EU legislation.89 NGOs are active in trying to pressure more thorough legal 
protection for TCN on the EU agenda, for it is often argued that TCN are being granted 
insufficient protection in EU law. Under the ECHR, protecting jurisprudence could stop 
non-nationals from being expelled from the territory of MS if there is a real risk that they 
will be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 3 ECHR) or if there is a 
disproportionate interference with their right to respect for family life (Art. 8 ECHR). In 
2004, the Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and 
regional HR law (“Meijers Committee”) presented a draft Directive to the European 
Parliament on legal protection and remedies in matters of immigration control.90 Apart 
from this example and the EU Migrants’ Forum (funded by the Commission), pro-migrant 
NGOs tend to be relatively weak, probably because public opinion across the EU is 
rather anti-immigration and because non-national migrants themselves have limited 
access to local, national, let alone European political systems.91
As a way of concluding this section, it seems difficult to re-affirm Angenendt’s 
statement dating from 1999 that the many entrenched national differences in MS’ 
immigration policies make their integration therefore ‘illusory’.92 Quite big national 
differences do remain visible in migration trends, as the next section will show 
concerning the specificities of Germany. But there have still been significant advances on 
the EU-level in terms of communitarisation of migration policies. The outlined idea that 
this step was linked with a securitized approach was verified by many documents taken 
over the last five years and by the impact of the institutional reforms undertaken in 1999. 
Yet it also has to be said that the necessity to protect individual TCN rights and the need 
for a more balanced approach between fighting terrorism and migration is only starting to 
find its way to the EU-level, supported by the ECJ and NGOs. Angenendt could not 
foresee the developments of the EU-policy evolutions in 1999 and also made a point 
when outlining the differences in national political strategies in their way of addressing 
migration challenges, based on national histories, varying economic and social structures 
and distinct political cultures.
89 La Strada International, “Fighting Human Trafficking Across Europe,” (25.12.2004), Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague
90 R. Cholewinski, “The need for effective individual legal protection,” in: European Journal o f Migration 
and Law (pre-cited), pp. 238ff. and E. Brouwer, “Effective Remedies for Third Country Nationals...” 
(pre-cited), pp.213-236
1 A. Geddes, The politics of migration... (pre-cited), p. 144
92 S. Angenendt, Asylum and Migration Policies... (pre-cited), p. 4f.
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Chapter III: Germany’s immigration policies: difficult adaptation to the 21st 
century
Section 1: Historic-political evolutions of immigration realities and debates
Germany is an important actor geo-strategically and politically in the debate over 
national and European-wide migration issues, but the German case of immigration 
policies also has some distinctive features with an ethno-cultural dimension and 
economic arguments that have had an impact on its WS identity. For these reasons, 
developments on the EU level cannot be understood without reference to Germany. The 
more in-depth study of this country will allow giving some insight in the problems faced 
on a national, regional and local level: the federal system of the FRG provides therefore 
one more argument for using it as an example. A first section will give the historic- 
political background and debates that have shaped the different perceptions of 
immigration issues over time in the German state(s). This will then help understanding 
the more specific positions of political actors, which will be analysed in a second section.
A—Historic background of actual German immigration policies (1945-1990s)
A country’s policies are forged by the political culture underlying distinctive 
features of the WS systems: Esping-Andersen noted that WS systems are deeply 
influenced by history and politics, on the basis of which different WS regime (ideal-) 
types can be discerned. Germany belongs to his category of conservative/corporatist 
WS, meaning that the country is moderately de-commodifying (i.e. that citizens can more 
or less freely opt out of work without potential loss of job, income or general welfare) and 
etatist in terms of social stratification (i.e. the ability to regulate social relations are 
imputed on the state).93 The issue of immigration has however posed quite a big 
challenge on the German state. As pointed out by Geddes, immigrant policy focuses on 
the “(...) implications o f the relationship between Germany as a welfare state and 
Germany as an ethno-cultural national community and the resultant articulations 
between inclusion and exclusion that this has generated.”94 Thus, some attention will be
93 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Polity Press, 1990, pp. 23-29
94 A. Geddes, “Germany: Normalised immigration politics?”, in: The Politics of Migration... (pre-cited), 
p. 80
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dedicated to the impacts of immigration on the German WS while taking into account the 
ethno-cultural dimension. This approach outlines the interesting evolution of policies at 
the beginning of the 21st century, when the EU dimension becomes more influential, 
either as a consequence of national political will or taking its own dynamics, according to 
the theory of European integration that is adopted for interpretation.
a) Contested notion of traditional immigration country
Germany’s immigration patterns have to be understood on the background of 
historic developments, because they have greatly influenced recent immigration policies. 
While Germany had been a country of emigration in the 19th century, the tendency 
radically inversed after the end of WW II, the period of which turned Germany into "one 
of the most important destination countries for immigrants" 95 Nonetheless, it was only in 
2001 that the country recognized itself as a country of immigration. There is a striking 
misfit between migration realities regarding the numbers of influx and outflow of the 
country and its contradicting long-term official statements. In a first step, historic 
evolutions and ethno-cultural elements can provide a response for the establishment of 
this principle in 1977 and in a second step, political debates in the 1990s between the 
two main political parties can help understanding how the shift was finally induced.
i. Migration patterns from the aftermath o f WWII to the 1990s
A main pull-factor for migration from 1945 onwards was the booming economy in 
the period of post-war reconstruction, which had disclosed a big gap in the labour 
market, particularly with the human losses of the national-socialist regime and the war.
In a first period lacking workforce could be replaced by expelled or returned 
expatriates of German ethnic origin (so-called Aussiedler, i.e. from the Sudete region in 
Bohemia). Consequently, the Basic Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz) of the newly 
created Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)— which remained the legal point of 
reference after reunification— included a provision in its Article 116(1) that accorded the 
German nationality to residents of the German Reich as of the borders on 31 December 
1937 and thus allowed ethnic German expellees to return:
95 V. Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition” (July 2004), Migration Information Source, 
Available [online]: 08.06.2005, on: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=235 
(Social Science Centre, Berlin)
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Article 116: (1) According to this Fundamental Law (...), is German whoever has
the German citizenship or who has been taken over as a refugee or 
an expellee of German ethnic origin or as his/her spouse or 
descendent in the geographical area of the German Reich as of 31 
December 1937.96
From 1945 to 1955, refugees and expellees represented about 12 million people 
in FRG and were seen as being part of a “Schicksalsgemeinschafl” (community of 
fate).97 This point of view remained a permanent feature especially among the political 
right (CDU/CSU) and was to provide the basis for more open immigration practices at the 
eve and in the aftermath of German reunification in 1989/90. Regardless of the 
difficulties that the Aussiedler had to face, they nonetheless represented a major part of 
immigrants to Germany after the war: Miinz and Fassmann noted that some 3 million 
ethnic Germans continued to immigrate to their ‘mother’ country between 1950 and
1993, with part of them allowed to emigrate after financial inducements had been 
transferred by the FRG to the respective countries.98 The main countries of origin were 
Poland, Romania and the former Soviet Union. According to the two authors, ethnic 
migrants made up for over 75% of the European East-West migrants in this period and 
the rest were refugees, asylum seekers and labour migrants.99 Yet however big these 
migration movements might seem, they did not suffice to fill the immediate needs of the 
labour market. As political tensions with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the 
Soviet Union reached its peak with the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, the 
possibility of attracting labour force from this population pool to the western part of 
Germany was terminated. The GDR accepted immigrants from socialist countries and 
Vietnam, while the FRG had to rely on foreign labour.100
Seeking to attract foreign temporary workers (Gastarbeiter) from Italy, ex- 
Yugoslavia and Turkey had already started earlier, but it now became the only available 
option. The most frequent sectors for employment of guest workers were gastronomy, 
the car industry and the metal industry. If some of them were also employed in 
agriculture, most of them settled in bigger towns, where such sectors were implanted. At 
the beginning of the 1950s the practice of hiring foreign labour had occurred on a non­
official basis (e.g. in the case of Italian labour migrants), but soon thereafter formal 
measures were undertaken in the form of bilateral agreements with dramatic
96 Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (on 26.11.2001), Die Deutsche Bibliothek, 9th 
edition, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001, p. 211 [translation: mine]; original: cf. Annex
97 A. Geddes, The Politics of Migration... (pre-cited), p. 80
98 B. Marshall, “West Germany and migration 1945-89”, in: The new Germany... (pre-cited) p. 8/9
99 R. Miinz/H. Fassmann, “European East-West Migration 1945-92,“ in: International Migration 
Review, no. 28 (3), 1994: pp. 520-538
100 B. Marshall, The new Germany... (pre-cited), pp. 5-19
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consequences for today’s immigration patterns. Contracts were signed with Italy (1955), 
Spain and Greece (1960) and Turkey (1961). This practice was expanded in a more 
limited scope with Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Morocco (1963; 1966). In 1970 
there was a peak of immigration especially to the Bundesland Bavaria.101
This trend was radically slowed down with the world-wide economic oil crisis of 
1973, giving way to more restrictive immigration policies between 1973 and 1977. On 23 
November 1973 the federal government stopped the immigration inflow from non-EEC 
countries (e.g. Turkey) with its “Anwerbestopp”. The reason for this was that it had 
become clear by then that the hope that the ‘guest’ workers would return after their—  
what was thought to be a temporary— work contract was over, was not happening. The 
German term is quite precise in its meaning, implying that from then on no more new 
labour migrants were attracted to the country. This did not mean though, that the doors 
were closed completely to immigration. Rather, migration patterns shifted from 
predominantly male single workers in the 1950s/60s to a feminisation of migration 
through family reunification (immigrating wives and children) after the stop of economic 
migration. In 1982, Interior Minister Gerhard Baum summarised the state’s approach by 
stating that after having brought guest-workers into Germany since the 1950s, they were 
entitled to some (moral) obligations. Joppke furthermore outlines the role of law and the 
courts, since the FRG’s Fundamental Law puts individual rights before state power. In 
addition, just as is the case for the social security system, the rights of the family could 
not be limited in scope for Germans.102
Next to the consequent family reunification flows, the 1970s and 80s were marked 
by increasing refugee and asylum seeker inflows. The effect accompanying this dramatic 
raise was an ever growing reluctance to recognize refugees as such. Reservations 
already emerged in the 70s against (left-oriented) political refugees, who were suspected 
of keeping up their activism in Germany, and against “economic asylum seekers”. 
Former Chancellor Kohl labelled them as such, suspecting them of using the asylum 
system for economic reasons.103 The system had been put in place to conform to the 
requirements of the international Geneva refugee Convention from 1951 (cf. p.89f.). In 
some cases there were no doubts that persecution on grounds of political opinion had 
taken place: this was for example the case for left-wing refugees after the Chilean coup 
in 1973. These refugees remained disrupting for some members of the political right in 
Germany, who were afraid that they could import revolutionary ideas to the country, as
R. Munz/H. Fassmann, “European East-West Migration 1945-92“ (pre-cited)
102 Cf. A. Geddes, The Politics of Migration... (pre-cited), pp. 82-86
103 Cf. B. Marshall, The new Germany... (pre-cited), p. 18
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Thränhardt analysed it.104 Such fears coincided with a national context of instability and 
even psychosis among the population induced by the terrorist activities of the Baader- 
group (Rote Armee Fraktion), which wanted to change what they called a ‘bourgeois 
society’. No link can be made between politically left-oriented refugees and this terrorist 
group, but the context itself did not shed a favourable image on the new-comers.105
Politicians like Kohl made a clear distinction between the asylum seekers who 
were and those who were rather not welcome. He justified the pertinence of the asylum 
system on grounds of the ‘historic guilt’ and the ‘crimes which were committed’ by the 
Germans. But he reminded that the country’s commitment to its past and to humanitarian 
values had not been intended for people emigrating for economic reasons. Thus, even 
when asylum seekers were not considered dangerous politically, they were thought to 
have left their country of origin mainly to improve their living standards abroad, a fact that 
did not fit the Geneva Convention definition. Interior Minister Genscher from the liberal 
FDP went as far as to call this phenomenon an “Asylmiftbrauch" (abuse of the asylum 
procedure). Caroline Kern tones this position down by pointing out that the motivation of 
this immigrant behaviour was probably induced by an attempt to enter the otherwise 
closed labour market.106 More restrictive policies (the introduction of visa requirements 
and shortened asylum procedures) paralleled growing popular discontent against 
immigration. In 1977 these developments led to the mentioned statement that Germany 
was not a country of immigration, a point of view that was stuck to well into the 1990s.
ii. Demographic evolution and public opinion after reunification
When a law was passed by Gorbachev in 1986, with the effect of loosening 
emigration restrictions from the Soviet Union, the ethno-cultural element became crucial 
again. It caused an immigration jump from the countries of the Soviet block to the FRG, 
especially after the fall of the iron curtain (e.g. ethnic Germans from Romania in 1990 
after Ceaucescu’s fall).107 The 1989/90 euphoria over the reunification of Germany led to 
a peak of mass emigration from GDR to FRG in a first time, but then gave way to a 
general trend of internal migration within the country. Between 1991 and 1999 about 1.7 
million people moved to the West, but 1.2 million also moved to the East of Germany, an
104 Quoted in: A. Geddes, The Politics of Migration... (pre-cited), p. 86
105 H.-H. JANSEN, “Stabilität und Reform -  Innenpolitik 1949-1999,” in: 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland: Paten und Diskussionen. preface Hans MOMMSEN, ed. by E. Conze/G. Metzler, 
Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999, pp. 25-38
106 C. Kern, “Fortress Europe?...“ (pre-cited), p. 82
107 Bundesregierung, “Politische Ziele,” on: http://www.zuwanderung.de/3_polit-ziele.html; “Zeitstrahl,” 
on: http://www.zuwanderung.de/1_zeitstrahl.html, both available [online]: 08.06.2005
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often omitted fact.108 The start of the 1990s were marked by relatively liberal asylum 
provisions and a right to return for foreigners with ethnic German background (called 
Aussiedler directly after the collapse of the Communist block, but labelled Spätaussiedler 
when they emigrated after 1994). The new immigration law includes the latter group in 
statistics, since they were considered as being part of a broader understanding of the 
German community. Most of them came from Kazakhstan, Russia and Romania.109
These relatively open asylum rules were based on a self-imposed wish to conform 
to international HR laws and were thus also responsible for the immigration increase in 
reunified Germany.110 Article 16 of the Grundgesetz stipulates that “politically persecuted 
people have a right to asylum", but this right was drastically limited after a tremendous 
peak of asylum applications to Germany in 1992. Pessimistic economic realities caught 
up with the initial elation over reunification. Post-communist transition proved more 
difficult than expected and led to massive emigration to the Western Bundesländer, 
although a solidarity fund had been put in place to overcome the gap between the 
Länder budgets. The identity of Germany as a WS was under threat, for unemployment 
was a rather new experience in the post-communist Länder and remained at a high level.
In addition, it had been mistakenly assumed that the ethnic national community 
dimension was now resolved, but it is still a central point of the immigration debate in 
Germany as of today: “The Germans have so far not been able to create a picture of 
themselves that lets immigrants know exactly what this country is all about. That has to 
do with the negative experiences o f National Socialism (...)”, stated migration specialist 
Klaus Bade (cf. societal debate, section 2 in this chapter).111 Besides, mentalities had 
evolved quite differently behind each side of the wall since the 1950s, more and more 
focusing on the question of German national identity, even leading to xenophobic 
stances in some cases. This fits the statement that immigrants contribute to testing “a 
country’s sense of itself, forcing people to define what they value",112 Only once there is 
a clear definition on what or who is German can there also be a consensus on who can
108 P. J. Opitz, “Internationale Migration” in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung (Bundeszentrale fur 
politische Bildung), “Internationale Beziehungen II— Frieden und Sicherheit zu Beginn des 21. 
Jahrhunderts,” no. 274/2002, p.48
109 Bundesministerium des Innern, “Das neue Zuwanderungsgesetz,” Available [online]: 
08.06.2005,on:
http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_165090/lnternet/Content/Themen/Zuwanderung/DatenundFakten/
Das__neue__Zuwanderungsgesetz.html; S. Angenendt, Asylum and Migration Policies in the
European Union (DGAP). ed. by Angenendt, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1999, p. 167 
A. Geddes, The politics of migration... (pre-cited), p. 79
111 Quoted by: A. Tzortzis, “In Europe, quizzes probe values of potential citizens” (04.10.2006), The 
Christian Science Monitor, Available [online]: 21.04.2006, on: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0410/p01s04-woeu.html
112 The Economist, “The Longest Journey: A Survey of Migration," (02.11.2002), p. 4
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find a path towards German citizenship or who has to remain outside of this realm. It also 
assumes that citizenship can be gained upon other criteria than having German blood.
Effectively, a survey over the perceptions on current demographic trends 
(published in 2005) states that “[the] differences in the perceptions and opinions between 
East- and West-Germans have been maintained. (...) East-Germans consider foreigners 
to be a far greater danger than is the case among West-Germans“ .113 The survey also 
discloses the differences in the perceptions of the demographic situation in Germany in 
comparison to the real situation in 2002/03. A commission was established in the year 
2000 to put in place an immigration policy; the body argued that immigration could be a 
way not to overcome, but at least to relieve problematic demographic developments.114 It 
was also important to get the pulse of public opinion in this endeavour, since such new 
relevant policy developments needed the support of the people.
Three numbers are revealing in the survey that juxtaposes public opinion and real 
demographic developments. Firstly, the expected number of population aging was 
extremely overestimated, since the proportion of 65 and older was of about 17.5% (not 
as estimated 30.1%). Population ageing is relevant since it is often used as an argument 
for loosening immigration policies. Secondly, it was argued that the average fertility rate, 
another demographic argument for favouring immigration, is very low. This was 
confirmed by the official statistical data body (Statistisches Bundesamt): in 2004, 
Germany’s fertility rate counted about 1.37 percent, which is still a bit higher than in the 
ČR, for instance (1.16 percent).115
Thirdly and most strikingly, the numbers of expected foreigners was greatly 
overestimated, exceeding the real situation by 36.4%. Statistics count about 7.3 million 
foreigners, which represents 8.9% of the total population. This naturally excludes illegal 
migrants, escaping official data by definition. The main country of origin of the immigrants 
to Germany remains Italy within the EU, Turkey and the former Soviet Union from non- 
EU countries (especially of Jewish origin). The length of stay also varies quite 
significantly and does not fit a common popular belief that once a foreigner comes, s/he 
never leaves. The following graph shows that a little more than 60% of the officially
113 Bundesinstitut fur Bevólkerungsforschung beim Statistischen Bundesamt, “Einstellungen zu 
demographischen Trends und zu bevólkerungsrelevanten Politiken— Ergebnisse der Population Policy 
Acceptance Study in Deutschland,“ J. Dorbritz/A. Lengerer/K. Ruckdeschel (2005), Available [online]:
08.06.2005, on: http://www.bib-demographie.de/info/ppas_broschuere.pdf, p. 8 [translation: mine]
114 Bundesministerium des Innern, “Migrationsbericht," ed. by Sachverständigenrat fur Zuwanderung
und Integration, BAMF, Berlin (2004), Available [online]: 08.06.2005, on:
http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_121894/lnternet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2004/Mi 
arationsbericht__2004,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Migrationsbericht_2004
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Bildung, no. 282/2004, p. 18
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registered remain longer than 10 years with 40% leaving the country beforehand. And 
only 19% stay seemingly “forever”.116
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The net immigration inflow rate, established by subtracting the outflow from the 
inflow of migrants, was conversely greatly underestimated by 33.4%. There is another, 
probably more precise way of establishing an approximation of net migration when 
subtracting the total number of deaths and births from the total of the overall population 
rate. Statistics are but a gross approximation and can only be seen as an indicator of the 
real situation in a country. According to Norbert Cyrus’ expert analysis for the 
government in 2004, uncertain estimations of those living in Germany without residence 
permit amount up to 1.3 million people.117 By 2003 Germany counted roughly 103.000 
immigrants as opposed to the highest peak of 595.000 in 1992, due to the asylum 
compromise pointed out earlier.118 This shows the impact that policies can have in terms 
of immigration management (not to say control).
Bundesregierung, “Statistik,” Available [online]: 08.06.2005, on:
http://www.zuwanderunq.de/imaqes/imq/larqe/1 5.gif
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b) Political debates starting to tackle pressing migration realities in the 1990s
The summary of the conference “Future European Co-operation in the Field of 
Asylum, Migration and Frontiers” in Amsterdam in 2004 stated that “Germany has 
Europe’s highest absolute number o f migrants and a population that is about 13 percent 
foreign-born.”119 Germany’s ‘counterfactual ideology’ (Tomas Faist) of not being an 
immigration country was only abandoned in 2001, when Interior minister Otto Schily 
made the opposite statement to finally fit realities.120 Why did it take politicians so long to 
officially recognize that Germany is indeed a country of immigration? A main reason is 
that admitting this also required that an immigration law be passed, when there were still 
so many political disagreements concerning the accents to put within immigration issues. 
While the right-wing CDU/CSU continued to focus on German-ness (Deutschtum) and 
feared a predominance of foreigners over time (Uberfremdung), the left-wing SPD 
labelled this discourse pejoratively “Deutschtumeleľ’ and focused on the fate of asylum 
seekers instead. These debates gained momentum in the 1990s, but have not yet been 
resolved today. Discussions were led on issues such as double citizenship or German 
culture as a ‘leading’ one (Leitkultur) embedded in an integration process. The CSU in 
Bavaria only recently toughened regulations regarding foreigners, forcing them to 
“integrate” into German society under the threat of financial sanctions if they refuse.121
The first broad debate concerned the asylum compromise of the year 1992/93, 
followed by diverse issues that laid the basis for the immigration law passed in 2004.
i. From the asylum compromise to the end o f the CDU/CSU-FDP 
coalition (1993-1998)
In 1991 a new law on foreigners’ rights came into force, facilitating the procedure 
to get the German citizenship. The following year recorded a historic peak of immigration 
to Germany with 440.000 asylum applications, yet in the end only 4.25% were actually 
entitled to it. This launched a sensitive societal uproar over foreigner and asylum policies 
to which an alternative had to be found, especially after violent physical attacks were 
launched against asylum housings. The Christian Democrats’ (CDU/CSU) primary goal 
was to reduce the number of asylum seekers in order to relieve the tension, whereas the 
coalition-partner Free Democrats (FDP) and the opposition party SPD asked for more
119 Migration Policy Institute, “Conference summary— ...” (pre-cited)
120 Quoted in: A. Geddes, The Politics of Migration... (pre-cited) p. 15+79
121 “Stoiber besteht auf Sanktionen fur unwillige Ausländer” (08.04.2006), Spiegel Online Politik, 
Available [online]: 24.04.2006, on: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,410557,00.html
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progressive measures turned towards integration. After some bargain, the government 
coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP reached an agreement with the SPD, the so-called 
“asylum compromise” on 6th December 1992.122 The article 16a(2) of the Grundgesetz 
specified the country of origin of “politically persecuted persons” entitled to claim asylum: 
it excluded all the EC countries and the third states, in which the Convention for the 
protection of HR and basic freedoms is guaranteed (defined as ‘safe’ countries of 
origin).123 As a result, the number of asylum-seekers dropped radically the following year 
and remained a downwards trend until the end of the millenary. Exceptionally, Germany 
accepted about 345,000 refugees who had fled from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid- 
1990s, but about 90% of them had returned by 2002.124 The situation remained 
somewhat stable until 2000, with one law in 1997 improving the living conditions of 
foreigners and facilitating the extradition of foreign criminals to their country of origin.
The following graph gives a rough overview of the proportions of asylum 
applications to Germany from 1990 (the year of German unification) to 1996, when the 
situation was somewhat stabilized; it opposes them to the United Kingdom and France, 
the two countries having received the highest numbers of applications within the EU-15 
after Germany, and the rest of the EU-15. It shows how disproportionately great 
Germany was touched by the phenomenon of asylum seekers in the first half of the 
1990s, even if the following numbers are but an approximation in itself.125
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
A distinctive feature of the CDU/CSU -  FDP coalition was the use of bilateral 
agreements to resolve border issues in the aftermath of reunified Germany. Germany’s 
Eastern border was finally clarified by the German-Polish Treaty on 14 November 1990, 
establishing the Oder-Neisse line as irreversible. On 17 June 1991 another Treaty was 
signed by the two countries, guaranteeing the cultural and linguistic rights of the Polish 
minority of German ethnic origin. Chancellor Kohl signed a cooperation and friendship
122 Bundesministerium des Innern, “Migrationsbericht...” (pre-cited), p. 14
123 Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2001 (pre-cited), p. 27
124 V. Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition“ (pre-cited)
125 Annual numbers of asylum applications, 1990-1996, based on: B. Marshall, The new Germany... 
(pre-cited), p. 35
56
treaty with the Czech president Václav Havel on 27 Feburary 1992, which however did 
not tackle claims by the Sudete minority expelled in 1945 from Czech lands. This was 
done a few years later on 21 January 1997 with a common declaration between the 
same two politicians, outlining the pains endured on both sides due to the war.126
Next to border issues and minority rights, bilateral resettlement agreements were 
signed by the government, thereby taking up the method used for establishing temporary 
work contracts in the 1950s and 1960s. But this time around, the negotiating states were 
respectively to arrange the reception of their national asylum applicants when the latter 
were rejected. Such agreements were signed with Romania (1992), Poland (1993), 
Croatia, Bulgaria and the ČR in 1994 and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
I the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996.127 It was also agreed upon, that third 
state members, who had illegally crossed the border, would be taken over, even if this 
point often made difficult political bargain necessary.
Furthermore, Glatzel pointed out that “Germany has always emphasised upon the 
conclusion of bilateral taking-back agreements that it is aiming at creating a European- 
wide system of taking-back agreements."'28 Indeed, the government regarded asylum as 
an issue touching the whole of Europe, which therefore had to be tackled on a broader 
basis. Logics of burden-sharing between richer and poorer Länder were in a way sought 
to be transposed on the community level. It can be said that the endeavour was 
successful to a limited extend, since it led to the Council of the EU ministers of interior 
and justice forging a draft for an EU-wide model for bilateral agreements in 1994. Yet 
despite this effort on the EU-level, countries such as Great Britain and Austria were 
vehemently opposed to such EU-wide burden-sharing advocated by Germany.
Another attempt to tackle the issue on a wider scope was the launching of 
multilateral agreements, such as between Germany and the Benelux countries on 7 July
1994. The aim was to take common actions in the sphere of asylum and consular 
cooperation. The most far-reaching agreement as of then nonetheless remained the 
Dublin Convention (cf. p.31).129 It had the ambitious goals of establishing a harmonized 
system of border controls, creating a common visa policy and judicial information system. 
This finally led to the creation of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on
I 126 “Allemagne— Actualité (1990-2001),” Encyclopaedia Universalis. DVD-Version 8, 2002
127 H. Glatzel, “Bilaterale Rucknahmeubereinkommen und multilaterale Harmonisierungspolitik”, in: 
Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung, Migration und Flucht— Aufaaben und Strateqien fur 
Deutschland, Europa und die internationale Gemeinschaft, band 342, ed. by Steffen Angenendt, 
Bonn, 1997, pp.107-115
128 Ibid., p. 114 [translation mine]
129 “Ubereinkommen uber die Bestimmung des zuständigen Staates fur die Prufung eines in einem 
Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gestellten Asylantrags,“ Available [online]:
08.06.2005, on: http://migration.uni-konstanz.de/pdf/geA/oelkerrecht/Dublin.htm
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the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) in 1992.130 Common visa policies are 
still a guideline for the Commission (of. the Hague Programme, p.39ff.) and Eurojust is 
responsible for the harmonization of judicial information systems.
It can thus be argued that the system of bilateral agreements has laid the path 
towards the coordination of asylum and migration policies of the EU. In contrast to this, 
Angenendt stated in 1997 that this system represented a hemming factor in a 
Europeanizing process, in maintaining the issue on a mainly national, intergovernmental 
mode of cooperation.131 This may have been true at first, but the 2003/109/EC 
regulation, which standardizes the legal status of TCN on their long-term stay in an EU 
country, proves the impact that the issue has gained a few years later.132
ii. Late 1990s political debates between the parties
Politics shifted in Germany at the end of 1998 shortly before the Amsterdam 
Treaty moved immigration and asylum issues to the first community pillar in a title 
covering free movement, immigration and asylum.133 As Monar points out, the heads of 
state and government referred for the first time to “our territory” in singular form in the 
conclusions of the European Council of Tampere in October 1999.134
There are two theories concerning the interplay of the domestic and the EC/EU 
level of migration policy at the turn of the century: one emphasises the input of EU 
developments into the domestic level, hence emphasising the supranational level, while 
the other views the use of Europeanized migration and security policies as a way of 
pushing through domestic interests that were otherwise being hindered by legal or/and 
political barriers, remaining state-centred. Yet another way to look at it is to outline the 
European-wide phenomenon of spreading xenophobic and extreme right-wing 
movements/parties in countries such as Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Similar 
domestic rather local experiences have pressured upon the governments to take up 
measures more urgently and efficiently.
In the German case, domestic politics were certainly important in shifting national 
positions about migration. On 26 April 1998 the extreme right-wing party Deutsche
130 “EU immigration policy” (CIREFI), Available [online]: 06.04.2005, on: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133100.htm
131 S. Angenendt, “Perspektiven einer deutschen Migrationspolitik,” in: Migration und Flucht (...) (pre­
cited), p. 283
132 Richtlinie 2003/109/EG (25.11.2003), “Rechtsstellung der langfristig aufenthaltsberechtigten 
Drittstaatangehórigen”, Available [online]: 08.06.2004, on:
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Volksunion (DVU) entered the regional parliament (Landtag) of Saxony-Anhalt by gaining 
12.9% of the votes and on 5 September 1999 the same party entered the parliament of 
Brandenburg. On 27 September 1998 the social democrats gained the federal elections 
and created a governmental alliance with the green party (Bundnis ‘90/Die Griinen) in its 
aftermath. The new coalition launched the process of many deep-going, though greatly 
contested reforms, among which a revision of the nationality code.135 Those reforms had 
been necessary also in the light of harmonizing attempts of national policies on the EU 
level, yet they happened in a climate of great political tension. On 21 May 1999 the 
Bundestag adopts the project reforming the nationality code.
The political tension remained nonetheless critical up to the point of Chancellor 
Schroder’s calling for advanced parliamentary elections in 2005. A closely related 
question had become the viability of such a highly redistributive WS system as the 
German one is, for the problem of demography (ageing and low birth rate) directly affects 
social security and pension systems. A way of approaching this problem had been for the 
government to gradually view immigration as an economic opportunity rather than a 
nuisance.136 Yet if one recalls the two main tasks of a WS as defined by Esping- 
Andersen— de-commodification and social stratification— one can derive the hypothesis 
that although the reforms in matters of immigration were necessary and represented a 
progress in some areas, the German WS itself suffers from them under certain aspects. 
Stronger intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation processes launched within the 
eyesight of a unique EU territory and a common EU border can harmonize the 
community approach and thereby maybe clarify conditions on the national levels.
B—Policy trends 2000-2005: coalition and compromise needed for reforms
a) 2000-2002: U-turn in German immigration policies
i. State regulation o f work permits -  the “green card” system
At about the same time as the Council of the EU met in Tampere the new 
government coalition of SPD -  Green party put the issue of migration on the forefront of 
its agenda and codified by law a series of immigration-related bills. Migration was used 
mainly as an economic argument again (like during the guest-worker period): it was seen
135 C. Kern, “Fortress Europe?...” (pre-cited), p. 82
136 The Economist, “The Longest Journey: A Survey of Migration“, published on 02.11.2002, p. 4
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as a positive measure when certain sectors of the economy suffer from lacking 
specialised workforce or when nationals do not accept low-qualified positions. But the 
negative aspects of economic migration concern fears of people from economically less 
developed countries flooding in, hoping to get better living conditions. Exceptional 
measures were undertaken on the EU-level in the face of EU enlargement in May 2004 
to limit access to the Western European labour market for two years to some of the new 
MS. Germany is not exempt of a similar dichotomy. General fears had emerged among 
EU-15 citizens that cheap labour force from Central Europe would flood the Western 
European labour market. The driving force behind these measures was fear of salary 
dumping or higher unemployment. A 2001 research lead by Brucker’s German Institute 
for Economic Research (DIW) for the European Commission had investigated expected 
effects of EU enlargement on the labour market.137 According to his estimations, 335,000 
people were to move west a year until the flow slowed down after the convergence of the 
salaries. This trend has not yet been verified. Furthermore, the general EU principle of 
free movement of persons already stated in the Treaty of Rome (1957) does not allow a 
permanent discrimination against non-German EU citizens in terms of employment.
Labour migration was used in the summer of 2000 by the German government, 
when the 1973 Anwerbestopp protective measure was loosened by an exception clause 
providing for the distribution of 324,000 additional work permits. In 2002 up to 374,000 
temporary work permits were issued. Mostly seasonal workers benefited from it, but they 
are allowed to remain maximum 90 days in Germany for this purpose. Contract workers 
have the right to stay longer (maximum two years); in over half of the cases, contract and 
seasonal workers are from Poland, Hungary and the ČR.138 The measures were meant 
to loosen restrictions on the labour market to favour circular migration. In the case of 
Polish temporary or seasonal workers, family reunification is not necessary if borders can 
be easily crossed back and forth. Furthermore, incentives for falling into an illegal status 
are diminished, because such a contract is renewable and because it is still possible to 
re-enter the country once a migrant has left the territory. The “Green-card” initiative was 
launched to attract 20,000 ICT specialists lacking to drive the German economy forward. 
In order not to repeat the ‘overstaying of the guest-worker’ phenomenon, their residency 
is limited to five years and the family members of these IT specialists were excluded from 
work for the first year after arrival. Mostly workers from India, Poland and Russia made 
use of this possibility. Yet these policies were not popular, the more so because the 
initiative failed to attract the expected number of workforce to restart German economy.
137 The Economist (2002), p. 6
138 Bundesministerium des Innern, “Migrationsbericht...” (2004) (pre-cited), p. 16
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ii. Reform of the citizenship law (2000)
Next to the economic aspect of migration the new government tackled the issue 
form the citizenship perspective. A clear u-turn occurred in the German approach from a 
traditionally predominant ius sanguinis to a more moderate provision including ius soli 
regulations, as used by custom in France. Over the last decades, the earlier approach 
had led to the feature that the children of long-term guest-workers were not recognized 
as German citizens, despites being born in Germany and having adopted a German way 
of life. Differences among generations of migrants emerged and were crucial in forging a 
heterogeneous German society: as first-generation migrants from Turkey did not believe 
that they would remain in Germany, they sometimes sent their children to their country of 
origin for school attendance. When returning to Germany to look for better employment, 
they were inadequately adapted workforce.139 Hence, Angenendt argued for a renewed 
policy questioning the ius sanguinis concept and allowing double citizenship instead.140
The reformed law on citizenship came into force on 1 January 2000. From then 
on, children born to foreigners received the German citizenship, when one parent had 
been a legal resident in Germany for at least eight years. Children affected by this clause 
have to choose one of the two nationalities between age 18 and 23, except when 
bilateral agreements allow to keep the double citizenship (as is the case with France). 
This meant that the ius sanguinis clause was not abolished, but broadened. Dispositions 
against extremists were added and the foreigners had to prove sufficient knowledge of 
German, so that they could fulfil the primary goal behind this law, i.e. integration.141 The 
CDU/CSU parties did not recognize dual citizenship— a critique aimed primarily against 
German-Turkish dual citizenship. The party started a large campaign among the 
population and gathered quite a number of signatures against the new law. This 
upheaval could not be ignored by the government and this is why dual citizenship is 
today only granted in exceptional cases (e.g. when the original citizenship cannot be 
abolished). This definition had the effect of decreasing the number of foreigners in 
statistics by about 80,000.142 These policies having yet again opened the path for 
sensitive political discussions, Minister of the Interior Schily created a commission in
2000 to elaborate proposals on an ambitious immigration and integration policy.143
The Economist (2002), “Feeling at home”, p. 9
140 S. Angenendt, “Perspektiven einer deutschen Migrationspolitik,” in: Migration und Flucht (pre-cited), 
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b) 2002-2005: difficult bargain towards and after the imposition of an immigration law
i. Political conditions prior to the Zuwanderungsgesetz and its content
The commission report “Structuring Immigration, Fostering Integration” was 
handed over to Schily the following year. It summarized demographic facts (aging 
population, viability of social security and pension schemes etc.) and proposed to focus 
on the goal of integration via education and language. It suggested having a quota of 
annually 20,000 immigrants, the criteria to choose the applicants were to be based on a 
point system (education, age and language skills, a procedure used also in Canada). It 
also aimed at speeding up the asylum procedure. Based on this report, the government 
coalition handed over a bill to the Bundestag, taking over some of the commission’s 
proposals. The bill focused on promoting highly qualified migration and integration and 
was consequently passed by parliament and signed by president Rau in March 2002, 
despite popular discontent (cf. p.81f.).
Yet the conservative parties were dissatisfied with it and blocked it through the 
Federal Court (BVG) on grounds of a procedural flaw at the end of the year. From then 
on, the political parties tried to achieve an agreement similar to the asylum compromise 
in 1992. It was a tight political bargain, especially since the Bundesrat had a CDU/CSU 
majority and thus had the necessary backing support for the negotiations. Whereas the 
government parties stressed integration of foreigners, conservative parties stressed 
threats that immigration might pose to interior security.
The question became pressing in spring 2004, precipitated by the “Kaplan”-affair. 
The extremist Islamic leader Metin Kaplan was the head of the Islamic association 
“Kalifatstaať (caliphate state), forbidden in 2001 because of anti-terror laws. In March 
2003, Kaplan had been convicted to four years of imprisonment on the grounds of 
incentives to murder and was to be handed over to Turkey. The Cologne administrative 
court confirmed the end of the asylum status he had been granted in 1992, but refused 
his extradition to Turkey. These judicial questions were solved only in May 2004, when 
the Munster higher administrative court admitted Kaplan’s expatriation.144
Finally, an outcome was agreed upon between the Chancellor of the time Gerhard 
Schroder, the representatives of the Green party, the conservatives and the FDP. This 
political agreement became the basis for the elaboration of a new legislative draft. Schily 
summarized the main aspects of the law in his presentation speech on 1 July 2004
144 Per Fischer Weltalmanach 2005. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, p. 145
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before the upper chamber.145 He picked up the topics of labour migration, humanitarian 
measures, integration and security. He welcomed the promotion of labour migration of 
highly qualified persons through the process of facilitating family reunification. In addition, 
a federal institution for migration and refugees was created (Bundesamt fur Migration 
und Fluchtlinge/BAMF), the role of which is to implement the concepts of the law. Schily 
referred to opinion polls to underline the importance of security matters, since 80% of the 
population believed that security measures had to be taken into account in a law on 
foreigners. The sensitivity of the issue has been under greater spotlights after the 
(terrorist) attacks in Washington and Madrid and contributed to the conservative parties’ 
insistence in adding the possibility to deport foreigners on the basis of a “threat 
prognosis”.146 The law was accepted by both chambers in July 2004 and the new 
immigration law came into effect on 1 January 2005.147
The 1973 measure against the inflow of low- or non-qualified workers was 
maintained and cannot be overcome lest by very exceptional measures. Incentives for 
migration are economically for unskilled labour for those jobs that Germans are reluctant 
to take (this is momentarily the case for harvesting asparagus). Independent workers are 
allowed to work in Germany if they create at least ten new jobs and invest one million 
Euros. The formerly proposed point system was abolished. One innovation concerned 
humanitarian right, which was improved in taking into consideration non-state 
persecution and gender-related persecution; it makes an explicit reference to the Geneva 
Convention for the rights of refugees (28 July 1951). The maximum number of months to 
stay was fixed at 18 and the possibility to prolong the stay every three months was 
abolished, since some refugees had already made abusive use of it. The security issues 
included the provision of expulsing foreigners on the basis of a well-founded threat 
prognostic (cf. p.70f.). This applies to “spiritual fire raisers” and “hate sermons” (Kaplan 
falls into this category). If expulsion is not possible because of an expected death penalty 
or torture in the country of origin, the person remains under strict watching and can 
eventually be imprisoned (§53 foreigners law148).
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Language and integration courses were put in place to facilitate the integration of 
foreigners. They were paid by the state, for which it dedicated 200 million € annually: 
50,000 foreigners have to follow these courses and sanctions can be applied if they 
refuse to do it (for example through non-prolongation of residence permits).149 The level 
to be achieved should follow the common European reference system for the knowledge 
of languages.150 Further programmes are dedicated to integrating women more in 
particular, who may have to adapt from a different environment in their country of origin, 
to help them access the job world more easily. Churches, trade unions, employer unions 
and other societal groups are incorporated into these projects.
ii. Rising popular discontent over the “integration” o f immigrants and 
the “visa scandal” in February 2005
Contrary to expectations, the party compromise did not soothe moods over the 
integration of immigrants. Having lifted the taboo on the topic seemed to have unleashed 
more debates. The issue added to a general sense of dissatisfaction in 2005, which 
finally led to Schroder’s anticipation of elections. The government crisis and high 
unemployment rates were expressions of failed social stratification, a feature continuing 
in 2006 with strikes and unsuccessful attempts to settle disagreements between trade 
unions and employers even through third parties (so-called Schlichter). The inclusion of 
foreigners poses a major challenge to the national WS not only in financial but also in 
socio-political terms.151 The viability of the actual German WS system cannot be assured 
in the long run, which is the reason why the previous government had launched such 
unpopular reforms as Hartz IV and Agenda 2010. Both measures had tried to tackle 
issues like unemployment, social security, health and pension system. In 2005 the 
number of unemployed people rose, due to a new definition of unemployed persons that 
hit foreigners in particular.
Rising popular discontent also challenged governmental authority to solve the 
sensitive problem of integration. The government summarizes the importance and the 
goal of ‘integration’ by stating that it “(...) cannot be limited to organizing a life in 
togetherness o f people from different cultures. A society cannot bear an internal
149
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separatism based on cultural borders."152 This sort of separatism adds to the 
heterogeneity and turbulence of German society, which can lead to a renewed and 
diffuse sense of danger. As the above-mentioned survey showed, people in Germany 
are generally in favour of integration, but they demand that those who reject it be 
expelled.153 Integration as understood by the government has been mainly a question of 
language, but it is increasingly also a matter of culture. The so-called second generation 
(children of immigrants) may have sufficient language skills, but may not be able to 
clearly define its place in society, becoming alienated and hostile rather than contributing 
to cultural diversity. In the opinion of deputy major of Marseilles Claude Bertrand this can 
contribute to an increased occurrence of petty crime among immigrants.154
The Muslim immigrant population is observed more closely, establishing more or 
less directly a link with terrorism and security, which becomes clear when taking into 
account recent proposals on the Länder-level for the establishment of immigration tests 
(cf. p.75ff.). Such reactions by politicians aim at limiting inner-political consequences of 
immigration, namely loss of political legitimacy and a further rise of the extreme-right. A 
few Länder especially in the eastern part of Germany have indeed at times experienced 
a renewed increase in support for the extreme right-wing NPD.155 Yet as Marshall points 
out, “(...) acceptance and integration o f foreigners could to some extent be ‘fair-weather 
attitudes” . The late 1990s have led to a renewal of hardened attitudes against 
foreigners. In addition, membership numbers in right-wing extremist organisations, which 
could function as an indicating variable, may have increased: this nonetheless does not 
mean that a real downturn of right-wing extremism has taken place, as change of tactics 
can be at the origin of this phenomenon.156
To add to the tension, a scandal broke out in Germany in February 2005 
concerning the attribution of visas in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, which became 
known as the “visa affair”.157 The visa procedures to Germany gave way to several 
abuses in terms of corruption by consular officials but also because of too liberal 
regulations. In fact, a measure taken by Ludwig Volmer, former state-minister in the 
ministry of foreign affairs, was at the origin of the debate back in 2000. It contained the 
provision that whenever there was a doubt about whether to confer a visa, the benefit 
was to be turned towards the freedom of travelling. The core problem was its abuse by
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the mafia, especially in terms of using this option as a channel for human trafficking. The 
minister of foreign affairs of the time Fischer was severely criticised by the media:
1 5 8
Minister Fischer, your embassies give visas away for merely 400€. You are killing our prices, Senorel
Roman Krištof, former IOM consultant and responsible for prevention of trafficking 
in persons at the Czech NGO “La Strada”, said that the scandal was worrisome 
especially from the point of view of human trafficking. He viewed the paradox of a visa 
regime in the fact that it aims at filtering unwanted criminals; but intermediary people, 
who are asked for help in the procedure of getting a visa, can turn out to take abuse of 
the situation and turn their clients into victims of human trafficking (be it consciously or 
unconsciously). He added that this was a feature applying not particularly to German, but 
also to Czech officials for example. But so far, the MS have not been very successful in 
implementing the provisions for an AFSJ of the Amsterdam Treaty.159 The writer 
Wladimir Kaminer views the impacts of the scandal in slightly different terms, namely in 
the danger of promoting xenophobia.160 The interviewing journalist pointed out that the 
unemployment rate of over five million people might justify the fact that Ukrainian people 
working on the black market are not popular, but Kaminer replied that they are very 
popular among those who employ them for ridiculous wages and that Ukrainian
158 J. Thurau, “Fischer ubernimmt Verantwortung in der Visa-Affäre” (20.02.2005), Available [online]:
08.06.2005, on: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/Q. 1564.1488915.00.html: “Visa-Skandal”
(20.02.2005), Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, no. 7, Available [online]: 08.06.2005, on: 
http://www.faz. net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E11C40E9635C44133A004C 
ApF861876AB~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html
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prostitutes apparently also find enough demand. His argument is backed by Cyrus’ 
analysis on irregular migrants in 2004, in which he outlines the role played by a “booming 
informal labour market opening up diverse possibilities to illegal immigrants" .161
The federal agency “Finance control black market” (Finanzkontrolle 
Schwarzarbeit) was set up by the former red-green government to launch deterring 
punishing procedures against illegal activities: shadow economy accounts for about 15% 
of the economy according to the actual finance minister Peer Steinbruck.162 The 
government’s main argument behind calling this “economic criminality” is however not 
predominantly the status of the illegally employed, but rather the loss in terms of annual 
taxes for the state. Stronger controls against the black market in the sectors of transport 
and logistics in addition to the already existing control of the construction branch still 
ought to limit illegal work opportunities for irregular migrants.
Section 2: Negative impacts of (il)leqal migration and societal debate in Germany
This section tackles more in depth diverse approaches within Germany on illegal 
migration realities, leading to border securitization. There are several obvious reasons for 
which public opinion has an often reticent opinion about opening up borders for new 
arrivals, which makes immigration a popular topic in media coverage and for politicians in 
election campaigns. It also deals with the underlying question of the effectiveness of 
stricter territorial controls to resolve problems linked with illegal immigration. Although it 
is quite difficult to determine what the social realities are, statistics can give an indication 
of some trends. Illegal border crossing, residence status and crime rates related to 
migration will be of interest here, since both issues provide basic arguments for calling 
for stricter border control measures.
In a first part, negative impacts, such as HR abuses and risks of political 
extremism are outlined as factors of societal instability; furthermore, border control 
measures and supposed illegal migration flows are discussed. A second part is 
dedicated to the societal debate on migration within Germany, the actors involved in it 
and how much importance is dedicated to the negative impacts of migration.
161 N. Cyrus, “Aufenthaltsrechtliche lllegalität...” (pre-cited), p. 13
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A—Need for control: negative consequences and scope of illegal migration in 
numbers
A statistical comparison is useful in finding out whether the law on immigration 
has decreased illegality and/or crime rate related to it. One factor made this however 
difficult: the register for foreigners has been re-evaluated in the year 2003, rendering 
numbers from 2004 (the latest available ones) incomparable with the previous years. It is 
therefore impossible to establish a clear trend up to today. Some other statistical tools, 
such as asylum-seeker or refugee numbers and their countries of origin can give hints 
over the overall evolution of the migration situation in Germany in recent years. The 
following numbers provide arguments for the necessity of keeping up traditional border 
control measures; however, investigations also indicate that most victims of HR absuses 
had entered the country legally, calling into question some aspects of the judicial system.
a) Negative outcomes of (il)leqal migration: human rights abuses and political
extremism
i. Human trafficking and forced prostitution
Unfortunately, statistics do not allow drawing clear conclusions about 
interrelationships of higher or lower numbers of victims from certain countries of origin. 
The latest data available stems from 2004 (published in August 2005) and indicates that 
the number of victims from Ukraine is comparatively higher from Ukraine and 
proportionally high from Bulgaria. The analysis from the BKA (Federal criminal agency) 
points to the fact that EU enlargement and new possibilities for EU citizens to legally act 
as prostitutes in Germany make it difficult to determine victims and potential perpetrators. 
It can however be said that most of the victims are females between the age of 15 and 
30; about 50% of the crimes are linked to prostitution. Germany remains the country of 
origin of most victims under age 18: 51% of the German victims were under age 21. This 
also applies to Bulgarian victims (nearly one in two victims is under age 21). In a little 
more than 50 per cent of the cases of victims, forced to take up or continue with 
prostitution, have been objects of physical or psychological violence.163
If trying to look at the proportion of foreigners involved in this crime, it can be 
determined that German citizens represent the major part of the people suspected of
163 Bundeskriminalamt, “Bundeslagebild Menschenhandel 2004” (August 2005), Available [online]:
15.03.2006, on: http://www.bka.de/lageberichte/nnh/2004/mh2004.pdf
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crime. At a closer look, one notices that 18% of them were born abroad and have 
acquired German citizenship later on, the country of birth being mainly Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Turkey or Poland. A great proportion of suspects stem from countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria. German citizens remain the victims of 
predominantly German suspects making use of financial dependencies, abusing of faked 
love affairs or family relations. Between 75 and 84 per cent of the suspects are male. 
Among the suspect women a number of former prostitutes can be found who either 
supervise victims of human trafficking or attract women from their home countries.
It is very striking that most of the victims (about 70 per cent) have immigrated to 
Germany legally. Border control measures thus seem to remain an ineffective measure if 
it aims at combating cross-border criminality and calls those claims into questions 
arguing for stricter entry conditions. This applies mainly to people who entered from the 
new EU MS and associated states. The sort of the discovered victims range from 
“unknown”, expulsion, resettlement, voluntary return, political witness protection to ‘other’ 
categories (marriage or asylum application). In the year 2004 about one third of people 
were listed as “unknown”, nearly 23 per cent chose to return on a voluntary basis and 
nearly 18 per cent were asked to leave Germany. No statistics are available on other 
horrible criminal activities as organ trafficking or modern slavery, mainly women 
subjected to sexual harassment by employers or house maids who are subjected to an 
excessive number of working hours for a low salary and difficult, inhumane tasks.
These extreme situations are often known, but reactions on the sides of victims or 
the population at large are frequently entrenched with a ‘no-way-out’ syndrome as some 
documentaries show. As long as there are not enough legal alternatives for victims of 
irregular immigration paths, individuals will continue suffering from the dramatic negative 
consequences of criminal networks. Academics have called for legalising measures for 
illegal or irregular migrants in order to help at least some of them to step out from the 
‘shadow’, but then again the counterargument that this might also have the effect of 
attracting even more undercover migrants thereafter is true as well. Also, this measure 
would not help legal immigrants who are victims of psychological violence (e.g. 
blackmailed with the fate of their families in their countries of origin) or financial 
dependence. But at least legalisation ought to be more systematically used and 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.164 A lot remains to be done in this issue, but quite 
often attention is focused on the danger emanating from terrorist networks.
164 G. Pflaumer, “Kein Mensch ist illegal,” AktionCourage, Available [online]: 12.05.2006, on: 
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ii. Stigmatisation o f immigrants derived from political extremism and 
violence o f and against foreigners
Immigrants have a negative public image and a majority of Germans still think that 
no immigration law should exist at all (cf. p.81f.); maybe this also stems from the 
knowledge of the risk of above-mentioned HR abuses— a way to respond to them would 
be not to let immigrants into the country at all, the argument seems to go. What's more, 
next to worries about diminishing work opportunities remaining available for Germans, an 
underlying worrying point is a ‘general suspicions against foreigners’ attitude. The 
government therefore gave out an official pamphlet informing citizens over the contents 
and impacts of the new immigration law, including the section “What happens to 
safeguard interior security?” This indicates the wish to reassure citizens against fears 
that the state is abandoning its duty of guaranteeing citizens’ security on national 
territory, a task remaining predominant for a government at all times. It also shows the 
link established nearly automatically between security and immigrants, in this way 
unconsciously perpetuating stigmatisation of the new arrivals.
It has to be acknowledged that the connection between foreigners and violence or 
crime has to do with the experience of terrorism and criminality of and against foreigners 
particularly in the 1990s, nearly always driven by extremist political, religious or 
xenophobic ideas. The pamphlet lists measures that can be taken against “people from 
whom a terrorist danger can derive”, against smugglers of human beings or foreigners 
suspected of being part of a forbidden movement (based on hatred-spreading speeches 
in mosques, for example, cf. Kaplan). Underneath general definitions, the target group 
remains Muslims, although the world-wide Islam community has asked governments and 
people continuously not to make a too inseparable Muslim -  terrorism link. Extradition is 
faced by the first group, when “danger prognosis based on facts” is established (an 
unclear definition in itself). Smugglers have to be expelled when condemned to 
imprisonment. The third group can also be expelled, and potential anti-constitutional 
activities hinder the process of acquiring permanent residence permit or citizenship.165
When looking at the numbers of suspects with foreign nationality in police 
statistics and the political importance of each case in election campaign, it shows that the 
criminality of foreigners is systematically overestimated. The main danger next to an 
extreme-right wing party entering Länder parliaments is the fact that democratic parties 
toughen their discourse and policies on behalf of foreigners, thus letting radical opinions
165 Bundesministerium des Innern, “Das neue Zuwanderungsgesetz,” (pre-cited), p. 5
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enter public debates, as happened in France in 2002.166 Violence against foreigners 
should not be neglected: racism does not belong to the past, as the news sadly keep 
testifying with new cases in all European countries.
Another issue of concern is the membership of foreigners in extremist 
organisations in Germany, which does pose a direct threat to the country’s internal 
security. There is again a link between external and internal security when people in exile 
continue supporting movements in their country of origin from Germany, be it in terms of 
financial support or through vocal support, as was both the case for the Kosovo 
Liberation Army.167 A predominant element in the debate over German identity and 
sense of community is therefore the immigrant’s commitment to the liberal post-war “free 
democratic fundamental order” (Freie Demokratische Grundordnung, FDGO). Following 
the chief of the employers Schleyer’s murder by the extremist RAF group, the 
government launched the so-called “Extremistenerlasse” in 1977 to protect the FDGO.168 
The trend to take repressive measures against any activist extremist movement has 
become deep-rooted in German politics, the reasons of which can be traced back to 
events occurring during the Weimar Republic. It thus seems natural that the government 
pays particular attention to radical movements going beyond political far-right or far-left 
cleavages and turns increasingly to dangers emerging from potentials based on Kurdish, 
Kosovo-Albanian or Islamic causes. It is also striking that most of extreme-right 
immigration organisations in Germany are Turkish (e.g. the Islamic Federation ICCB or 
the Islamic association Milli Górus). Marginalisation, lacking integration and acceptance 
as well as the rise of fundamental political Islam in Turkey might be the causes for this 
feature. Still, these extremist positions represent a small percentage of the overall 
number of immigrants (0.6 per cent in 1999).
b) Illegal immigration to Germany -  the dilemma of border controls
There is by definition no way to get certainty over the number of illegally 
immigrating persons to any country. Angenendt points out that one possibility to get at 
least a vague idea is to use statistics of the police on the criminality of foreigners. Still, 
some important flaws remain: some of the “crimes” can by definition only be committed 
by foreigners, e.g. over-staying or losing residence permits after a divorce. Therefore, the 
researcher concludes, “[the] only firm conclusion that can be drawn regarding illegal
166 S. Angenendt, Asylum and Migration Policies... (pre-cited), pp. 182 ff.
167 B. Marshall, The new Germany... (pre-cited), pp. 64-79
168 H.-H. Jansen, “Stabilität und Reform -  Innenpolitik 1949-1999” (pre-cited), pp. 25-38
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immigration is that it has increased during the last few years, and that this trend will most 
probably continue.”169 This statement dates from 1999, prior to the immigration measures 
launched by the government. In the meantime labour immigration regulations have been 
loosened in some sectors and tighter controls on the black market seek to narrow down 
employment options and thus— probably—  demand for illegal labour force.
Statistics also cannot provide clear answers at how many people succeed in 
bypassing border controls, even if Angenendt outlines the possibility to use statistics of 
the border patrol on arrested illegal immigrants (cf. p.96). Border controls have become 
stricter over time by involving private actors, such as long-distance bus drivers (e.g. 
Eurolines company) or increasing checkpoints at airports. Companies face financial 
punishments if they contribute (indirectly or directly) to helping illegal migrants crossing 
the borders. Immigration law reforms have included the possibility for other actors than 
the police to hold back suspect passengers in the transit area of airports (the “airport 
procedure”). This concerns nearly exclusively Frankfurt.170 The double effect aimed at is 
to keep suspects possibly out of the territory and to make passengers feel more secure 
when travelling. Again, it is the visibility of policies that makes border control an attractive 
measure for the state to take.
Already in 1985, Murray Edelman pointed to the symbolic uses of politics rather 
than actual law enforcement practices.171 Bigo argues that it is rare that there is often a 
differing reality between governments’ discourse on security and real resource increase 
the police, military police and border security agencies. This would however happen in 
real terrorist threat situations and certainly also if crime and migration were really directly 
correlated. Bigo outlines the paradox of border control as follows: “It is not possible to 
block all those who want to enter, only those who had no plan to enter illegally, such as 
asylum seekers and tourists, so anti-migration policies are only efficient against the 
wrong targets and do not affect clandestine networks.”172 Tougher controls leads to 
searching for alternative ways, such as recurring to smugglers in order to circumvent too 
narrow legal frameworks, especially when a migrant is not highly qualified and does thus 
not fit the image of the “good migrant”. In this sense, stricter controls have the reverse 
effect of favouring clandestine networks and thus make the demand for alternative 
options more lucrative. This background analysis would favour loosening border controls.
A counter-argument would be the mentioned fact that the negative consequences 
of migration occur in 70 per cent of the cases despite legal entry procedures, especially
169 S. Angenendt, Asylum and Migration Policies... (pre-cited), p. 172
170 BAMF, “Flughafenverfahren,” in: Referát 125— Statistik. Nurnberg: BAMF, 2004, p.49
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since the 2004 EU enlargement: if verified, this would be an alarming statement for legal 
frameworks of national MS and the EU’s capacity to ensure legal security within EU 
territory— the more so at the eve of applying Schengen provisions. Territorial controls—  
however strict they are— can be circumvented; the Mexican case in the US is a well- 
known example for this (migrants take up a death-threatening journey to risk crossing the 
border), even if Guiraudon and Joppke are right in pointing out that this case cannot be 
generalised for all state policies.173
This would mean that the question of “how to prevent entry to the territory?” is not 
very pertinent. One should rather ask how to prevent people from wanting to come 
without secure possibilities to create a dignified human living. As the next sub-chapter 
will show, concrete measures can be found in the legal framework.
B—Political actors and societal influence in the German institutional system: 
keeping migrants in or out?
The government (with the support of private actors) is not the only responsible 
instance for fighting against negative consequences of migration. Germany’s institutional 
framework led to spreading migration responsibilities on the federal, Länder and local 
levels. Up to the immigration reform lacking coordination and centralisation were the 
reasons for a frozen societal debate over migration. This has changed with the 
recognition of Germany being an immigration country.
This chapter deals with the actual societal debate between political actors, trade 
unions, NGOs and private persons and shows in what directions migration policies are 
steered: the focal points of the debate are not so much security issues and illegal 
migration, but how to best integrate migrants. The chapter outlines by way of a few 
concrete examples what kind of actors involved, which values are promoted and what 
are the subjective perceptions of the sources of threats among the population. In public 
debates, the previously mentioned problem of human trafficking and smuggling are 
evoked only little, probably because they are too sensitive, too far from private people’s 
everyday concerns and also because it is thought to fall under the sphere of influence of 
the state (police, justice...) whereas society’s role is to integrate new arrivals.
173
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a) Federal level— integrate and control
The government has set up federal agencies to handle legal, economic and 
political aspects of migration with the two predominant goals to find ways to integrate 
migrants effectively into a multicultural society while fighting against illegal migration. 
Sine the role of major agencies (BKA and BAMF) and the evolutions of the executive 
have been mentioned in the previous section, some more attention will now be paid to 
impact of the judiciary system and the legislative power.
The judicial dimension is important when having to distinguish between the 
notions of “informal” versus “criminal” in law processes. Informality and criminality 
depend on the regulatory framework of the states (e.g. whether prostitution is defined as 
legal) and the ensuing enforcement practices; judicial policies concern how immigration 
crimes are defined and characterised. There is also a procedural element that impacts 
on how migrants are considered: at the start of a process it is a standard procedure to 
consider the foreign defendants’ real name, address and identity as uncertain by 
definition, since passports are either not available or it would be impossible or too 
expensive to check the papers. In a second step, the stability of his/her way of living is 
checked, in order to find out how probable it is that the defendant commits new crimes. 
Quite often no alternative (legal) source of income can be determined, especially when 
the legal employment status is dependent on the residence status.174 So the judicial 
system itself is responsible for the status and opportunities for illegal migrants.
As a result, Norbert Cyrus proposes legal alternatives to fight the negative 
consequences of illegal migration: by providing legal security to migrants, legal norms 
can limit self-justice phenomena, e.g. when illegally employed migrants do not get the 
promised (level of) salary, trying to impose their due by force.175 Minister of Justice 
Zypries also has a weighty voice in political debates. In December 2005, she vehemently 
opposed the idea to imprison foreigners suspected of terrorist activities as a preventive 
measure, supported by her SPD colleague and responsible for security affairs Markus 
Meckel.176 The BVG has also been influential in the past by imposing moral obligations 
on the German state, e.g. in family reunification matters.
The Bundestag has also used the judicial channel and passed several laws to 
strengthen state authority since 1994. Since it occurred with support of the opposition, it 
shows that there was an overall consensus on the need to make state authority visible.
174 F. Quassoli, “Migrant as criminal...“ (pre-cited), pp. 153-165
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Some initiatives were for example: the “Law for the Fight against Illegal Drug Trafficking 
and Other Manifestations of Organised Crime” (1993), the “Money Laundering Law” 
(1997), the “Federal Border Guard Law” (1994) and the “Anti-Crime Law” (1994). When 
the Kurdish cause caused public turbulences in 1996, the “Law to Amend Rules 
Governing Foreigner and Asylum Seeker Regulations” was passed. According to this 
law, one could already be expelled when participating in a demonstration that was 
deemed to threaten public security. Yet the issue of foreign criminality remains a difficult 
question to tackle, not only for political actors: academic opinions range from warning 
against dangerous rumours of disproportionately high crime rates on the one hand to an 
admonition against a just as dangerous naive downplaying of the phenomenon.177
The outcomes of federal initiatives on the federal level show that the prime 
responsibility is to manage (or visibly control) migration.
b) Role and influence of the Länder— financial burden-sharing and integration
The Länder play an important role in German politics due to the federal 
institutional structure, the more so since they are concerned with the concrete realities of 
providing social, health care and housing to asylum seekers. They pressured the 
government to restrict migration provisions, particularly induced by the financial burden 
that they had to carry and often overwhelmed by the task. They became main 
protagonists in the idea of burden-sharing among EU MS, particularly since Germany 
had been the main financial contributor to the EU until the end of the 1990s. In May 
1998, the CSU representative and Bavarian Prime Minister Stoiber tabled a resolution in 
the Bundesrat, in which he called for equal conditions for all EU MS in asylum policies. 
He implied that the national level had been lifted from its main prerogatives by the EU, 
while at the same time denouncing the lack of burden-sharing among the MS. The issue 
was from then on also increasingly used in electoral debates to the detriment of the EU. 
During the Kosovo crisis, the Länder to which the refugees were distributed, only 
reluctantly provided shelter. As a result, the federal government reduced the original offer 
of accepting 40,000 refugees for shelter to 10,000. This happened also as a 
consequence of the previous Bosnian crisis, where many Bosnian refugees who had 
come to Germany did not return to the former Yugoslavia and still represented an 
important financial burden for the Länder. Kosovar Albanians were granted three month- 
visas if they promised not to apply for asylum.178
177 B. Marshall, The new Germany... (pre-cited), pp. 65f.
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The Länder were also active in fighting criminality. In 2004, an initiative was 
launched to make the federal and Länder level cooperate by the Fighting Crime 
Commission (Kommission Kriminalitätsbekämpfung). The project group encompassed 
Baden-Wurttemberg, Berlin, Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Lower Saxony and Saxony. 
Federal agencies joined the team: the Federal Police, the Finance Control of the Black 
Market Agency and the BKA. The aim was to analyse the role of the police in human 
trafficking, smuggling, criminality and illegal employment activities. Child trafficking was a 
particularly underlined problem and options to better enforce protective norms on 
national and international levels were evoked.179 This was one of the rather rare concrete 
initiatives to fight illegal migration other than on the state level and it occurred in 
cooperation with federal institutions. In general the regions’ main responsibility is to 
integrate foreigners into the society, a task shared with the communal level.
In the past months Baden-Wurttemberg and Hess were particularly in the 
newspaper headlines for issuing own citizenship test proposals. At first, Baden- 
Wurttemberg proposed a guideline for discussion, later known as ‘the muslim tesť for 
asking questions like: “Do you think that a husband has the right to beat his wife?” Then 
Hess Minister of the Interior Volker Bouffier proposed a catalogue of 100 questions to 
answer to become German. Among them the question “The German painter Capsar 
David Friedrich painted a landscape on the Rugen Island on one of his most famous 
paintings. What motive is shown on the picture?” Next to the possibility of learning the 
answers by heart, people started to wonder whether these questions were really 
distinctive for being German, especially when many Germans could not reply to them.180
Critiques called the tests an attempt to limit access to German citizenship, pushed 
for political reasons (Baden-Wurttemberg held parliamentary election in March 2006) and 
based on a general suspicion against foreigners. In the eyes of journalist Robert Misik, 
the citizenship tests postulated laissez-faire culture while actually doing the opposite. To
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him, the underlying feature of the tests was to keep foreigners out: only those with an 
incredibly high level of general culture and mastering tricky questions with a liberal 
undertone (checking the adaptation to the FDGO, mainly addressed to Muslim 
applicants) could become German. But in effect, the liberalism promoted in the tests 
expected positions, which were debated within the society itself.181
The question emanated whether to introduce federal citizenship criteria. 
Chancellor Merkel supported a unique citizenship procedure for immigrants, based on 
the idea that the real incentive of a person to become German has to be apparent— the 
value of being German has to be felt, unlike the response of a new German citizen asked 
how it feels like to be German— “Just like always.”182 On 3 May 2006 the Ministers of the 
Interior found an agreement in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The compromise is to have 
federal rules and the application will be carried out by the Länder. Prime criteria are 
participation in integration and language courses under the responsibility of the BAMF 
and having a FDGO attitude. This regulation is ‘in the national interest of people and the 
state’ by preventing problems at their roots. Conversely, new German citizens will not 
only get rights, but will also be subjected to obligations (e.g. military service).183
This debate shows again the sensitivity of parties and political actors to 
immigration, as well as the attempt to control migration as far as possible; if not at the 
borders, then at the latest when migrants want to become German citizens.
c) Other politically involved actors
i. Approaches from political parties
A 1993 survey asked people according to their party affiliation, whether foreigners 
who had committed criminal acts had to be expelled, even if they were born and had 
lived in Germany all their life. The reason for this was that, in practice, the law meant that 
they were sent “abroad”; conversely, committing a crime was then considered a grave 
abuse against hospitality rights. The results were generally in favour of such an 
expulsion: CDU/CSU 62%; FDP 54%; SPD 50%, Bundnis ‘90/Die Griinen 33% and PDS 
(in former GDR countries) 44%. It shows that only the Green Party is against a harsh
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interpretation of the law.184 The debate is not passé: discussions over who has the right 
to be German and how to check the honesty of immigrants’ candidacy have been very 
heated in the last months, as outlined above. The following will be an actual overview of 
party positions in addition to those already mentioned (cf. p.55f.).
The far-right party DVU included a clear definition of who belongs to the Germany 
community in its party programme. It states explicitly that it is against violence against 
foreigners, but the core DVU being “safeguarding German identity”, “not giving up 
legitimate German interests” and “equal position for Germany in the world”, there is no 
place for welcoming more foreigners. The DVU asks for “limiting the percentage of 
foreigners, stopping increasing foreigner influx, making asylum processes faster and 
expelling criminal foreigners".185
The liberal FDP has a quite different standpoint: the expert for internal affairs 
within the FDP Bundestag-Uaction Hartfrid Wolff referred himself to the principle of free 
movement of the people, which applies to the whole German territory. This is why the 
party was clearly against the different standards emerging on the Länder level and called 
for unique, federal integration criteria. Coherently with its general party programme, the 
FDP underlined the value of the FDGO and Germany’s cultural and historic background, 
making a serious long-term integration process more relevant than a punctual test.186
The CDU/CSU said that newcomers would have to adapt to national culture if they 
wanted to become part of that community: the party expected active participation in this 
process, expecting that requirements of culture and language would be met (following 
Goethe’s definition of “Kulturnation”). On the integration debate, the party supports the 
standpoint of the FDP to have federal integration criteria.187
The SPD fraction leader Peter Struck also supported unified regulations in this 
case, for “[there] is no such thing as a Hess (...) citizenship, only a German one.” 
Furthermore, he supports the idea of having integration courses, which deal with German 
language, but also with the role of the state for society and understanding (and 
accepting) the FDGO values.188
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The Green party in Germany is very active in integration policies. The party 
supports the idea of having language classes coupled with integration courses, but also 
states that insufficient knowledge of German should not be imputed on the immigrants’ 
‘lack of integration will’, but should rather question the quality of the courses as such. 
Since the Länder do not participate in financing these courses, the party emphasises the 
importance not to cut the promised funds on the federal level.189
In December 2005, the Linke/PDS party called for a thorough revision of 
citizenship laws. According to the 2000 citizenship law, Germans lost their nationality 
when picking up another one -  this measure was meant to avoid double citizenship in 
general, but in effect this meant that 21.500 naturalised Germans who had taken up their 
Turkish citizenship again, thereby lost the German again. The title of the article therefore 
ironically states that ’21.500 ex-Turks are now again ex-Germans’. The Linke/PDS party 
indicated that this meant in practice that those people had to go through the whole 
procedure of getting residence status once again, despite having lived and worked in 
Germany for many years. This is the main point they fought against.190
ii. NGOs— pushing the HR dimension for migrants
The trade union DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) has created an educational 
group promoting equal rights for migrants, supported and recognized by federal 
agencies, so that their engagement for migration in general has to be acknowledged. In 
cooperation with other NGOs the DGB issued a pamphlet in March 2006 defending 
migrants’ rights.191 Two major NGOs are active for migrants’ rights in Germany: “Pro 
Asyl” (PA) and the “Interkultureller Rat” (IR). On the occasion of the above-outlined 
citizenship debate, the PA, IR and the trade union DGB elaborated the pamphlet “One 
step forward, two backwards— against a more restrictive immigration law”. The IR 
representative Jurgen Micksch called it irresponsible from sides of politicians to use 
existing stereotypes and prejudices against migrants instead of fighting against them, 
going as far as calling the debate racist.192 At a time when German immigration law has
189 Bundnis 90/Die Grunen, “Vielfalt lohnt sich. Grúne Integrationspolitik,“ (13.07.2005), Available 
[online]: 12.05.2006, on: http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/zuwanderung/dok/78/78211.htm 
90 Ngo-online.de, “21.500 Ex-Turken sind jetzt wieder ex-Deutsche,” (02.12.2005), Available [online]:
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to be revised in order to integrate new EU regulations, German foreigners’ law remains 
mainly ‘danger prevention law’ (“Gefahrenabwehrrechf). Immigration paths remain small 
and full of ‘stones’, integration policy is reduced to the acquisition of the knowledge of 
German language and the humanitarian regulations for refugees do not apply. In addition 
the pamphlet criticises that next to the police foreigners and border control institutions 
have the right to keep asylum seekers, once discovered, on the spot; during the asylum 
seeking procedure the people subjected to it are put in “resettlement detention” if another 
MS is responsible for them according to the Dublin II rules.193
This criticism is supported by the HR NGO Amnesty International in Germany, 
which in addition asks that no refugee is expelled to the unstable crisis regions of 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.194 These initiatives are very important in Germany, 
because the mentioned associations have moral authority, which can thereby contribute 
to the debate. Nevertheless, they do not have political power.
The association AktionCourage is also an important player in the humane 
dignified discourse on migrants. Gerd Pflaumer underlines that the fate of illegal migrants 
is too little evoked, despite being in very vulnerable situations outside the legal 
framework. Often called “those who are living in the shadow”, they try to live without ever 
being in contact with official bodies, which could discover and denunciate their situation 
by asking them for papers. In other countries, Pflaumer notices, these people are more 
respectfully called “without documents” (e.g. in France “sans-papiers”); “illegal” is a term 
carrying a negative connotation close to “criminal”. Pflaumer’s main point of criticism is 
that the issue is still a taboo in politics. He welcomes first initiatives by the independent 
commission immigration (Sussmuth Commission in 2001) and the 2002 and 2005 
government reports. They both recognised the legal framework in Germany as being 
insufficient from a HR perspective. Germany also has international obligations toward 
illegal migrants (cf. p.89f.). The International Covenant for economic, social and cultural 
rights requires signatory states to provide equal access to health, UN children right 
Convention asks that access to education be granted to children regardless of their legal 
status.195 These examples show that NGOs remain important even in democratic 
Germany for their outlining the precarious situation of illegal migrants and in calling for 
the necessity to constantly stress and push the maintenance of HR.
PA/DGB/IR, “Ein Schritt vorwärts, zwei zuruck— gegen die Verschärfung des 
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m. Public opinion— fearing predominant foreigner proportion in FRG
Quassoli summarizes the impact public opinion can have on the shaping of 
migration policies: “Public opinion can put a great deal o f pressure on the police’s law 
enforcement decision and can allow or oblige the police to increase their presence in the 
“hot spots” o f the city, the degree o f street control and consequently the rate o f arrests 
for typical street crimes.”196 Political parties are by definition dependent on public opinion 
out of fear to lose votes or, more idealistically, because politicians aim at representing 
the wishes of the people. This concerns all aspects of migration, not only economic ones, 
and is even more sensitive when radicalised opinions against asylum seekers exist. 
These can lead to centre-right politicians taking “preventive measures” by holding a more 
security-based discourse not to lose votes to extremist parties. Surveys have shown that 
public opinion predominantly has a negative image of foreigners without distinguishing 
between ethnic Germans or other migrants. Asylum seekers had the worst score of 
popularity in 1991.197
Four Allensbach opinion polls can give some indications about the evolution of 
public opinion since the crime and migration became more debated in the 1990s. In 
1993, the question of whether foreigners who had committed criminal acts were to be 
expelled in any case was posed as above to non-party affiliated citizens. 54% of the 
interrogated people believed that foreigners who were born and grew up in Germany had 
to be expelled if they had committed a crime, which fits the FDP score. Political party 
opinions therefore generally do reflect the average of the overall population approach. In 
any case, these positions show the priority that is given to the ius sanguinis approach to 
citizenship among the population.198
A few years later, in 1999, the Germans felt more relaxed, particularly in terms of 
criminality: the overall tendency shows that the percentages fearing criminality at the 
beginning of the 1990s was much greater.199 At the occasion of the introduction and 
voting of the immensely debated immigration law, an opinion survey found out in 2002 
that “The federal president has signed a law, the quality o f which is doubtful to the 
majority o f the people.’’200 Effectively, the opinion poll finds out that only 17% of the 
Germans were convinced that the law was a good one and 49% thought that it was 
‘doubtful’ whether the law was overall positive. The most striking result was that 50%
196 F. Quassoli, “Migrant as criminal...” (pre-cited), p. 165
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were against immigration altogether and therefore even against having a law regulating 
immigration at all. This position was particularly strong among the new Länder in the east 
of the country. But when asked about opinion climate, i.e. what people think that the 
majority of Germans would prefer independently of their own opinion, it came out that 
they thought in 84% of the cases that the population was against immigration. The 
overall opinion climate was thus very negative and certainly contributed to making 
discussions last two years before a compromise was finally achieved in 2004 (cf. p.62 f.).
The same year, another opinion poll asked a question similar to the one in 1994, 
thus measuring evolutions over a time period often years. The survey wanted to find out 
what the Germans feared and what they were worried about the most.201 In comparison, 
the outcome was that less threats emanating from environmental catastrophes or from 
criminality in general were felt. Yet 46% of the interviewed fear ‘that more and more 
foreigners come into the country’, which is also the issue the interviewed agree on the 
most. The second point that was the most worrisome was ‘that my salary, my living 
standard sinks’ in 45% of the cases. One can then ask if there is a link between the two 
questions and which one: are fears of salary dumping connected with foreigners entering 
the country? 42% feared bigger terrorist attacks occurring in Germany. According to 
other, even more recent opinion polls, 54% Germans fear “Clberfremdung”\ five years 
ago— prior to the Islamic attacks— the percentage lay at 33%.202 This means that the fear 
of a predominance of foreigners in Germany rose steadily over the last five years, a 
worrisome outcome. Even if politicians generally recognize this feature as a reality, 
opinion polls provide the proof for the fact that the tendency is not declining.
iv. Private actors in churches and other organisations— promoting cultural 
and societal integration
Private people have also increasingly sought to fight anti-migrant positions. 
Societal commitment is quite frequent in Germany, mainly within churches or NGOs. The 
two mainstream Protestant and Catholic churches have frequently taken position in 
immigration policies by criticising lacking HR protection for refugees. It has happened 
that parishes have circumvented official state law by granting protection from deportation 
to rejected asylum-seekers until their claim was re-examined. This turns them into real 
players in political decision-making, the more so since such re-issued claims have often 
had a positive outcome. This however leads Angenendt to shed doubts on the “fairness
201 IfD, “Ängste und Sorgen in Deutschland” 2004/21, IfD 7063
202 SZ, “Neue Burger fur das Land" (pre-cited)
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and wisdom” of asylum procedures altogether 203 One of the most famous religiously 
motivated groups acting for the sake of migrants’ rights is CARITAS (latin for charity). It 
is a world-wide organisation, but is indeed very active in Germany. The German bishop 
conference took up the issue within its commission for migration issues and published 
the report “Life in Illegality -  a humanitarian and pastoral challenge” (2001). Three years 
later, the Catholic Forum “Life in illegality” was founded, which published the “Manifesto 
illegal immigration -  for a differentiated and solution oriented discussion” (March 2005), 
signed by over 400 personalities from public political, scientific, cultural, media and 
economic life. Another initiative aimed to improve the health situation of irregular 
migrants— “respect instead of neglect”; several doctors stated as a result to be willing to 
provide their services without remuneration, thus implementing international duties.204
Several citizens participate in initiative outside the political or religious framework. 
One quite broad initiative is the idea to create a museum on migration as a centre for 
culture, art and history, based on the example of the Ellis Island Immigration museum in 
New York. This idea is being promoted by the “Migration museum in Germany” 
organisation, created in September 2003 by immigration communities and scientific 
researchers. It emerged out of the recognition of an obvious memory ‘hole’ of 
immigration history (also due to the late recognition that Germany is an immigration 
country), not adapted to the presence of immigrants in everyday life. The aim is to 
integrate immigrants from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia, 
Morocco, Tunisia, South Korea (for the former Western FRG), Vietnam, Cuba, 
Mozambique and Angola (former GDR) within the awareness of German history.205
The DJO (German Youth in Europe) is an organisation promoting cultural 
understanding between young Germans and immigrants through common activities and 
political discussions. It wants to integrate migrants to the German society and help them 
finding their identity and is mainly engaged against deportations and for the protection of 
social, political and cultural rights of refugees. Activities are practically orientated 
everyday missions, i.e. providing help in mastering school and professional life.206
The group “Clandestino-lllegal” tries to raise public awareness for the individual 
situations of illegal people. “No person is illegal, one is made illegal, a situation, in which 
more and more people have to fall involuntarily.” It gives a more detailed account on the 
ways, in which a person can find him/herself in the situation of illegality without being a
203
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criminal. It also promotes economic and educational opportunity rights to be granted to 
immigrants; lacking facilities could lead to precarious situations, despair and— in extreme 
situations— violence and crime. The same applies to immigrants’ health: since doctors 
have to signalise illegal people, they often wait until expensive health care cannot be 
circumvented. Protection and humanly dignified solutions do theoretically exist for all 
migrants, but scared of deportation once they make their status official, they prefer to go 
underground: a direct path towards making them ‘modern slaves’.207
These are only a few examples of the ways private actors have chosen to be 
active for protecting migrants’ rights. Even though none of them contests the legitimacy 
of states to control its borders, they all press politicians to take up and face the difficult 
question of irregular people. It also shows that these actions are not mainstream 
positions among the overall population that remains sceptical towards migration. A 
reason for politicians not evoking this problem more is the unpopularity of the topic and 
the difficulty in resolving it. The focus therefore lies on how to best integrate those 
migrants, who have been allowed ‘in’, while remaining more or less quiet about the rest.
This chapter has tried to analyse in depth the evolution and the participation of 
diverse actors within the national level of Germany. Several conclusions can be outlined: 
firstly, the institutional component of the country allows for a more decentralised tackling 
of the issue. A great variety of actors are implicated in integrating migrants into society; 
the main focus lies much less on the security dimension of (illegal) immigration within the 
German societal debate than on the supranational level. It seems that the securitization 
of EU migration policies does not transpose itself on the German national level (although 
this might be the case in Great Britain, France or the Netherlands, for instance). 
However, there also is an underlying juxtaposition of irregular migration with criminality, 
which makes the status of illegal migrants an unpopular topic in politics, even if 
awareness only starts to arouse on the precarious situation of this population group 
within the country. Indeed, intergovernmental cooperation remains crucial in limiting the 
scope of trans-national crime, which— because of its cross-border nature— can only be 
effectively fought against by common actions. But interstate cooperation also has to 
address the issue of more effective individual rights protection more directly.
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Chapter IV: Embedding Germany in cross-border cooperation processes
Germany is embedded both in EU politics and in the international system itself. 
More attention has therefore to be given to some ways, in which the levels are 
interlinked. This is what German political scientists call “Politikverflechtung” (‘interwoven- 
ness of politics’). Some examples will be added to the EU-level in a first sub-chapter, 
before mentioning the international level, which could not be distinctly be analysed within 
this thesis, although it would have been pertinent. It will include intergovernmental 
cooperation initiatives from the German state or Länder outside the realm of the EU.
A—EU and German “Politikverflechtunq”
When analysing distinctive features and problems linked with the German 
immigration system, a recurring pattern emerges, namely the fact that the country is 
conscious of the possibility for MS to contribute to the process of harmonization of 
immigration and asylum policies on the EU-level. Germany seeks to participate in 
furthering EU actions especially in terms of multilateral resettlement agreements or by 
launching conferences with international experts to promote ideas for establishing 
common EU-wide systems. As mentioned, Germany has been a proponent of the 
harmonisation of European immigration policy because of burden-sharing among the 
MS.208 Ex-Chancellor Kohl had tried to launch initiatives towards a common migration 
policy at the summit in Luxembourg in July 1991; the Luxembourg presidency had 
merely proposed to integrate migration and asylum in the intergovernmental third pillar, 
not however in the communitarian first EC pillar, a German idea. Bi- and multilateral 
agreements proved an efficient method to circumvent the EU-level and this method is 
therefore still popular on both federal and Länder level. For instance, Germany sought to 
play a role in the recent process of eastwards enlargement and also benefited from it: 
Bavaria collaborates closely with the ČR, which turns more and more from a transit to a 
destination country (cf. pp.95-97).
Several impacts can be inferred from the national situation of Germany on the 
European level. In the following, a few points of debates will be picked up again and the 
ways, in which both levels are interconnected, outlined. Firstly, Germany has called
208 Cf. also Angenendt, Asylum and Migration... (pre-cited), p. 166
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several times for asylum burden-sharing, renamed ‘solidarity’, concerning the lot of 
refugees. Yet in the long run, the Bavarian civil servant Wilton Park said in July 1995, 
Germany started to feel like being the ‘laughing-stock of the Union’ because the country 
was welcoming and catering ever new refugee flows. The relative reluctance from other 
MS, particularly those geographically further away from the trouble zones of the Balkans, 
to accept more refugees in times of urgency finally led the country to be also more 
reluctant in accepting Kosovo refugees, even despite the fact that the German population 
was in favour of helping refugees. By 1999, the German position was still convinced that 
a common refugee policy in the EU was still far from being in place.209
Secondly, the seemingly national scandal of the visa affair did not remain an 
inner-political dispute, but spread over the whole of the EU and even led to the EU 
Commission taking part actively in the debate. The justifications for the interference of 
the Commission are to be found in the Schengen area provisions, which had set as a 
main goal to unify the system of visa-requirements among the Schengen members:
“The parties shall endeavour to approximate as soon as possible their visa policies
in order to avoid any adverse consequences that may result from the easing of
91 ncontrols at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security.”
Concretely, this meant that a residence permit had to be issued at the first EU 
country entered, but was then valid EU-wide. The German scandal thus had 
consequences directly affecting neighbouring countries; this could in the worst case lead 
to spreading the scope of human trafficking. In reaction to this, the EU Commission 
declared the Volmer measure contrary to EU-law on visa-issuance within the Schengen 
area in May 2005.211 The fear underlying this statement was that such entry 
requirements would lead to “visa-shopping” (a problem addressed at the Amsterdam 
conference in August-September 2004). This added to the MS’ worries of security threats 
inherent to illegal cross-border activities already present in the 1990s and emphasised 
even more in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. SIS II, VIS and the creation of Frontex are 
a consequence of the wish to make EU external borders secure again, recovering a 
feeling of lost security. Thus, the German visa affair in effect contributed to make an 
impression of subjective threat re-emerge in the EU.
Thirdly, refugee protection and the organisation of their resettlement discussed at 
the Amsterdam conference was picked up by the German government. Quite a few 
measures were implemented to deal with this programme— generally in cooperation with
209 Quoted in: B. Marshall, “The European Dimension” (pre-cited), pp. 133-135
210 Schengen Agreement, Article 7, in: Kern (2003), p. 86




‘lOM Deutschland’— , for example the REAG (Reintegration and Emigration Programme 
for Asylum-Seekers in Germany) and GARP (Government Assisted Repatriation 
Programme). The government works closely with the EU programmes EQUAL and 
AENEAS, the European refugee fund. Since the end of 2002, about 400 Afghans have 
returned voluntarily on the basis of a financial contribution.212 In April 2005, the BAMF 
director launched an international conference dealing with European harmonisation of 
voluntary return of refugees to their home country. The conclusion was that European 
projects were desirable and ought to be pursued— a rather feeble statement, yet at least 
a start. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that voluntary return of foreigners is a more 
humane and also less costly procedure.213
Nevertheless, international criticism against the German immigration system was 
harsh, when in May 2005 a series of flights started to deport 50,000 Kosovo refugees 
back to Slatina. The majority of the deported persons were Roma and HR group said that 
these expulsions reflect “deeply held prejudices in Germany’s immigration system’’. A 
main reason for these deportations is the fact that they are dependent on welfare, thus 
representing a burden of about 500€-630€ a head per month on regional authorities.214 
This exemplifies what the presidency of the Amsterdam Conference has summarised: 
“(...) the world’s countries o f immigration all share the disappointing reality that their 
immigration systems are broken: (...) unauthorized migration and failures in integrating 
immigrants are growing,”215 An ensuing proposal was to create a European Agenda for 
Migration Management that would tackle these problems in common. Yet the date of its 
realisation is still pushed into the future, the Luxembourg conference later that same year 
evoked the year of 2010 to create a common asylum and migration policy. Until now, the 
MS have a veto right on these decisions, which blocks deeper-going advancement on 
EU-harmonizing measures. So communitarization of migration works if it deals with its 
security dimension, not however a supranationalisation of this policy area.
Yet it has to be acknowledged that some EU agencies are well implemented by 
now: in the face of the European-wide phenomenon of increasing extreme-right wing 
movements, Europol was created. The Eurodac system was established in December 
2000 by the EG regulation 2725/2000 to more effectively implement the Dublin
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Agreement. This was implemented and amended by Germany in 1997 and now falls into 
the area of competence of the new BAMF.216 Especially from 2001 on, the EU became 
quite active in forging incentives for national frameworks on immigration and asylum 
issues. The Council of the EU had created CIREFI, which established an early warning 
system for the transmission of information on illegal immigration and facilitator networks 
in 1999. In 2001, the European parliament issued with A5-0304/2001 a resolution on a 
common asylum procedure and proposed a charter for TCN rights.217 From the side of 
the Commission, several regulations were put in place, e.g. 2001/55/EC on temporary 
protection measures in the case of mass inflow of refugees (20.07.2001); 2003/9/EC on 
minimum norms to apply to asylum-seekers (27.01.2003); 2003/86/EC on the right of 
family reunification (22.09.2003); 2004/38/EC on the right of EU-citizens and their family 
members to move and reside freely in the territory of the MS (29.04.2004). These 
numerous regulations have had a big impact on German law that tried (and still tries) to 
adapt accordingly, notably family reunification.218
The prevailing method of forging Community immigration policy remains the open 
method of cooperation which makes states cooperate closely, but which has no power to 
sanction and is thus sometimes regarded as a weak instrument. Finally, the Treaty on a 
Constitutional Draft had included provisions that could have promoted a common 
immigration and asylum policy, but the rejections by referenda in France and the 
Netherlands momentarily put a hold on this matter. Although the diverse European 
systems of immigration share many challenges that would have to be addressed across 
borders, national problems often seem to be more pressing to handle and sometimes an 
essential part of negotiations is therefore lacking, namely political will. This is not a 
distinctive feature of the EU, only that contradicting goals and pressures seem to be 
condensed on this level. Germany is also dependent on other self-imposed obligations 
on the international level or through intergovernmental cooperation initiatives, which are 
outlined in the following.
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B— International and regional influences on / o f German policies
a) International obligations for Germany and intergovernmental cooperation
i. International law— the basis for the German commitment to the 
cause o f refugees
The right of nations started to implement more concretely HR for individuals in the 
aftermath of WWII. International rules have from then on tried to protect the human 
dignity and fundamental rights of persons, influencing also states, since it had been 
recognized that threats could emanate from nationals’ very own governments. The 
international legal framework regulates relations among various international players 
(thus also international organisations and individuals) and is a clear guideline for German 
principles and laws. The first article of the German fundamental laws of 1949 underlines 
the inalienable nature of human dignity and the guarantee of HR by the state and its 
people, still applicable today. In addition, article 25 guarantees the predominance of 
international over domestic law.219 Yet the main problem of international law remains its 
relatively lacking independent sanctioning power, which depends on the will of the 
adherent states. The International Court of Justice created in July 1998 would have been 
a great step forward in enforcing international law, but the important candidature of the 
USA was retrieved by the president.220
Still, some texts have gained more power over the years and it has become 
increasingly unacceptable to circumvent rules, which are now part of international 
customary law (e.g. the principle of non-refoulement).221 Two major texts have 
contributed to induce states to accept refugees despite illegal entry or residence status 
on the national territory: the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (10 December 1948) 
and the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951). The first 
text represents an important starting point for international right to asylum in its article 14, 
according to which any person facing persecution has the right to seek asylum in other 
countries. Even more importantly, the Geneva Convention, labelled the ‘Magna Charta of
219
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edition, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001
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refugee law by Eichenhofer,222 defined the conditions for a person who can be called a
refugee, clarifying a previously vague statement. A refugee is anyone, who:
(...) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the county of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.223
Signatory states have the responsibility to make the accession to the refugee 
status accessible to anyone fitting this definition and to deliver all the official 
administrative documents, passport and civil status to them (art. 25, 27 and 28). 
Furthermore, states must not impose penalties on refugees having entered the country 
illegally, if they present themselves to the authorities and launch the process of asylum- 
seeking without delay and if there are good causes for their illegal entry or presence (art. 
31). Equally important is the provision of non-refoulement (art. 32 and 33): a refugee may 
not be returned to the country of origin when s/he would face a life-threatening situation 
there. One notable exception remains: “The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee 
lawfully in their territory save on grounds o f national security or public order (art. 32(1)), 
nor when a refugee constitutes a danger to the community of the receiving country when 
already convicted of a ‘particularly serious crime’ (art. 33(2)).224 The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created on 14 January 1951 has the 
task to check the application of the Geneva Convention by the signatory states. It 
coordinates international action for protecting and assisting refugees and wherever 
necessary the UNHCR supervises repatriation operations.225
Other international texts have mentioned the situation of refugees more regionally. 
The Convention of the Organisation of African Unity (10 September 1969), gives a larger 
definition of the status of refugees and the Carthaginian Declaration for Central America of 
22 November 1984 adds the notion of ‘massive violations of HR’. Other texts provide indirect 
judicial bases for not sending concerned refugees back to their country by forbidding torture, 
a fate they would face if sent back: the European Convention for the prevention of torture
222 E. Eichenhofer, “Migration und lllegalität” (pre-cited), p. 31
223 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951), Article 1(2), Available [online]:
19.03.2006, on: http://www.ufsia.ac.be/~dvanheul/migration/genconv.html
224 Ibid. [emphasis: mine]
225 P. Moreau Defarges, “Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés,” in: Encyclopaedia 
Universalis (pre-cited); The UNHCR is supported by the UNRWA, specialised UN agency for the 
protection of Palestinian refugees.
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and pains or illegal or degrading treatments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), the UN Convention against torture and the ECHR.226
The German law has incorporated the right to asylum in its basic laws, albeit reforms 
had become necessary as a result of domestic inputs (cf. the asylum compromise of 1992, 
pp.55ff ). These international commitments are generally not questioned by German 
politicians, even if asylum seekers are not all that welcomed among the population. Out of 
the tragic past of the country emerged a particular dedication to the protection of HR and 
asylum seekers, but this also led to the idea that the asylum ‘burden’ was an international 
one and therefore ought to be addressed by the international community as a whole.
A recent international text crucial for the migration-security debate is the UN 
Convention against Trans-national Organized Crime against four main trans-national 
offences: participation in organised criminal groups, money-laundering, corruption and 
obstruction of justice. International cooperation involves measures of extradition, mutual 
legal assistance or joint investigation. Additional protocols aim to ‘prevent, suppress and 
punish trafficking in persons’, fight ‘against the smuggling of migrants by land, air and 
sea’ and ‘against the illicit manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms’. It is interesting to 
notice the ostensible definition in terms of crime side by side of firearms trafficking and 
smuggling or trafficking of human beings. The elaboration of the Convention in 2000 
shows how vulnerable migrants are; but it also shows that the international community is 
increasingly aware of and takes legal actions against the phenomenon.227
ii. International Migration Management and crime prevention
Several global efforts have sought to promote strengthened dialogue among all 
countries in the field of migration. Total global revenues for business of human 
smuggling, car theft, money laundering and other trans-national criminal activities are 
estimated to be increasingly important and therefore have to be fought against more 
efficiently. Germany has actively participated in most of these initiatives and thus also 
voluntarily ties itself to international obligations.
The Berne Initiative was created to develop an inter-state, non-binding policy 
framework on migration that draws on effective practices emanating from regional 
cooperation mechanisms. The outcome was ‘The International Agenda for Migration 
Management’ in 2004, with the goal to develop a “more orderly and humane
J.-E. Malabre, “Droit d’Asile,” in: Ibid.
227 UNODC, “Summary of the UN Convention against transnational organized crime and protocols 
thereto”, Available [online]: 28.03.2006, on: http://www.unodc.org/palermo/convensumm.htm
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management of migration at the national, regional and international levels, for the benefit 
of migrants and societies" 228 While agreeing with the general measures of managing 
migration like visa requirements or border control, the agenda warns against the negative 
associations from abusive types of irregular migration and migration in general. The 
difficult tasks for governments is to ensure the credibility and transparency of their ability 
to manage irregular migration flows by providing authorised channels of entry and stay 
alongside information about these channels and deterring measures against irregular 
movements. It recommends the signature and ratification of the above-mentioned 
Convention and the establishing of clear distinctions between traffickers and their 
victims. Point 16 is dedicated to international security and terrorism: it provides possible 
solutions of how to facilitate mobility for dynamic economies while ensuring safety of the 
host community and without stigmatising migrants. Effective practices would be to 
strengthen national security enforcement and risk evaluation systems, share information 
collectively, make public campaigns against “scapegoating” of migrants, protect HR and 
the use of personal information and increase integration of migrants.229
In 2002 the Geneva Migration Group (GMG) was established. It has the same 
overall goal and is composed of international organisations dedicated to migration or 
being more indirectly linked with it, namely the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
IOM, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNHCR and 
UNODC. It aims at furthering dialogue and cooperation also at the supra-national level 
between relevant agencies. In October 2005, the Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM) published the report “Migration in an interconnected world: new 
directions for action”. It is an intergovernmental cooperation initiative in cooperation with 
the UN framework. The countries part of it are: Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Brazil, Morocco, South Africa, Mexico, USA, Australia, Canada, Pakistan, 
India, Philippines, Ireland, Russia, Egypt and Spain. Quite extensively does the report 
outline problems faced by most countries and endeavours to cooperate more closely 
between them. It strongly recommends incorporating financial international actors into 
the otherwise positively rated GMG initiative. As a way of conclusion, it therefore strongly 
suggests enlarging GMG to an “Inter-agency Global Migration Facility” by adding the 
institutions of OHCHR, UNDESA, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNIFEM, World Bank and 
the WTO to it.230
228
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229 Ibid., p. 37f.
230 Global Commission on International Migration, “Migration in an interconnected world: new 
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The transatlantic cooperation has been crucial in the decision to integrate 
biometric data in EU passports, since this has become a precondition for the entry of EU 
citizens to the USA. Since 5 January 2004, the US Visitors and Immigrants Status 
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) programme fingerprints and photographs visa holders 
arriving in or leaving the country by air or sea. The purpose is to identify individuals 
having violated immigration controls and to supervise criminal records or possible 
affiliations to terrorist organisations. Most EU MS are exempted from the US-VISIT 
program, but since 26 October 2004 the US requires these countries to issue passports 
including biometric features; otherwise the visa-regulation applies.231 This can of course 
be understood on grounds of the prime goal to stop terrorist cells from reaching the US 
territory, even if the extensive reach of this policy limits the travel freedom of individuals.
The awareness for the role played by migrants to security has its roots in US 
political agenda shaping even prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 1996, the US 
adopted counterterrorism legislation, which significantly affected the rights of legally 
resident aliens— analysts considered this immigration law to be a reflection of anti­
immigrant mood in the US public. Mark Miller outlines that migration is always security- 
sensitive because migration changes societies and vice-versa. He regrets the insufficient 
attention paid to the marginality of political violence by immigrants and foreign-born 
populations, eroding migrant rights to combat international terrorism: “a much greater 
danger can be seen in anti-immigrant violence and discrimination (,..).”232 The subjacent 
agreement of the majority of the population with such measures for the sake of American 
security has naturally increased in the 21st century.
Germany has followed this development by reinforcing cooperation procedures 
with the US in the fight against terror, especially after the recovery of the tense 
transatlantic relationship further to the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Fighting 
international criminality has become a common denominator for both countries. On 18 
April 2006 US Minister of Justice Alberto Gonzales and the German Minister of Justice 
Brigitte Zypries signed additional contracts to the German-American extradition Treaty 
(.Auslieferungsvertrag) from 1978. Interestingly, this signature was induced by already 
existing treaties between the USA and the EU concerning extradition clauses (another 
example is the 2004 debated Treaty between the US and the EU on data transfer to air
231 IOM Brussels, “US and Biometric Data,” (09.01.2004), Available [online]: 06.03.2006, on: 
http://www.belgium.iom.int/PDFDocuments/2006030614545664000064.PDF
232 M. J. Miller, “International Migration and Global Security,” in: N. Poku/D. T. Graham, Redefining 
security... (pre-cited), pp. 15-27; quote on p. 25
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companies). Now the provisions already active on the EU-level have been transposed on 
the bilateral German-US level.233
b) Germany’s actual cooperation initiatives in the region of Europe
Germany is also continuously part of inter-governmental cooperation processes 
within the region of Europe, but not necessarily on the EU-level, as the conference in 
Heiligendamm in March 2006 shows (cf. p. 19). Another multinational initiative occurred 
on May 2005, when the Prum Treaty was signed between Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria: it deepens and makes cross-border 
cooperation easier in the spheres of trans-national crime, illegal migration and terrorism 
by more comprehend information exchange. Rules are currently being transposed into 
German law (March 2006). Federal Minister of Justice Zypries commented the result as 
being a positive outcome reaching the balance between efficient security measures and 
the guarantee of individual data protection of citizens. The treaty allows state parties to 
directly access DNA and fingerprint data of other state signatories; (person-)specific 
information can also be passed on in the case of “terrorist dangerous people”; preventive 
measures can be taken for big meetings (e.g. football games or European Council 
meetings). Tighter police cooperation or joint operations are possible and mutual help in 
extraordinary catastrophic situations, such as sending specialists. The treaty is open to 
all the EU MS and it is planned to integrate it into the EU legal framework in about three 
years. It thus goes hand in hand with the provisions of the Hague Programme.234
Still, bilateral agreements remain the most frequently used method of cooperation 
promoted by the German government, considering it a more practical way of 
implementing concrete ambitions. One such close bilateral cooperation procedure 
happens with the French neighbour, following a general tendency of Franco-German 
policy coordination. On the occasion of two consecutive meetings in Blaesheim of 
President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Angela Merkel, it was decided to take common 
integration initiatives, open for other EU MS. In order to discuss more concrete 
measures, the French integration Minister Azouz Begag met with the State Minister
233
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Maria Bôhmer, responsible for migration, refugees and integration affairs in February 
2006. Main themes to be tackled are the improvement of education and labour market 
situations for young migrants, as well as their integration in exchange programs. It can 
be noticed that the economic and cultural component of integrating migrants into the 
respective societies occurs despite differing national histories: it is another step towards 
loosening the ‘deeply entrenched national differences’ (Angenendt) and can be rated as 
positive innovation, if rendered effective.235
The same month, Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble signed a 
readmission treaty with his Bulgarian colleague Rumen Petkov, touching ‘illegal 
immigrated people from Bulgaria— both Bulgarian nationals and TCN and state-less 
people’. Reasons are the ‘fight against illegal migration’ from the Balkan region, 
comments Schäuble in an interview; Bulgaria is being recognised as a transit country for 
illegal migrants to Germany and by extension to the Schengen area. Furthermore, it 
represents an important move towards the EU integration of Bulgaria. Indeed, this 
political step is a logical move, probably induced by the most recent BKA statistics 
(published in August 2005) about the origin of the victims of human trafficking, among 
whom a great number of Bulgarian were identified (cf. p.68f.).236
As BKA statistics have shown a tendency for the new EU membership being a 
way to legalise previously irregular migration flows, Germany has also intensified 
cooperation in border control with its two neighbouring Central European countries 
Poland and the ČR. Monar outlined in 2001 the yet insufficient training and equipment 
problems keeping some elements of the old military border control system in former 
applicant countries, which are necessary to integrate the Schengen zone.237 According to 
the director of the West Bohemian foreigner and border police Jindřich Urban the highest 
illegal migration is registered at the border with Poland.238 In 2000, Germany had issued 
proposals to Poland to have German border officers control Poland’s eastern borders 
jointly with Polish border guards. It was a delicate issue, since some Polish inhabitants 
had difficulties in accepting the idea of German guards patrolling on their territory, seeing 
it as a way to infringe on their national sovereignty or recalling bad memories from 
history. Helmut Dietrich outlined that Germany had made public funds available to
235
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Poland in the 1990s, meant to be used in making borders more secure in the 1990s. 
German border officials regretted the hostility towards them by West-Polish citizens in 
particular. Dietrich explains that a large part of the population living closer to the border 
participated in illegal border crossing actions by renting small rooms or providing 
transport facilities, for instance.239 Poland’s Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration 
Marek Biernacki responded however positively in 2000, stating that the country did not 
rule out the German proposal.240 Effectively, on 18 February 2002 a bilateral treaty for 
the extension of police cooperation in the border region was signed. A first step towards 
application of the treaty despite its non-ratification occurred on 2 April 2003 by the 
planning of a bi-national coordination instance in order to ensure security of citizens on 
both sides of the border. It is an effective cooperation among Polish-speaking civil 
servants from Brandenburg, the Federal border control agency (Bundesgrenzschutz) and 
the customs.241
Cooperation with the ČR happens especially on the more concrete Länder-level 
with Bavaria, since there are at least 19 common border crossings between the two 
regions only. Teams— with one customs and police officer from each side— work directly 
together. Since 1999, the BGS provides personnel and materials for the development of 
border police organisations fitting EU standards. The Czech-German cooperation in 
fighting crime has become more intensive than with other German neighbours, such as 
Austria or France: police officers can chase criminal across the borders, without having 
to even stop. A border responsible of the Bavarian police has been posted in the border 
police inspection of Furth im Wald, working permanently with a Czech colleague. Ways 
to replace border controls, which will automatically end with the entry of the ČR into 
Schengen, are being elaborated: mixed working groups deal with specific issues of car 
smuggling or human trafficking.242
To give one very concrete example, on 26 March 2006 Police President Hans 
Junker and Police Director Josef Heisl presented the border situation in 2005 for the 
Czech-German border crossing of Waidhaus.243 The official press statement informs that 
the numbers of illegal migrants and smuggled people caught at the Czech-German and
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sinking appeal of Germany as a destination country for illegal migrants, harmonisation of 
EU law and loosened visa-requirements (e.g. for Rumania and Bulgaria), restrictive 
application of asylum regulations and therefore less asylum granting procedures and 
finally more people caught on the Czech side. Main problems remain car theft, driving 
under the influence of drugs and the increasing mobility of criminals. But all of these 
outlined examples show that cross-border cooperation has become more intensive and 
prepares the enlargement of the Schengen area also against fears of proliferating 
criminal gangs. The report also found out that 1.102 people could be caught on the basis 
of national or international arrest orders and that the SIS played a predominant role in it. 
This would be a positive sign showing that more travel freedom can indeed be granted 
EU-internally without having to fear the creation of a rule-less zone.
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Conclusion
The work has tried to outline diverse facets interplaying in the tight balance to 
achieve between the duties of managing (sometimes paraphrased controlling) migration 
and ensuring security of the people. Both are also deeply entrenched with HR 
commitments and international law regulations. While the national and more regional 
level of German policies take into consideration economic and cultural components of 
migration, integrating these facets within the core of national interests, the focus lies 
mainly on fighting illegal migration on the intergovernmental and EU-level of cooperation 
(safe for some exceptions, such as the recent Franco-German integration initiative).
In parallel, the evolution of migration realities within Europe and its gradual 
communitarisation have been distinctively accompanied by a tendency of viewing 
migration management mainly from the lenses of ensuring security on the EU-territory. 
The EU itself has already taken steps towards pushing other dimensions on its agenda, 
such as HR of migrants. When in the Commission stated in September 2005 that 
Europe, not individual MS should be the main actor in policing deportations and Franco 
Frattini, the Commission’s vice-president, proposed that temporary custody under 
immigration laws should not last longer than six months. Furthermore, there was a 
proposal to demand an oath of faithfulness to European laws and the charter of 
fundamental rights. Britain opposed this idea on the grounds that national citizenships 
exist and suffice. In effect, such an oath would be a way to generate a European 
supranational citizenship. And Britain is not willing to give up its anti-terrorist laws.244
There is an increased recognition that migration is just as intimately linked with 
development as with security. The problem is that it remains unclear what consequences 
can be expected from supporting the economic development in main countries of origin, 
for example on the African continent. When living under the poverty line, potential 
migrants do not have the possibility to get on the move; if getting richer, this possibility 
would therefore open up and would have the opposite effect of what was aimed at— it 
might actually support migration. In a very long-term perspective developing countries 
would be able to provide sufficient incentives for their nationals to remain in the country. 
But this presupposes also better law enforcement, in order to erase root causes (wars, 
genocides...) for refugees. When looking at the global level however, it has to be 
acknowledged that it is especially Western European countries that fear for their capacity
244 N. Watt, “EU calls for agreed rules on deportees” (02.09.2005), The Guardian, Available [online]:
01.03.2006, on: http://www.guardian.co.Uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1561317,00.html
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of keeping migration flows in line, whereas it is developing countries which carry the 
main ‘burden’ of migration and especially refugee flows, as the example of Rwanda, 
Burundi and the DRC show. Furthermore, another main cause root for migration remains 
environmental catastrophes, which are by definition not “manageable”, but can have just 
as many damaging and life-threatening impacts as security.
Migration pressure is therefore not easily manageable, because despite being a 
global phenomenon, it has such a variety of causes, implications and far-reaching effects 
(even on the very identity of peoples) that measures have to be just as encompassing. 
The focus on security stems from its being at the core of state responsibilities, as 
mentioned before. Understandably, it is subconsciously thought that something can and 
has to be done against terrorism or negative impacts of irregular migration in a 
Hobbesian ‘homo homini lupus’ perspective. The main enemy of the human being -  next 
to environmental catastrophes -  remains the human being itself.
Yet it is not enough to focus on the one security aspect of migration, even when 
tackling the issue internationally among states, which retain the main decision-making 
power in the end. The inherently problematic feature of migration remains the fact that it 
is both uses the increasingly open channels of liberalising, global markets and wants to 
be controlled at the same time. If extending this argumentation line to its end, anti­
migration movements could even lead to the emergence of a counter-liberal ideology, 
calling for a ‘shutting down the borders again’, thereby reinforcing state entities at a time 
when borders are abolished.
Despite an increasing recognition that migration can be also efficiently managed 
through supporting development in countries of origin among migration experts, security 
remains the priority link to make for heads of government, as the Pan-European 
ministerial conference shows (24/25 January 2006 in Brussels). Its aim was to “shape 
coherent and transparent migration-related polices aimed at improving security, migrant 
rights and promoting greater economic development and prosperity within the region 
(...)”. Significantly, foreign and interiors ministers were invited by the organizers of the 
conference (IOM and the Belgian government currently chair of the OSCE), as well as 
representatives of international organisations. Indeed, migration generally falls under the 
areas of competence of the ministers of the interior, but is increasingly a foreign policy 
issue. Blurring external and internal dimensions is the most important link towards the 
migration— security discourse. As a result, main conference themes tackled coherence in 
migration policies and its impact on migration management, security, democratisation 
and improving common prosperity in the OSCE region. IOM Director General McKinley 
said that the conference would especially deal with the security challenges of irregular
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migration, but would also discuss legal labour migration. On the issue of border 
management per se, the participants at the conference stated that “(...) border systems 
and high quality travel document security should not be seen only as means o f limiting 
migration [but as] essential tools for facilitation o f movement.” Furthermore, border 
management needs to remain a tool among others, such as policy and legal instruments. 
This conference is to be followed by one in Vienna in May 2006 to give new impetus for a 
EU external strategy on migration and security issues. It will be interesting to see how 
this will develop further.245
Remaining problems are lacking implication for migrants’ rights and large anti­
migrant positions among the population, too big an incentive for politicians to insist on 
the visible security aspect of migration. Effective practices next to strengthening national 
security enforcement and risk evaluation systems are to share information collectively, to 
make public campaigns against the underlying bogus image of migrants (also 
recognizing their positive contribution on the labour markets), to protect migrants’ rights 
and respect the use of personal information and, finally, to accept cultural diversity in 
order for societal integration of migrants to be a goal and not a duty. Some CDU 
politician stated that the new arrivals have to show their wish to become German— but 
Germany (and this is true for all the states) also has to show that they are actually 
welcome. For if irregular migration can have the most dramatic effects if taken abuse of, 
migration has always existed and is also enriching for international society.
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í[ Brussels - 3/6/2006 2:39:30 PM
tet: EU Response to Terrorism
; EU Leaders Adopt Terrorism Action Plan
(cation Date: 26 March 2004
nary:
meeting held on 25 March 2004 in Brussels, the EU Head of States and Governments adopted an ambitious package of 
Srrorism measures aimed at showing a united Europe in wake of the recent terrorist attack in Madrid. EU leaders agreed on 
of measures proposed by European foreign and interior ministers, with the objective to improve security in the EU through 
oordinated action. The lack of cooperation between their intelligence services and the police is mentioned as one of the 
shortcomings in anti-terrorist cooperation.
leaders agreed a number of steps, including:
i setting up of a database containing criminal records, lost and stolen passports and visa applications;
: introduction of visas by making them computer-readable, including biometric facial features, by the end of 2005 for all 
ountries;
implementation of already-agreed upon counter-terrorism measures, such as a pan-European arrest warrant, harmonising 
ties for terrorist crimes, and the freezing of assets held by outlawed groups;
retaining of all telecommunications data, including mobile phone records, for an agreed minimum time to enable 
igence agencies to track calls;
i implementation 30 June 2004 in all Member States the EU action plan against terrorism agreed to after the 11 September 
is in the United States. This includes the European arrest warrant, joint investigations and anti-money laundering 
ures;
boosting of cooperation between police and justice officials in EU Member States;
drafting of EU-wide rules on retention of phone and Internet records for use by police in investigations for up to three
»
consideration that Eurojust should be used to the maximum to the purpose of co-operation in a cross border terrorism
E
linking of trade and aid agreements with third countries with their compliance in enforcing anti-terrorist measures;
strengthening of Europol's anti-terrorism task force and setting up an EU border control agency by 2005 to co-ordinate 
ms security;
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e adoption of a NATO-style 'solidarity clause' pledging that a terrorist attack against one Member State is considered an 
;k against all. The nation under attack will be benefiting from military and other assistance.
EU leaders instructed ministers to accelerate the development of the EU shared data-base of visa seekers that would 
rmine whether a foreigner is allowed to enter the EU. Lower-level ministers have been instructed to propose common rules 
mtcrnet providers on how long e-mail messages should be retained. Common rules are expected to be adopted by 2005.
EU leaders also appointed former Dutch deputy interior minister Gijs de Vries as a main EU representative/co-ordinator for 
X)rism. They called on Javier Solana to present during their next EU summit in June 2004 to present a proposal for 
grating the "intelligence capabilities" into the EU Council Secretariat. They also instructed the European Commission to 
id up development of a system that would allow the police to access a Pan-European Database of DNA, fingerprints and 
data.
nmentary: Regional Representative Peter von Bethlenfalvy of IOM Brussels reiterated the importance for establishing a 
rammatic action against terrorism that would at the same time provide effective measures to protect potential victims and 
note the creation of legal provisions for the just indemnification for victims and their next of kin.
úle condemning all terrorist atrocities, IOM also wishes to prevent □ by all means □ overreactions towards migrants and 
1 country nationals who may be affected by xenophobia and discrimination," stated Mr. von Bethlenfalvy. "IOM welcomes 
lew initiative taken by the EU Summit and the Irish Presidency and wishes to give the best possible support for a balanced 
cy and action against terrorism and its root causes. □
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feet: Border Control
I Inauguration of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States
í “ 1*0" 04 July 2005
ľ*
p a ry :
0 June 2005 the Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security and 
embourg Justice Minister Luc Frieden, on behalf of the EU Presidency visited the European Agency for the Management of 
rational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX Agency). During the European Council of 
April 2005 Warsaw was formally selected as the location for the Agency Ds headquarters while on 25 May 2005 Colonel 
aLaitinen of Finland was appointed as Executive Director of the Agency. Commander-in-chief of the Royal Marechaussee 
ze Atte Beuving of the Netherlands and Major General Jozsef Bendek of Hungary were elected Chairperson and Deputy 
irperson respectively. The Agency will be steered by a Management Board, whose decisions are taken by a 2/3 majority of 
members. The Agency will have a staffing up to 57 people for 2005-2006, consisting of 26 officials or temporary staff, 
iding Executive Director and his deputy, and 24 detached national experts from the Member States and 7 contracted staff.
ne with the priorities set out in the Hague Programme (European Council of 4-5 November 2004), the Agency will 
dinate/assist the competent services of Member States responsible for implementing the Schengen acquis on control of 
ons at the external borders. In particular, the Agency will be entitled to:
Coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders;
Assist Member States on training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; 
Carry out risk analyses;
Follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders;
Assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; 
Provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations.
mdget for the Agency is -> 6,28 Mio for 2005 and 9,95 for 2006. The European Commission has also proposed an amount 
JO Mio for 2007, —>25 Mio for 2008 and -i30 Mio for the years after.
th this Agency [1 stated Vice President Frattini and Minister Frieden, Dwe have finally in place at European level an 
lent operational cooperation mechanism for the national border guards. The visit to the external border has further 
gthened our confidence in our capability to establish and maintain an area of freedom, security and justice for everyone 
; in the EU. The spectre of international terrorism, the human tragedies of victims of trafficking and the equally sad and 
! consequences of illegal immigration into the EU, are constant reminders that we need to do even more to combat the 
'f and diverse threats facing this area ľ].
President Frattini added: flThe European citizens rightly expect us to find efficient solutions to these security problems, 
pese solutions must always fully respect human rights and preserve the integrity of the common, free travel area provided 
e Schengen cooperation □.
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3— § 53 Ausländergesetz— Abschiebungshindernisse
(1) Ein Ausländer darf nicht in einen Staat abgeschoben werden, in dem 
fur diesen Ausländer die konkrete Gefahr besteht, der Folter 
unterworfen zu werden.
(2) Ein Ausländer darf nicht in einen Staat abgeschoben werden, wenn 
dieser Staat den Ausländer wegen einer Straftat sucht und die 
Gefahr der Todesstrafe besteht. In diesen Fällen finden die 
Vorschriften iiber die Auslieferung entsprechende Anwendung.
(...)
(4) Ein Ausländer darf nicht abgeschoben werden, soweit sich aus der 
Anwendung der Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten vom 04. November 1950 (BGB1. 1952 II S. 686) 
ergibt, dass die Abschiebung unzulässig ist.
(5) Die allgemeine Gefahr, dass einem Ausländer in einem anderen 
Staat Strafverfolgung und Bestrafung drohen kônnen, und, soweit 
sich aus den Absätzen 1 bis 4 nicht etwas anderes ergibt, die 
konkrete Gefahr einer nach der Rechtsordnung eines anderen 
Staates gesetzmäBigen Bestrafung stehen der Abschiebung nichts 
entgegen.
(6) Von der Abschiebung eines Ausländers in einen anderen Staat kann 
abgesehen werden, wenn dort fur diesen Ausländer eine erhebliche 
konkrete Gefahr fúr Leib, Leben oder Freiheit besteht. Gefahren in 
diesem Staat, denen die Bevôlkerung oder die Bevôlkerungsgruppe, 
der der Ausländer angehôrt, allgemein ausgesetzt ist, werden bei 
Entscheidungen nach § 54 berucksichtigt.
Source: Bundesamtfur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Referát 125— Statistik. Nurnberg: BAMF, p. 40
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Policejní prezídium Dolní Bavorsko/Horní Falcko 
prezentuje hraniční situaci 2005
„Pátrací f iltr“ též po rozšíření EU na východ je významný 
Klesající tlak migrace 
Vzrůstající záchyty drog 
Spolupráce s českou pohraniční policií prokazuje vzrůstající efekty synergie 
Údaje statistických hodnot: (loňská čísla v závorce)
23. března 2006 představili v Rozvadově na hraničním přechodu, dálnice, Policejní 
prezident Hans Junker a Policejní ředitel Josef Heisl (Řezno) hraniční situaci 
2005 na bavorsko/české hranici.
Již tradičně byl pódiovým hostem vedoucí České pohraniční policie pan ředitel, 
plukovník JUDr. Jindřich Urban (Praha). Oba dva regionální ředitelé České 
pohraniční policie, pan ředitel, plukovník Ing. Pavel Vosickv (Plzeň) za Západočeský 
kraj a pan ředitel, plukovník JUDr. Miroslav Zidek (České Budějovice) za Jihočeský 
kraj, které spojuje již  dlouhá léta úzká spolupráce s panem Junkerem a panem 
Heislem, byli vnímaví posluchači, kteří se zájmem konferenci sledovali.




• Pátrání po osobách a předmětech
• Padělání listin
• Krádeže vozidel
• Nedovolený vývoz omamných látek a jedů
• Dopravní situace
• Spolupráce s Českou Republikou
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Ilegální vycestování/zločinecká migrace
Na bavorsko/české hranici, dlouhé 356 kilometrů, zadrželi společně policie, Spolková 
policie a pohraniční celní služba v loňském roce dohromady 1416 osob (rok 2004: 
1.435, 2003: 1.863), které ilegálně vycestovaly nebo byly převedeny přes hranice. 
Trestné pokusy mají podíl 869.
Z počtu 1416 zadržených osob, bylo 1.219 (rok 2004: 1.127) osob zadrženo 
služebnami pohraniční policie, to znamená zvýšení o 8,2.%.
Dohromady prokazuje počet zadržení na bavorsko/české hranici v posledních 
letech klesající tendenci. To platí obvzláště v oblasti „Zelené hranice“. Ubývající 
počet zadržení byl též zaznamenán na bavorsko/rakouské hranici, kde bylo 
registrováno 3.037 (3.595) ilegálních přejezdů.
Úředníci pohraničních policejních inspekcí vyřešili na 19-ti bavorsko -  českých 
hraničních přechodech v roce 2005 27 případů ileg. migrace (2004: 50; 2003: 34; 
2002: 34) a zjistili 106 převáděných osob (2004: 215; 2003: 203; 2002: 121). Oproti 
loňskému roku se přesunul počet vyřešených případů z hraničních přechodů na 
„Zelenou hranici“. Důvodem by mohly být intenzivní kontroly na hraničních 
přechodech, které se provádí cílevědomě a často společně s českou policií.
Společně se Spolkovou policií bylo na bavorsko/české hranici vyřešeno v roce 2005 
73 (92) případů migrace a zjištěno 78 (92) převaděčů, kteří převedli 232 (2004: 390; 
2003: 528; 2002: 311) osob do Německa. Taktika převodů se v posledních letech 
změnila, z rozsáhlých převodů na malé převody a skupinové životu nebezpečné 
přejezdy s nákladními vozy, byly zaznamenány jen výjimečně.
Registrované ilegální přejezdy se snížily o 20,7 %.
Národnost ilegálních cestujících/převedených osob
Na hraničních přechodech se pokoušeli o vycestování do Německa převážně státní 
občané Bulharska a Rumunska, přičemž na „Zelené hranici“ byli zadrženi Spolkovou 
policií občané Ukrajiny a Číny.
Hlavním bodem pro nedovolené překročení přes “Zelenou hranici” je neustále 
úsek Selb/Bärnau/Waidhaus. Tím, že počet všeobecně neustále klesal, byl zjištěn 
vzrůst migračního tlaku na hraničních přechodech resp. pozoruhodný vzestup 
(+42,6%) nedovolených přejezdů/pokusů na hraničním přechodu Rozvadov BAB A 6.
Důvody pro klesající zadržení ilegálně cestujících a ilegálně převáděných osob 
jsou m.j.:
ve všeobecném měřítku, ve spolkovém měřítku a v celošengenském měřítku 
zjištěná ustupující migrační tendence v Evropě
klesající atraktivita Německa jako země cílová a její vývoj k zemi tranzitní 
harmonizace EU práva a s ním spojené zjednodušení cestování pro členy 
států zproštěných vízové povinnosti (obzvláště Rumunsko a Bulharsko) 
restriktivní využití azylového práva a z toho rezultující malý počet uznání
- stoupající počet zadržených osob policií sousedního státu Česká Republika
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Zákaz vycestování
Počet zákazů vycestování ubyl v roce 2005 opět o 12,5 % na 1.742 (2004: 1.993; 
2003: 4.327). Rozšíření EU na východ 1. května 2004 se projevilo silně ve statistice z 
roku 2003 na 2004. Na základě toho, že Češi, Poláci a Slováci využívají jako členové 
EU volnost, je jejich zákaz vycestování podle EU práva jen omezeně možný.
Největší počet vrácených osob tvoří státní příslušníci Bulharska a Rumunska, kteří 
nesplňují při kontrolách kritéria Šengenské dohody pro vycestování a pobyt. 
Cestujícím nebylo často možné udat konkrétní cíl, resp. jméno a adresu místa 
pobytu. Nazvaný důvod cesty a prostředky na živobytí připouštěl často 
pochybnosti a opravňoval zákaz vycestování.
Pátrání po osobách a předmětech
Hraniční kontroly vytváří eficientní pátrací filtr. Tak vedla kontrolní činnost na 
hranicích k České Republice dohromady k 7.298 (7.347) osobám se záznamem k 
pátrání. 1.102 (1.356) osob bylo zadrženo na základě národního a 
mezinárodního příkazu k zatčení.
U kontrol zjistily pátrací jednotky též v 503 (575) případech relevantní předměty,
mezi nimi 366 vozidel, 85 listin a 52 dalších předmětů.
Základem popsaných zásahů a výpisů je celošengenská síťová pátrací databáze 
(SIS), ve které jsou hledané osoby nebo předměty zadané.
Paděláni listin
I když osoby, které se zabývají paděláním, pracují neustále profesionálněji a jsou na 
nejnovějším technickém stavu, bylo v roce 2005 zajištěno dohromady 1.042 (1.093) 
padělaných dokumentů. Jedná se o průkazy osobní, řidičské, víza, technické listiny 
a další. Mnohokrát byly zjištěny padělané řidičské a osobní průkazy ve spojení s 
ilegální migrací.
Stálé zpracování a vypracování nových možností padělání, se kterými se zabývají 
zvláště vyškolení kvalifikovaní úředníci (multiplikátoři), obnáší, že kontrolní úředníci 
mají stále aktuální stav informací v oblasti padělání listin. Jen tak může být zajištěna 
vysoká kvalita kontrol na hraničních přechodech.
Krádeže vozidel
Počet krádeží v Bavorsku se pohyboval v posledních letech stále na stejné úrovni, v 
roce 2005 byl zaznamenán citlivý pokles na 4.641 případů (v loňském roce 5.140). 
65%, t.zn. 2.999 (3.319) kradených vozidel zůstává na dále nenalezená.
Stále velmi vysoký podíl kradených vozidel v cizině, jsou vozidla od bavorských 
majitelů, 1.546 případů (1.854), z toho 408 (445) vozidel bylo ukradeno v České 
Republice.
Na hraničních přechodech bavorsko/české hranice se podařilo úředníkům pohraniční 
policie v loňském roce při vycestování zajistit 117 (177) vozidel (krádež, podvod).
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Klesající počet zajištěných vozidel je způsoben převážně tím, že pachatelé se stále 
více vyhýbají hraničním přechodům a používají turistické a vedlejší cesty na „Zelené 
hranici“.
Zjištěn byl přesun k sasko/české hranici. Profesionálně působící skupina ze 
Severních Čech kradla vozidla a motorky a převážela je přes různé hraniční úseky 
na předělání do domácího regionu. Ruská organizace zpracovávala „zákazkovou 
listinu“ pro model BMW X 5, která byla nalezena u jednoho pachatele.
Nedovolený vývoz omamných látek a jedů
Dohromady se podařilo zjistit 714 (2004: 561; 2003: 326) případů drogové 
kriminality.
V České Republice v pohraničí je relativně jednoduché si bez problému zakoupit 
drogy. Ze zhora uvedeného počtu 714 spadá největší podíl na občany Německa a 
České Republiky. Znepokojující pro úředníky na HP jsou jízdy pod vlivem drog. 
Převážně se jedná o jízdy z východu na západ a počet na 730 (534) se zřetelně 
zvýšil (+36%)
Dopravní situace
V loňském roce přejelo 66,8 (63,4) milónů osob a 20,1 (19,5) milónů osobních 
vozidel přes silniční přejezdy na východní hranici k České Republice. To znamená 
mírný vzestup oproti loňskému roku, ale pohybuje se přibližně v pětiročním průměru. 
U těžké nákladní dopravy byl zaznamenán v posledních sedmi letech stálý vzestup.
V roce 2005 bylo registrováno 3,22 miliónů vozidel, v loňském roce 2,68. V roce 
1999 se pohyboval póčet kolem 1,78 miliónů. Střediskem pro přeshraniční nákladní 
dopravu je hraniční přechod Rozvadov -  dálnice, přes který přejelo 1,9 (1,3) miliónů 
vozidel, to je 58% z celé nákladní dopravy na bavorsko/české hranici.
Aby bylo možné zajistit vysokou bezpečnostní úroveň ve vnitrozemí, jsou nasazeni 
na kontrolu nákladní dopravy specializovaní úředníci. Tito “úředníci pro technickou 
kontrolu vozidel (BtŮ)” kontrolovali v roce 2005 41.095 (40.847) nákladních 
vozidel, autobusů a přívěsů.
Počet reklamovaných vozidel byl u 10.319 (8.819). Z toho byl 4.386 (4.128) vozidlům
-  skoro 50% -  zakázán výjezd.
Spolupráce s Českou Republikou
Policejní smlouva o kooperaci a dodatek ke smlouvě o právní pomoci jsou 
neustále základem bilaterální spolupráce. Na tomto základě byla již v roce 2004 
realizována dohoda pro společné zásahy a pokyny ke „kontrolám ruka -  v ruce“
na hraničních přechodech a k tomu potřebné pásmové dohody.
Použití těchto smluv a pokynů u společných hraničních kontrol se potvrdilo a patří již 
k „dennímu pořádku“.
Spolupráce mezi Bavorskem a Českou Republikou se praktikuje a prohlubuje již leta 
na mnoha společných konferencích a u pracovních skupin.
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Důležitý spojovací článek u přeshraniční spolupráce je instituce Pohraničního 
zmocněnce Bavorské policie pro Českou Republiku u Pohraniční policejní 
inspekce Furth im Wald. Funkci splňuje v osobní unii vedoucí Pohraniční policejní 
inspekce ve Furth im Wald.
Aby byla možná co nejrychlejší výměna informací mezi různými útvary, jsou nasazeni 
vztyční důstojníci, kteří konají jejich službu v budově Pohraniční policejní inspekce 
Furth im Wald. Vztyční důstojníci jsou úředníci Pohraniční policie Furth im Wald, 
Spolkové policie a České policie.
Výhody této přímé spolupráce na hranici leží přímo na ruce:
Zaměstanci, kteří ovládají více cizích jazyků mohou přímo a rychle komunikovat, 
používat německé a české informační systémy a tím efektivně a úspěšně potírat 
přeshraniční zločin. 3.141 (2004: 2.696, 2003: 1.825) žádostím mohlo být v 
posledním roce vyhověno.
S východním rozšířením EU 1. května 2004 byl na hraničních přechodech postupně 
zaveden system „ruka-v-ruce-kontroly“. Při společných kontrolách pracují 
německý a český pohraniční úředníci společně, to přináší cenné efekty synergie: 
Policejní informační systémy mohou být společně používány a poznatky obou policií 
mohou být optimálně využity a komunikační cesty jsou nebyrokratické.
V roce 2005 byly na 17-ti z 19 přechodů realizovány „ruka-v ruce-kontroly“. K 1. 
květnu 2006 budou tyto kontroly na přechodu Waidhaus/Rozvadov B 14 též 
realizované. Na přechodu Waldsassen/Svatý Kříž nemůže být kontrolní modus z 
technických a prostorových důvodů realizován.
V říjnu 2004 podepsaná smlouva mezi Policejním prezídiem Dolní Bavorsko/Horní 
Falcko a ředitelstvím Západních a Jižních Čech, české cizinecké a pohraniční policie
o společných akcích a výcviku na hranicích, byla v roce 2005 prakticky realizována: 
Vedle jiného opatření se uskutečnilo 215 německo/českých cílových kontrol a 110 
společných výcviků a postgraduálních kurzů.
Závěr
Též v roce 2005 byly hraniční kontroly důležitým příspěvkem k potírání ilegální 
migrace a přeshraničního zločinu. Tato úspěšná bilance ovlivní přípravné opatření, 
které je vzhledem k brzkému Ženskému vstupu České Republiky a s ním zrušení 
hraničních kontrol zapotřebí učinit. Personální a hmotné zdroje musí být včas 
přesunuty, musí být určeny přehledné jednací a rozhodující stupně, a nalezeny nové 
cesty přeshraniční spolupráce.
Zločinci jsou stále pohyblivější a zločin musí být v době bezhraniční Evropy a 
narůstající Šengenské oblasti vzájemně potírán. Naší spoluprací a kontakty s mnoha 
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